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ABSTRACT 
Since 1945 the focus of the principle of self-determination has 
been on decolonization. The remarkable success of the application of 
the principle in the decolonization process has established it as a 
hximan right, a norm of modern international law and (arguably) part of 
jus cogens. With decolonization virtually completed, the question is 
whether self-determination as a right of all peoples should still be 
legally valid in the post-colonial era. In this research the conclusion 
is reached that international law neither recognizes nor prohibits self-
determination as a right in the post-colonial context, and that the law 
is in this sense "neutral". 
The neutrality of international law on the subject does not prejudge 
the issue as to the desirability of a recognition of the right in the 
post-colonial context. A fortiori it necessitates a rational analysis 
of the role of self-determination in the context of decolonization and 
the potential of the principle in the pos.t-colonial setting with the view 
to regulating competing claims. To this end, the research analyses the 
function of self-determination in decolonization and arrives at the con-
clusions that, within that context, self-determination is a putative 
remedial right aimed at remedying a specific form of human relations 
manifested by domination, exploitation and (or) a general denial of human 
rights. In the light of this, the research advances the thesis that in 
the post-colonial context, where inter-communal relationships in a 
sovereign state are characterized by similar trends of domination and 
denials of human rights, the application of self-determination could be 
a useful remedy. It also indicates that, as an inherently democratic 
principle, self-determination could be used to settle certain types of 
territorial disputes. 
Using the relationship between human rights and self-determination 
as the normative basis for a community policy on post-colonial self-
determination, the research recommends a set of substantive and procedural 
^v. 
prescriptions on the support for or rejection of specific claims. 
The first two chapters of the research deal with the emergence of 
self-determination as a right in international law and its application 
in the colonial context. Chapter Three discusses the relationship 
between self-determination and other norms of international law, namely 
territorial integrity, domestic jurisdiction and the use of force (within 
the context of decolonization). In all,the first three chapters 
define the confines of self-determination as lex lata. 
Chapter Four addresses the issue as to whether self-determination 
exists as lex lata beyond the context of decolonization and concludes 
that it does not exist. Chapter Five is devoted to a normative inquiry 
into the desirability of recognizing a right of self-determination in 
the post-colonial context. The chapter draws the conclusion that in 
view of the persistence of competing claims usually accompanied by con-
flicts of international dimensions, and in view of the relationship 
between human rights and self-determination, it is desirable to recognize 
the right, at least in cases that involve gross deprivation of human 
rights (e.g. genocide). 
Chapter Six is devoted to a discussion of separatist movements 
that seek a right of self-determination in the post-colonial context. 
In Chapter Seven, human rights as the normative basis for a community 
policy on post-colonial self-determination is discussed. On the strength 
of the discussion, recommendations are made as to which claims should 
be supported and which claims should be rejected. It is also recommend-
ed that as a means of expressing popular will, the principle of self-
dtermination could be useful in the settlement of territorial disputes 
that involve transfer of populations. Chapters Eight and Nine deal 
with the substantive and procedural conditions that must precede the 
support of a claim for self-determination in the post-colonial 
context. 
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INTRODUCTION 
THE MEANING AND INTERPRETATION 
OF SELF-DETERMINATION 
Of the ideas, concepts and principles evolved in the twentieth 
century few have produced an impact so great as that of "national 
self-determination". It emerged as a recognized principle of inter-
national relations as far back as WWI. However, self-determination 
as pursued by various groups today is principally articulated in 
declarations by the United Nations. It is therefore intended to adopt 
the basic United Nations' definition as the basis of our discussion. 
In standard United Nations literature, self-determination is defined 
as the "right" by virtue of which a people "freely determine their 
political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural 
2 development". The United Nations' definition is relatively new; and 
is usually interpreted narrowly in relation to colonial territories 
to mean the right to freely establish an independent state or to merge 
3 
or associate with an existing state. 
Despite its narrowness, the United Nations' definition is basic-
ally a reflection of previous statements on self-determination. 
During WWI, for instance. President Wilson defined it in 
4 
terms of "liberty and self-government of all peoples". The Bolsheviks 
1. Ofuatey-Kojoe,Self-Determination in International Law (1977),96. 
In the course of WWI itself, the principle received a great deal 
of attentions (see pages 6-7 infra). There is however little 
agreement as to the period of origin of the principle (see notes 
12 and 13 , Chapter One). 
2. This definition was first adopted in 1952 by the United Nations 
Commission on Human Rights (page 13 infra). However, the text, of 
which the definition formed a part was not approved by the General 
Assembly until 1966. Since 1952, the definition has been used 
frequently in many United Nations' pronouncements on the 
principle (pages 13-16 infra). 
3. Note 6 infra; see also page 38 infra. 
4. Quoted in Scott, Official Statements of War Aims and Peace 
Proposals (1921), 1105. 
XTV. 
also saw it as the right of every nation to arrange its life accord-
ing to its own will. The principle so defined, encompasses the 
elements of human dignity and human identity. Its relationship with human 
identity concerns those qualities that distinguish a people from 
others. It emphasizes the parochial factors that are intrinsic to 
natural human groups (such as the family, the tribe, the clan, the 
village, etc.). The element of human dignity on the other hand relates 
to those attributes shared by all peoples. It refers for example, to 
the common human desire for freedom and the parochially-centred moti-
vations among these groups to control their own social, economic and 
political affairs. Self-determination is thus a broad concept, the 
scope of which covers a wide spectrum of human organizations in differ-
ent situations. The narrow interpretation usually adopted by the 
United Nations (i.e. in relation to colonial territories) fails to 
take account of the diversity of human organizations and the relevance 
of the principle to their different circumstances. 
While retaining the basic ideological meaning of self-determina-
tion postulated by the United Nations, the principle can be given broad 
interpretations depending on the peculiar disposition of the benefici-
aries. We have indicated that for a people under colonial rule (and 
indeed under any form of alien rule or occupation) the principle implies 
the right to freely create an independent state of their choice or to 
merge or associate with an existing state. In the case of an independ-
ent state, self-determination means equality with other like entities 
Stalin, Marxism and the National and Colonial Questions, 19. 
See also Cobban, The Nation State and National Self-Determination 
(1969, Fontana ed.), 39. 
It is in this sense that the principle is explained in General 
Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV) in relation to peoples under 
"alien subjugation". It is also in this sense that self-determin-
ation is used in Resolution 1541 (XV) Annex (see particularly 
Principle VI). Generally, all non-self-governing peoples' right 
to self-determination comes under this meaning. The right of 
Palestinians to self-determination could also be in this sense. 
XV. 
7 
in international relations. It also related to freedom from external 
interference in the administration of its internal affairs. This 
interpretation of the principle is particularly relevant to "politic-
ally independent states which (need) protection from external pressure, 
o 
threats and the use of force and subversive activities". 
Self-determination could also have economic relevance to a sovereign 
state. In this regard it denotes the right of a state in a condition of 
economic siobordination to recover full sovereignty by acquiring complete 
control over its own natural resources even if this (means) expulsion 
9 
or nationalization of certain (i.e. foreign) undertakings subject to 
rules of international law. This aspect of the principle is usually 
described as economic self-determination. Self-determination in 
this regard also implies the notion of permanent sovereignty of a 
11 
state over its natural resources. 
7. Kelsen's discussion of Article 1 and 55 of the U.N.Charter. He 
argues basically that even though "self-determination" of the 
people usually designates a principle of internal policy and the 
principle of democratic government; the use of the terms in both 
articles refers to "sovereign equality" (The Law of the United 
Nations. A Critical Analysis of its Fundamental Problems (1951),50-
53) . - .. . . 
8. Eagleton, S-elf-Determination in the United Nations, Vol. 47, 
A.J.l.L. (1953) , 88, 90. 
9. Cited id., 91. 
10. G.A. Res. 3281 (XXIX); 1314 (XIII); 626 (VII); 1803 (XVII); 2158 
(XXI). See also Umozurike, 204-223; Umozurike, "Nationalization of 
Foreign Property and Economic Self-Determination", Journ.of African 
Law (1972), 79; Brownlie, "Legal Status of Natural Resources", 
Hague Recueil, Vol. 162 (1979), 249; Onejeme, "The Law of Natural 
Resource Development", Syracus Journ.Int'l.L. and Comm.(1977-78),1. 
Sornarajah, "The Myth of International Contract Law", Journ.World 
Trade Law, Vol. 15 (1981), 187. 
11. On the broad notion of permanent sovereignty over natural resources 
and its implications^see generally, Gess, "Permanent Sovereignty 
Over Natural Resources", I.C.L.Q. (1964), 398; Akinsanya, "Perman-
ent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources and the Future of Private 
Foreign Investment in the Third World", I.J.I.L., Vol.18 (1978),175; 
Schwarzenberger, "The Principles of International Economic Law", 
Hague Recueil (1966), 117; Hyde, "Permanent Sovereignty Over 
Natural Wealth and Resources", A.J.I.L., Vol.50 (1956),854; Sapozhni-
kov, "Sovereignty Over Natural Wealth and Resources", Sov.Y.B.I.L. 
(1965); De Waart, "Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources as 
(contd) 
3:v^. 
Within the sovereign state, self-determination for a people 
could mean the right of the majority to determine the government they 
12 
wish to live under through periodic elections. Similarly, the right 
of such a majority to change their government through a revolution is 
also an expression of the right to self-determination. 
The principle can be interpreted in terms of claim rights against 
the state. For minorities or racially disadvantaged groups, the prin-
ciple implies the right to equality and participation in the national 
political process and the right to recognition of their cultural ident-
ity. It also means the right to self-administration over issues direct-
13 ly relating to their racial well-being. Disaffected groups with 
definite territorial bases demand self-determination as a right to 
regional autonomy. This interpretation is sometimes labelled internal 
self-determination or autonomism. Such groups usually accept central 
authority over certain aspects of national life but advocate local 
14 
control over local administration. Other groups however do demand 
complete secession from their parent states. To these groups, the prin-
ciple of self-determination implies a right of a people to freely 
separate from the parent state and to determine the government it 
chooses to live under. It is in effect a right to secession. 
Thus to all these groups, self-determination implies a right of 
separation in one form or the other. For the purposes of our discussion. 
11. (contd) a Cornerstone of International Economic Rights and Duties", 
Netherlands Int'l.L.Rev., Vol. 25 (1977), 304. 
12. Rosalyn Higgins suggests that "the right of self-determination 
is the right of the majority within an accepted political unit 
to exercise power". Higgins, The Development of International 
Law Through the Political Organs of the United Nations (1963), 105. 
13. The Australian Aborigines and the Black Americans are presenta-
tive of such groups. 
14. Examples are the French Corsicans, and the Catalans of Spain. 
15. Examples of such groups are the Eritreans, the Basque people, 
the people of the Ogaden, the Biafrans and the people of the 
Southern Sudan, the Quebecians and the Tamils of Sri Lanka. 
X:DVI. 
all these groups will be referred to as "separatists". The broader 
interpretation of self-determination as in respect to them would be 
called separatism or separatist self-determination. 
Clarification of Basic Terms 
The focus of this work is on "separation" and separatist self-
determination. The word "separation" is used instead of "secession" 
because not all groups that pursue the right of self-determination 
within a state seek secession or a complete break. As indicated earlier, 
some groups only seek a 'mild' form of separation within the same 
body politic. Thus the generalized teirm 'separation' is considered 
more appropriate. Where a group demands a complete break from the 
parent state, the word 'secessionist' will be used to describe it. 
Separatism is distinguishable from the other forms of self-deter-
mination in many ways. Separatist groups are not states. This ipso 
facto differentiates their interpretations of self-determination from 
those of sovereign states who seek non-intervention, equality and ade-
quate control over their economic and political affairs. Majority-
based self-determination only requires a change in the governmental 
machinery of the same body politic. Separatist self-determination on 
the other hand requires at the least, structural and or constitutional 
changes in the body politic. At the most, separatism, expressed in 
secession, calls for a total change and the creation of a new body 
politic. In these respects, separatism is similar to the interpre-
tation of self-determination within the colonial context. This is 
because under colonialism, self-determination required basic structur-
al and constitutional changes to satisfy the interpretations of the 
nationalists who pursued the goals of statehood or associate statehood 
in the process of decolonization. Nevertheless, it would be a mis-
judgment to consider separatists as colonial peoples and separatism 
xrovvv. 
as anti-colonial. In order to maintain the similarity and the distinc-
tion between separatist self-determination and colonial self-determin-
ation for the purposes of this work, separatism will be referred to as 
"post-colonial self-determination" or "self-deteirmination within the 
post-colonial context". Thus the phrase will be used to refer to 
claims of self-determination made against any sovereign state irrespect-
ive of whether it is a former colony or not. 
The phrase 'separatist group' is used to describe any identifiable 
association of persons within a sovereign state that demands or advances 
a claim for self-determination in the post-colonial context. The 
phrase would be used interchangeably with the term 'claimant' or the 
phrase 'claimant group'. It is important to note that while every 
separatist group may be a claimant, not all claimants are necessarily 
separatist groups. A claimant may sometimes be a sovereign state 
third-party making the demand for, and on behalf of, a group within 
a parent state. The Somali Republic's claim on behalf of the Somalis 
in Kenya and Ethiopia is a typical example of such a case. The phrase 
'parent state' is any state entity against whom a claim is made and 
in whose frontiers a separatist group is habitually resident. 
The Delimitation of the Problem and Research Objective 
Despite the broad interpretations one can attribute to self-deter-
mination , the United Nations has in practice persisted on the narrow 
application of the principle to only colonial peoples. Thus since WWII 
the principle of self-determination has operated principally in rela-
tion to decolonization, supposedly as a matter of international law. 
It has therefore been suggested that legally, after decolonization, 
there is no room for self-determination and that in any case, as a 
*XJ L'tXj • 
matter of international policy, its continued application to separatists 
could be dysfunctional. To this school of thought self-determination 
in the post-colonial context constitutes a dangerous anarchronism 
17 
which could bring in its train, chain-reactions of separatist claims. 
The risk in any such situation is quite definite: an infectious spread 
of post-colonial claims could lead to the dismantling of states and 
foster chaos. 
As a result of a combination of the foregoing reasons, existing 
states do not favour post-colonial self-determination demands general-
ly and secession particularly. As a general practice, the right of 
self-determination in the post-colonial context is denied to claimants. 
This usually generates violent conflicts. The conflicts arise princip-
ally because there seems to be no definite international law rule that 
regulates claims and counter-claims. Thus claim-denial situations 
are characterized by self-help measures. The primary objective of this 
work is to formulate a set of prescriptions which could be used as a 
guide in dealing with present and future claims. 
The choice of our objective is necessitated by a number of factors. 
Empirically, claims for self-determination in the post-colonial context 
with attendant violent conflicts are on the ascendancy. This can be 
demonstrated with the current insurrection in the Indian State of Punjab 
where Sikhs are demanding a separate state, the ongoing conflict in Eritrea, 
the endemic confrontations between Ethiopia and Somalis over the Ogaden, 
the very recent purported secession of Turkish Cypriots, and the violent 
clashes between the Tamils of Sri Lanka and their Sinhalese countrymen. 
The inability of the international community to deal with these cases 
in any effective or consistent manner underscores the need to evolve 
16. See page 173 seq., infra. 
17. Ibid. 
XX. 
practical institutional mechanisms to regulate the claims. 
It has been indicated that by their nature claims of self-deter-
mination in the post-colonial context amount to demands for broader 
interpretations of self-determination. Given the persistence and the 
growing number of these claims, it will be unrealistic to insist on 
the United Nations' practice of restricting self-determination to 
colonial peoples. The recognition of a right of self-determination 
in the post-colonial context, and the evolution of internationally 
acceptable prescriptions for its application could provide a standard 
for assessing claims. It could also minimize self-help measures in 
admitting or dismissing claims and reduce violent conflicts that 
characterize them. Since such conflicts usually attract external 
intervention and threaten international peace and security, their ord-
erly reduction could minimize the threats. In a world where violations 
of basic hximan rights are common, the recognition of a right of self-
determination in the post-colonial context in human rights-related 
situations and the formulation of prescriptions in these respects could 
also contribute towards the promotion and protection of human rights. 
The Status of the Prescriptions 
Conflicts generated by claims to self-determination in the post-
colonial context are essentially political in nature. The role of the 
international lawyer in the resolution of these conflicts is to evolve 
legal postulates that are capable of ensuring order through direct 
political application by the international community. As indicated 
earlier, there seems to be no definite rules on post-colonial self-
determination, this necessitates the evolution of rules on the subject. 
Thus, the prescriptions in this work do not constitute lex lata. They 
are meant to be policy formulations and a basis for a rational 
assessment of claims. Being normative by their very nature, the 
prescriptions are rules de lege ferenda. 
1. 
CHAPTER ONE 
EMERGENCE OF SELF-DETERMINATION 
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW. 
The Principle of Self-Determination Before World War II. 
The notion of the 'right' of peoples to self-rule, with its 
parochial sentiments against alien^- can be traced to the early begin-
nings of the institution of government. However, the term 'self-
determination' is of recent origin. It was first used in the works 
2 
of radical German philosophers in the mid-19th century. The term 
was also used in the report of the London International Socialist 
1. Umozurike, Self-Determination in International Law (1972)(here-
after cited as Umozurike) ,A. For a different opinion 
see Dalberg Acton, The History of Freedom and Other Essays (1907). 
He suggests that in dealing with the evolution of self-determina-
tion the significant date must be 1831. He describes 1831 as the 
watershed year because in his view, before that period alien rulers 
were resisted as oppressors and not aliens.. In other words, they 
were resisted "because they misgoverned (and) not because they 
were of a different race" (284). Lord Acton's views are mislead-
ing. They imply that prior to 1831, groups were quite 
happy to be governed by "aliens" so long as such rulers were not 
oppressive. He disregards the basic human parochial instinct that 
divides communites into 'us' and 'them' and the desire to associate 
with one's own kind. Historically such sentiments have always 
existed and "social leaders have found (the) division into 'us' 
and 'them' a useful, if not always defensible, outlook on human 
existence" (Buchheit, Secession, The Legitimacy of Self-Determina-
tion (1978)(hereinafter cited as Buchheit) ,1. Since primitive 
times, man has maintained his parochial outlook in his clan, tribe, 
village etc. while generally looking on alien institutions with 
distrust .(Kohn, The Idea of Nationalism (1943), 5-6. See generally 
also Hayes, Essays on Nationalism (1926) particularly Chapter 1; 
Macartney, National States and National Minorities (1934), 21-23. 
2. The original term in German is Selbstbestimmungsreaht. Literally, 
the term refers to the "right" to have a "voice" in matters affect-
ing one's "self". In the German Declaration of Rights in 1848, 
the term had been used in this sense as the basis of a policy 
of the voluntary and democratic unification of all Germany 
(Cobban, The Nation State and National Self-Determination (1969) 
(hereafter cited as Cobban, 45). The first English translation of 
the word appeared in one of the resolutions adopted by the Confer-
ence of Socialists from Denmark, Holland, Norway and Sweden, at 
Copenhagen in January 1951. The resolution had called for "the 
(contd) 
3 
Congress m 1896. The evolution of the principle of self-determina-
tion in modern political and legal thought is closely related to the 
institutional development of nationalism and the modern state in 
Europe. Before the emergence of the state, European society was 
principally based on feudal institutions. Territory, as a rule, was 
the property of the king. It was his divine right to dispose of any 
4 
part of his territory at any time as he thought fit. Social organi-
zation was localized and the nation-state, as an organized political 
5 institution,did not exist. These were due to limitations on the 
2. (contd) recognition of the right to self-determination of...nations" 
(Wambaugh, Plebiscites Since the War (1933), 3 note 1; Collins, 
"Self-Determination in International Law, the Palestinians", 
Case W., Res.J.Int'l.L., Vol. 12 (1980), 137, 138. 
3. Lenin, "The Right of Nations to Self-Determination", in Selected 
Works, Vol. I (1947), 564. Shaheen however notes that "the right 
of national self-determination had been proclaimed in the first 
manifesto of the Russian Social Democratic Labour Party at its 
First Congress in 1898, but it was at its Second Congress that a 
clause regarding the right of self-determination of all nations 
forming part of the State was, at Lenin's insistence, adopted in 
the party program. The term had been used principally in relation 
to the non-Russian nationalities in the Russian State (Shaheen, 
The Communist (Bolshevik) Theory of National Self-Determination 
(1956), 1. 
4. Shukri, The Concept of Self-Determination in the United Nations 
{19^5) ,18; Bl\m,Historic Titles in International Law (1965), 1; 
Verzijl, International Law in Historical Perspective, Vol. iii 
(1970), 1-3; Oppenheim, International Law (H. Lauterpacht, ed.), 
(1955, 8th ed.). Vol. I, 545. See generally also Jennings, 
The Acquisition of Territory in International Law (1963); 
Brierly, The Law of Nations, 6th ed. (1963), 162. 
5. In this period, people generally looked upon things not from the 
point of view of nations, nationality or race, but from the point 
of view of religion. "Mankind was divided not into Germans and 
French and Slavs, and Italians, but into Christians and Infidels" 
(Kohn, op.cit., note 1, 79). Even at the beginning of the 15th 
century when the church and institutions of higher learning used 
the term "nation", it did not refer to the nation as a political 
collectivity in the sense that we have today. It was used to mean 
associations representing territorial groups without any regard to 
nationality. Such associations "were nothing but parts of the exist-
ing whole subdivided for practical purposes to express a difference 
of opinion" {id. 107). In fact, at the Council of Constance (1414-
1417) voters were generally divided into four nations, French, 
German, English and Italian. The aim was to represent the major 
(contd) 
3. 
level of technology and the means of communication in the period. 
At the end of the fifteenth century,technological and social develop-
ments in Europe precipitated revolutionary changes manifested in 
improved communciations and changes in the general perceptions of life 
7 
m European society. More significantly, the advances in technology 
also led to the growth and expansion of trade and the emergence of 
powerful merchant classes who advocated the removal of internal bound-
aries of feudal municipalities and the unity of territories under 
o 
the monarch into single exclusive territorial market units. These 
arrangements became the basis of the monarchical state and the fore-
runner of the nation state, in which the merchant classes,having dis-
placed the influence of the monarchy,established themselves in 
authority in the name of the people, calling themselves the nation 
9 
and ruling in the name of the nation. 
5. (contd) political divisions in Europe. Thus the German nation com-
prised Hungarians and Poles while the English also included 
Scandinavians {id. 108). See also Akzin, State and Nation (1964), 
47; Hayes, op.cit., note 1, 4-5. Macartney, op.cit., note 1, 
Chapter 1. 
6. Sabine and Thorson, A History of Political Theory (4th ed., 1973), 
311; Kohn, id. 201; Hayes, id. 31; Akzin also notes that two 
principal reasons accounted for this: on the one hand, the cultur-
al immobility of the large masses of mankind coupled with their 
lack of literacy kept their outlook geared to their immediate 
social group, e.g. tribe, clan, village, etc. On the other hand, 
where loyalties transcended these confines, they were on the basis 
of common religion or dynastic tradition more often than ethnicity 
{id. 49-50). See also Hayes, Political and Social History of 
Modem Europe, Vol. 1 (1924), 36. 
7. These developments comprised the industrial revolution on the 
one hand and the Reformation and Renaissance on the other hand. 
For an analysis of the combined effect of these developments on 
Europe see generally Pollardj Factors in Modem Europe (1907); 
Arthur Slavin (ed.). The New Monarchs and Representative Assemblies. 
Modem Constitutionalism or Absolutism (1964) . 
8. shafer, Nationalism, Myth and Reality (1955), 100-105; Hayes, 
Political and Social History of Europe (1924), 30-38; Woolsey, 
Colbert and a Century of French Mercantilism (1939), 24-25; 
Tilly (ed.), The Formation of National States in Modem Europe 
(1975). 
9. Shafer, op.cit., note 8, 103; Hayes, op.cit., note 8, 69. 
4. 
The basis of the nation-state then was seen as comprising 
"citizens, propertied citizens usually, who inhabited a common terri-
tory, possessed a voice in their common government and were conscious 
of their...heritage and their common interests". The emphasis in 
the nation-state was on the citizens as represented by their 'voice 
in their common government'. It was this voice that was expres-
sed in more manifest terms as the 'will' of the governed; the will 
that had to determine future political association and any peace-
time territorial changes. The 'will' came to be regarded as a 
derivation of the natural rights of man and the basis of legitimate 
government. 
The earliest significant expression of the will of the governed, 
occurred in the British colonies in America where general anti-
imperial sentiments culminated in the American Revolution. The mood 
of the times among the colonists was clearly expressed in the famous 
Declaration of Independence: 
"We hold these Truths to be self-evident, that all Men 
are created equal, that they are endowed by their 
Creator with certain inalienable Rights, that among 
these are Life, Liberty and the Pursuit of Happiness. 
That to secure these Rights Governments are instituted 
among Men, deriving their just Powers from the Consent 
of the Governed, that whenever any form of Government 
becomes destructive of these Ends, it is the Right of 
the People to alter or to abolish it...." 12 
10. Id. 105. 
11. The notion of the "will" was later to be represented in Rousseau's 
thesis on the Volonte general, the common "will". See generally 
The Social Contract (Cole, ed.), Chapt 6 of Books I and II. 
12. On the basis of the Declaration, and subsequent American comir.it-
ment on self-determination, a considerable niomber of authors have 
suggested that the principle took its roots from the American 
Revolution. See Toynbee, "Self-Determination", Quarterly Rev. 
(1925), 317; Barbour, "The Concept of Self-Determination in 
American Thought", Dept. of State Bull., Vol. 32 (1954), 576; 
Murphy, "The Principle of Self-Determination in International 
Relations", id., Vol. 33 (1955), 889; Rivlin, "Self-Determination 
in Dependent Areas", Int.Cone. No. 50/. 195. But see Note 13, 
infra. 
In Evurope, the "will" of the governed received a 
major expression in the French Revolution. The Declaration of the 
Rights of Man and the Citizen issued after the revolution also emphas-
13 ized the primacy of the wishes of the people. 
Given the primacy of the wishes of the citizens as the basis of 
government, it was logical that any territorial transfers had to be 
preceded by the expressed wishes of the people affected. After the 
French Revolution, a common method used to ascertain the wishes or 
the will of the people became the plebiscite. In 1791, it was used to 
determine the xinion with France of Avignon and Vanassin and again in 
14 1792, in the case of Savoy and Nice. Thereafter,the plebiscite 
became established in Europe as a procedural institution for determin-
ing the "will" of nations (usually racial homogeneous groups), in 
13. There is a further class of authors who take the view that the 
French Revolution provided the basis for the principle of self-
determination. See for instance Woolsey, "Self-Determination",A.J. 
I.L., Vol. 31 (1919), 302; Mattern, The Employment of Plebiscites 
in the Determination of Sovereignty (1921), 77; Carr, The 
Bolshevik Revolution "(1917-1922). Vol. 1 (1969), 417. See also 
Sureda, The Evolution of Self-D-etermination: A Study of 
United Nations Practice (1973!^ (hereafter cited as Sureda), 11. 
If one should accept "popular will" as manifested in revolutions 
as the test, then arguably the American Revolution is the starting 
point since it was first in time. However, it needs to be emphas-
ized that there is an inherent risk in using these revolutions as 
the cut-off points for the emergence of the principle. The idea 
of self-determination, like many others, was not formed overnight 
in one massive revolutionary action. It was rather the product 
of social economic and political forces that were prevalent in 
definite historic periods. Admittedly, these forces precipitated 
the great revolutions in France and America. But, to say that the 
idea itself started with the revolutions would amount to disregard-
ing the formative processes of the idea itself. If one addressed 
oneself to the continuous historical forces that shaped the 
principle and the great significance of the formative years behind 
it, it would be impracticable and in any case not prudent to use 
either revolutions as a definite starting-off point for self-
determination. The two revolutions are at best, significant land-
marks in the evolution of the principle and not the sources of 
it origins. 
14. Cobban, 41; Woolsey, op.cit., note 13, 302; Prakash-Sinha, "Is 
Self-Determination Passe?" (Col.Journ.Transnational Law, Vol. 12 
(1973), 260, 265; Kohn, Prelude to Nation States (1967), 35-38. 
6. 
territorial issues. Plebiscites were used as the basis of the new 
Italian Kingdom and the cession of the Ionian Islands in 1863. 
Within the Tiirkish Empire and the Austrian Empire that comprised the 
races of Germans, Slavonians and Macedonians, the concept of the will 
of the people as the basis of government and political association was 
used as a justification for the union of all the fragmented groups into 
homogeneous nations. Hence the inception of Pan Slavic and Pan 
Germanic groupings and the great wave of nationalism that swept 
1 6 
Europe in the middle of the nineteenth century. 
Plebiscites (and for that matter the principle of self-determina-
tion) declined by the late nineteenth centiiry when forceful annexations 
17 
assumed prominence in Europe. However the principle emerged again 
in European international relations with the outbreak of the First 
World War when the Central Powers and the Allies employed it as a 
basis for propaganda to win the support of the annexed and other non-
18 
self-governing nationalities. The Central Powers made political 
19 
capital out of the colonial possessions of the Allies. The latter 
15. Wambaugh, op.cit., note 3, 3. 
16. Thomson, Europe Since Napoleon (Pelican), 326-7. 
17. After 1870 there were only two plebiscites:that of Saint Bathole-
mew in 1877 between France and Sweden and the case of the separa-
•t^ion of Sweden from Norway in 1905. The annexations included the 
Prussian take-over of Hanover (1866), Schelswig (1868), and 
Alsace-Lorraine (1871). See Wambaugh, op.cit., note 3, 3; 
Lecky, Democracy and Liberty (1896), 418. 
18. Macartney, National States and National Minorities (1934),181-182. 
19. The general position of the Central Powers was summed up in 
identical notes issued by Germany and Austria: "If the adversaries 
demand above all the restoration of invaded rights and liberties, 
the recognition of the principle of nationalities and of the free 
existence of small states, it will suffice to call to mind the 
tragic fate of the Irish and the Finnish peoples, the obliteration 
of the freedom and independence of the Boer Repxiblics, the sub-
jection of North Africa, by Great Britain, France, Italy and last, 
the violence brought to bear on Greece for which there is no prece-
dent in history" (J.B. Scott, Official Statements of War Aims and 
Peace Proposals (1921), 44). 
on the other hand declared that they were fighting for the liberation 
20 
of smaller nationalities and the strengthening of democracy. The 
general position of the Allies was siommed up in the words of President 
Wilson: 
"No peace can last or ought last which does not accept 
that governments derive all their just powers from 
the consent of the governed and that no right exists 
to hand peoples about sovereignty to sovereignty as 
if they were property.^ 
Self-determination was regarded as an'imperative principle of action*' 
which was to be the basis of the post-war settlements. 
At the conclusion of the War the principle of self-determination 
was used in the territorial settlements at the Peace Conference 
for the creation of several states in Europe. It 
was also expressed through the Mandate System. In the post-war period, 
the Allies took the view that non-self-governing communities did not 
have a right of self-determination except as it accrued under inter-
national obligations at the Peace Conference or under the Mandate 
System. However, in applying self-determination in the territorial 
settlements, the Allies tended to be selective; generally, they sup-
ported the principle only where it favoured their political or 
22 
strategic interests. This led to the situation of "trapped" minori-
23 
ties in the new states of Europe, and the subsequent introduction 
20. Cobban, 49. 
21. Quoted in Scott, op.cit., note 19. 
22. George, The Truth About the Peace Treaties (1938), 31-32; Brown, 
"Self-Determination in central Europe", A.J.l.L.,Vol.15 (1920), 235. 
23. The new states included Poland, the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and 
Solvenes (Yugoslavia), Czechoslovakia, Roumania, Finland, the 
Baltic States - Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. The Baltic States 
were later to be absorbed into the Soviet Union These new 
states contained trapped minorities whose lot was often worse 
than it had been before the war. At the end of the Peace settle-
ments over 47 million Europeans comprising different races were 
living as trapped minorities. This figure excluded over 10 million 
Jews in Europe and the Russian nationalities. For a statistical 
analysis of the distribution of these nationalities see Baran 
(contd) 
8. 
14 
of the minorities' regime to protect the rights of the minorities. 
The Mandate System, on the other hand, was vitiated by the fact that 
it only applied to the colonies of the Central Powers and not to all 
colonies. Secondly, even though "the wishes of the populations" were 
supposed to be taken into consideration in the administration of the 
Mandates, this requirement applied only to 'A' mandates. The disposition 
of 'B' and 'C mandates was hardly different from that of other colonies 
25 insofar as the principle of self-determination was concerned. 
To siommarize, even though self-determination played a role in the 
post-war arrangements, it was restricted and not regarded as a norm 
of international law or a general right for all peoples. After the 
23. (contd) Heyking, "The International Protection of Minorities -
The Achilles' Heel of the League of Nations", Transactions, 
Vol. XIII (1928), 31-52. See also Brown, op.cit., note 21, 235. 
24. For a treatment of the position of the minorities and the minori-
ties' regime as a whole, see generally Azcarate, National Minori-
ties (1945), particularly Chapter II. Ladas, The Exchange of 
Minorities: Bulgaria, Greece and Turkey (1932), particularly the 
introduction; Stone, International Guarantees of Minority Rights 
(1932); Regional Guarantees of Minority Rights (1933), for a 
survey of the procedures and practices of dealing with the minor-
ity problems; Macartney, op.cit., note 3, particularly Chapter 
VI. Inis Claude, The Protection of Minorities (1955); Evans, 
"The Protection of Minorities", B.Y.I.L. (1923-24), 95, 95-101; 
Mair, The Protection of Minorities (1928), particularly 17-21. 
See also Jungham, National Minorities in Europe (1932); 
Royce, International Protection of Minorities (1933). 
25. In the words of one cynic, the Mandate System was the same old 
hag of colonization which put on a fig leaf and called itself 
mandate (De Madariga, The World's Design (1938), quoted in Claude, 
Swords into Plowshares (3rd edn), 321. On the Mandate System see 
generally Wright, Mandates Under the League (1930); "Sovereignty 
of the Mandates", A.J.I.L., Vol. 17 (1923), 691; Lewis, "Mandated 
Territories, Their International Status", Law Quart.Rev., Vol. 39 
(1923), 458; Batty, "Protectorates and Mandates", B.Y.I.L. (1921-
22), 107-121. In the origins of the Mandate System see Alfred 
Zimmern, The League of Nations and the Rule of Law 1918-1936 
(1938), Chapter VIII. For a critical account of the operation of 
the Mandate System, see Hales, "The Creation and Application of 
the Mandate System: A Study in International Colonial Supervision", 
Transactions^ Vol. XXV (1940), 185-283; "The Reform and Extension 
of the Mandate System. A Legal Solution to the Colonial Problem", 
id., Vol. XXVI (1941), 153. See however, Lee, "Mandates, How They 
are Working", id., Vol. XII (1927), 31-47, for a positive account. 
9. 
'5 C^ 
post-war settlementsfthe principle declined in significance. It 
was not until the eve of the Second World War (WWII) that it was 
27 
revived again. The formation of the United Nations after War was 
to help consolidate self-determination as an international law norm. 
Self-Determination and the United Nations 
In August 1941, the United Kingdom and the United States conclud-
ed the Atlantic Charter in which both parties pledged inter alia that: 
- they seek no territorial aggrandizement or other 
- they desire to see no territorial changes that do 
not accord with the freely expressed wishes of the 
peoples concerned 
- they respect the right of all peoples to choose the 
form of government under which they will live. 28 
After Pearl Harbour, the principles of the Atlantic Charter as incor-
porating self-determination were adopted in the "Declaration of the 
26. Brownlie, "An Essay in the History of Self-Determination" in 
Alexandrowicz (ed.). Studies in the History of the Law of 
Nations (Grotius Society Papers (1969)), 97. After 1930 the few 
cases in which the principle received any serious attention 
included the July 1940 Act of Habana Concerning the Provisional 
Administration of European Colonial Possession in the Americas 
and the case of the British Dominions. Iraq also became 
independent. 
27. The earliest manifestations of the principle in this period 
were implicit in Hitler's exploitation of the many imperfections 
of the post-war territorial settlements, in his campaign to 
build a Greater Germany. See his speeches in this regard in 
Baynes, Speeches of Adolf Hitler (1942), Vol. I, 83, and Vol. ll., 
1568. 
28. The full text of the Atlantic Charter is reproduced in Church-
ill, The Second World War, Vol. Ill (1950), 395. Apparently, 
these pledges were made with particular reference to the Balkan 
States and those European territories to be liberated from the 
Nazi occupation (Ofuatey-Kojoe, Self-Determination in Internation-
al Law {1912)),91. Churchill confirmed this. In his view the 
principle of self-determination as incorporated in the Atlantic 
Charter did not apply to India, Burma or any of the British 
colonies but only to the European States. (Parliamentary Debates 
(Gt. Britain), 374, H.O. Deb-, cols. 67-69-)Churchill emphasized 
this point again in his oft quoted statement that he had not 
"become the King's First Minister in order to preside over the 
liquidation of the British Empire" {London Times, November 11, 
1942). 
10, 
29 United Nations" as the basis for international relations. At the 
conclusions of the war, the principles of the Atlantic Charter were 
accepted as part of the framework for the discussions at the 1945 
San Francisco Conference which led to the formation of the United 
Nations. , 
At the initiative of the Soviet Union, the San Francisco Confer-
ence adopted the development of "friendly relations among nations 
based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-deter-
mination of peoples" as one of its purposes. The principle of self-
determination was subsequently incorporated into Article 1(2) and 
Article 55 of the United Nations Charter. The reference to self-
determination in both articles was however a generalized reference 
to the relations among the members of the United Nations. It related 
to the concept of equality of states and the right of each state 
30 
to adopt its own form of government without external interference. 
With respect to non-self-governing territories, the San Francisco 
Conference viewed self-determination as a principle that encompassed 
either self-government or independence. In other words, self-
determination for non-self-governing territories was regarded as an 
institutional process for acquiring or confering a definite political 
status (i.e. either self-government or complete independence). While 
complete independence meant the acquisition of statehood by the 
beneficiary territory, self-government involved only internal 
31 
autonomy. On the basis of this, the San Francisco Conference 
29. Russell and Mather, A History of the United Nations, Role of 
The United States 1940-1945 (1958), 51-52. The 'United Nations' 
at this stage comprised originally the U.S., U.K. and China and 
22 other states which were at war with either Japan, Germany 
or Italy. Thus the 'United Nations' became the forerunner of 
the United Nations Organization formed after the war. 
30. Kelsen, The Law of the United Nations (1951), 22-24. 
31. For trends in the views expressed at the Conference in this 
regard see U.N.C.I.O., Vol. 10, Doc. 115; Doc. 877. 
11. 
adopted a Declaration Regarding Non-Self-Governing Territories. In 
the Declaration, incorporated as Chapter XI of the United Nations 
Charter, administering powers recognized the "principle that the 
interests of (dependent) territories are paramount and accept as a 
sacred trust the obligation to promote to the utmost within the system 
of international peace and security...the well-being of the inhabitants 
of these territories". 
In pursuance of such recognition, administering powers also pledged 
to "ensure with due respect for the culture of the peoples concerned 
their political, economic, social and educational advancement, their 
just treatment and their protection against abuses". The powers further 
pledged themselves to help the peoples concerned "to develop self-
government" taking due account of the political aspirations of the 
peoples and to assist them in the progressive development of their 
free political institutions. 
Chapter XII of the Charter established an International Trustee-
ship System that covered three categories of non-self-governing terri-
tories: (1) former mandated areas, (2) colonies detached from enemy 
states after WWII, (3) colonies voluntarily placed under the system 
by the administering states. 
Under Article 76 of the Charter, the purposes of the system were 
the furtherance of international peace and security. The system also 
aimed at promoting 
"the political, economic, social and cultural and 
educational advancement of the inhabitants of the 
trust territories and their progressive development 
towards self-government or independence, as may be 
appropriate to the particular circumstances of each 
territory and its people and the freely expressed 
wishes of the peoples concerned." 
The form of independence to be exercised by a territory depended on 
whether it was a trust territory or an 'ordinary' non-self-governing 
12. 
unit. Only the former could exercise a right of self-determination 
leading to complete independence. 
Despite the distinctions between Trust Territories and non-Trust 
Territories the provisions of Chapter XI and Chapter XII were very 
significant because they emphasized the emergence of a new subject of 
the 'right' of self-determination. For the first time the principle 
was considered not only in relation to the nationalities of Europe or 
former enemy territories but to all non-self-governing peoples^ albeit 
in different terms. The incorporation of self-determination in the 
United Nations Charter symbolized an institutional recognition of 
the principle and underscored its role in the post-war world order: 
an order partly based on the ideal that all peoples have the right to 
determine their own political destiny. The Charter's recognition of 
self-determination also provided a basis for nationalist activity in 
the non-self-governing territories. The nationalist movement, coupled 
with the efforts of anti-colonial groups in the United Nations^consti-
tuted a combined assault on imperial status quo and a challenge to 
the legitimacy of colonialism in world order. These developments pro-
vided a favourable international political climate for the process 
of decolonization in the years after 1945. 
Self-Determination as the Basis for Decolonization. 
In the years after the adoption of the United Nations Charter, 
the issue of self-determination for dependent peoples appeared settled 
with the commitments under Chapters XI and XII. However, after 1950, 
liberal groups sought more concessions for dependent peoples generally 
and for those areas not covered by Chapter XII particularly. As a 
basic strategy, the groups demanded a more positive change in the 
entire setting and international frame of mind in which colonial affairs 
13. 
had so far been conducted. They sought a link between human rights 
and colonialism and argued in favour of a "higher law" of decoloniza-
tion in the international sphere on the basis of which total freedom 
32 
could be achieved by all dependent peoples. Anti-colonial groups 
generally called for the speediest possible ending of all colonial 
relationships and condemned utterly any extension or re-establishment 
of colonial rule. To the anti-colonial school, self-determination was 
to serve the purpose of implementing a definite human rights goal -
33 decolonization. 
In the United Nations, the new "higher law" of decolonization 
received its initial expression in 1952 when the General Assembly re-
quested the Human Rights Commission to include an article on self-
34 determination in each covenant on human rights. The Commission 
consequently adopted a draft with the section on the principle as 
follows: 
1. All peoples and all nations shall have the right to self-
determination, namely the right to determine freely their 
political, economic, social and cultural status. 
2. All states, including those having responsibility for the 
administration of Non-Self-Governing and Trust Territories and 
those controlling in whatever manner the exercise of that 
32. See the comments of Emerson : "The New Higher Law of Anti-
Colonialism" in Deutsch and Hoffman (eds), The Relevance of 
International Law (1968), 153-174, particularly at 153-154. 
33. Ibid. For a detailed study of the activities of the anti-colonial 
school and the development of the decolonization process in 
general in the United Nations see Cristescu, The Right to Self-
Determination, Historical and Current Development on the Basis of 
United Nations Instruments. (A study prepared by the Special 
Rapporteur for the Sub-commission on Prevention of Discrimination 
and Protection of Minorities.) E/C N.2/Sub 2/404/Rev./New York 
(1981); Decolonization, publication of the United Nations' Depart-
ment of Political Affairs, Trusteeship and Decolonization, Vol.11. 
No. 6 (Dec. 1975). 
34. G.A.Res. 545 (VI), 5th Feb. 1952. 
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right by another people, shall promote the realization of 
that right in all their territories... 
The draft was significant in the evolution of the principle and the 
general development of decolonization. For the first time no distinct-
ion was made between Trust Territories and Non-Self-Governing terri-
tories. The implication was that self-determination was 
35 
appliccible equally to both categories of territories. 
After the Commission's declaration, anti-colonial groups pursued 
the relationship between colonialism and human rights more vigorously. 
At the Bandung Conference in 1955 it was resolved that "colonialism 
in all its manifestations is an evil which should speedily be brought 
to an end". More significantly, the resolution stipulated that the 
subjection of peoples to alien subjugation, domination and exploitation 
36 
constituted a denial of human rights. The significance of the 
Bandung Declaration lay in the fact that it represented the first 
definitive statement on colonialism and its relationship to human 
rights. Colonialism as a form of hviman relationship was. defined in 
terms of "alien subjugation", "exploitation" and "domination". 
In 1958 and in 1961, the Conference of Independent African States 
meeting in Accra and Addis Ababa, respectively, affirmed the Bandung 
Declaration. The three declarations did not perhaps constitute 
37 
valid international law norms at the time, but they nevertheless 
represented a cumulative assault on colonialism and gave an indication 
of existing thought on the issue of decolonization. 
Within the United Nations, the general state of affairs also 
35. Bokor-Szego, New States in International Law (1970), 20. 
36. The text is reproduced in Mates, Non-Alignment 
Theory and Current Practice (1972), 371-377. 
37. It is however interesting to note that in the Namibia Opinion 
the declarations were cited as one of the basis of the legal 
validity of the principles of self-determination. See the 
separate opinion of Judge Ammoun, I.C.J. Reports (1971), 4, 74. 
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changed. With the admission of fifteen new African states 
the balance between the anti-colonial groups and imperial forces 
changed in favour of the former. The prevailing view of the anti-
colonial group in the General Assembly was siommed up in the words of 
the then President of Ghana, Kwame Nkrumah: "possession of colonies 
38 is...incompatible with membership of the United Nations". 
At its fifteenth Session, the General Assembly adopted the famous 
Resolution 1514 (XV)(Declaration on the Granting of Independence to 
Colonial Countries and Peoples). It repeated the Bandung Declaration 
on colonialism and added other new elements. Thus the first paragraph 
read: 
The subjection of people to alien subjugation, domination 
and exploitation constitutes a denial of fundamental hioman 
rights, is both contrary to the Charter of the United 
Nations and is an impediment to world peace and security. 
Resolution 1514 (XV) is of great significance to the evolution 
of self-determination and the development of decolonization for a 
number of reasons. Firstly, it was supported by an overwhelming major-
ity in the General Assembly, and constituted the first official con-
demnation of colonialism by the Assembly. Secondly, it established 
that colonialism was contrary to the principles of the United Nations 
Charter and linked the realization of the right of self-determination 
with the maintenance of international peace and security. This is 
important because issues affecting the maintenance of peace and 
security are matters of international concern excluded from the pro-
visions of Article 2(7) of the Charter. By implication the resolution 
sought to make the realization of self-determination a matter for 
39 international concern. Thirdly, the resolution affirmed the 
38. Address by Dr. Kwame Nkrumah, 15th Session of the General 
Assembly, 23rd September 1960. 
39. The relationship between self-determination and Article 2(7) 
will be treated in more detail later in the work, see p. U S 
infra. 
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necessity of taking immediate steps to bring colonialism to an end. 
It further paved the path for concerted efforts in the General 
Assembly to end colonialism. To ensure the implementation of the 
directives under the resolution, the General Assembly established the 
Special Committee (of twenty-four members) to monitor the development of 
decolonization. 
After 1950 the General Assembly and the Sec\irity Council followed 
Resolution 1514 (XV) with a consistent series of resolutions on self-
40 determination for all non-self-governing peoples. The high point 
of these resolutions in the General Assembly was the Declaration on 
Friendly Relations adopted in 1970 as Resolution 2625 (XXV). The 
Declaration affirmed the legitimacy of self-determination for decolon-
ization and the right of colonial peoples to seek and receive assist-
ance in their quest for self-determination. 
Despite the distinctions made between self-determination for 
Trust Territories and self-determination for other Non-Self-Governing 
Territories in the Charter, the General Assembly has over the years 
continuously affirmed the right of self-determination for all depend-
ent territories without distinction. In the process, the Assembly 
has, through its resolutions, instituted the development of a decolon-
ization regime quite different from what was envisaged at San 
Francisco. The question is. What is the legal significance of these 
General Assembly resolutions? And, in particular. How do they affect 
the status of self-determination in international law? 
The Status of Self-Determination in International Law 
41 
Even though a number of authorities argue otherwise, a basic 
40. See for instance General Assembly resolutions 1554(XVI),1961; 
1810(XVII),1962; 2131(XX) ,1965; 2105(XX) ,1965; 2160(XXI) ,1956, 
and Security Council resolutions 269(1969); 277(1970) and 282(1970) 
41. See Judge Alvarez in the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case,lCJ Reports 
(1951), 116, 152; Sloan, "The Binding Force of a Recommendation 
(contd) 
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point about General Assembly resolutions is that generally, they are 
in the nature of recommendations and as a rule they are not legally 
42 binding. However, repeated resolutions or declarations on the same 
matter supported by overwhelming majorities, could lead to the emer-
43 gence of a binding rule of customary international law. In the 
light of this, it is submitted that the repeated affirmations of the 
principle of self-determination in the General Assembly's resolutions, 
accompanied by the general international acceptance of the principle 
has led to the crystallization of self-determination into a rule of 
41. (contd) of the General Assembly of the United Nations", B.Y.I.L., 
Vol. 25, 4-5; Johnson, "The Effects of the Resolutions of the 
General Assembly of the United Nations", B.Y.I.L., Vol.32 (1955-5), 
121; Asamoah, The Legal Significance of the Resolutions of the 
General Assembly (1966). Other authorities in this school adopt 
a rather cautious approach on the legal significance of General 
Assembly resolutions. Rosalyn Higgins points out that the 
"Assembly certainly has no right to legislate in the commonly 
understood sense of the word. Resolutions of the Assembly are 
not per se binding", {The Development of International Law Through 
the Political Organs of the United Nations (1963), 5). See also 
Falk, "On the Quasi-Legislative Competence of the General Assembly 
A.J.I.L., Vol. 60 (1965), 782,783. D'Amato, The Concept of 
Custom in International Law (1971), 3-4; Bin Chen, "United 
Nations Resolutions on Outer Space, Instant International Law 
Making", I.J.I.L., Vol. 5 (1965)^  23; Judge Tanaka, South West 
Africa Cases, I.C.J. Reports (1966), 4, 292. Castenada, Legal 
Effects of United Nations Resolutions (1969), particularly 2-5. 
Sir Waldock, "General Course", Hague Recuile, Vol. 105 (1962), 
31-33. 
42. Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, "Hersch Lauterpacht, The Scholar as 
Judge", B.Y.I.L., Vol. 38 (1962), 3; Vallat, "The Competence of 
the United Nations General Assembly", Hague Recuile, Vol.197 
(1959), II, 225,230; Dugard,"Legal Effects of U.N. Resolutions 
on Apartheid", South African Law Journ., Vol. 83 (1966), 44, 45-47. 
See also Judge Lauterpacht in the Voting Procedure Case, I.C.J. 
Reports (1955), 67 at 115; Judge Fitzmaurice in the Certain 
Expenses Case, I.C.J. Reports (1962), 210, and the views of Judge 
Winarski, in the same case at 233. Brierly, The Law of Nations 
(5th edn) (1955 (, 107; Wilcox and Marcy, Proposals for Change in 
the U.N. (1955), 348; Kelsen, The Law of the United Nations (1957), 
195-196. See also Stone, Israel and Palestine Assault on the Law 
of Nations, 1981, Chapter 2, particularly 29-32; P.A.S.I.L., Vol. 
55 (1971), 52; Devine, "The Status of Rhodesia in International 
Law",Acta Juridica, (1974), 109,187; Thirlway, International Custom-
ary Law and Codification (1972), Chapter 5, particularly at 79; 
Jennings, The Acquisition of Territory in International Law (1963), 
82-83. 
43. Judge Tanaka, South West Africa Cases, I.C.J. Reports (1966), 4, 
292; Akehurst, "Custom as a Source of International Law", B.Y.I.L. 
(contd) 
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customary international law. 
At the San Francisco Conference there was the view indi-
cated in the report of the Committee 2 (Commission IV) that if an 
interpretation of a provision of the United Nations Charter given by 
an organ of the organization is generally acceptable, such an 
44 interpretation acquires binding force in international law. In this 
regard, where a General Assembly resolution relating to the interpre-
tation of a particular provision of the Charter is adopted by an over-
45 
whelming majority,the resolution acquires binding force. The General 
Assembly's resolutions on self-determination are in themselves authori-
46 
tative interpretations of the Charter provisions on the principle. 
47 
To the extent that they are adopted by overwhelming majorities, 
they have a law creating effect and are legally binding. 
The principle of self-determination as established by these 
43. (contd) Vol. 47 (197 -75), 1, 5-8; Bleicher, "The Legal Signifi-
cance of Recitation of General Assembly Resolutions", A.J.I.L., 
Vol. 53 (1969), 444, 5. 
44. U.N.C.I.O., Doc. (1945), XIII, 710. 
45. Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law (1979)iherein-
after cited as Brownlie, Principles) 595; Tunkin, Theory of Inter-
national Law (W.E. Butler translation)(1974), 171. But see 
Vallat, op.cit., note 42, 211, for the view that it is as a "law 
applying" and not a "law making" body that the General Assembly 
exercises the function of interpretation. See also Devine, op.cit., 
note 42, 184, for the argument that the General Assembly's inter-
pretations are not final and conclusive but merely evidence in 
favour of a particular interpretation of the Charter, the accuracy 
of which may therefore be contested by states. 
45. Brownlie, Principles, 575; Bleicher, op.cit., note 43, 474-5; 
Sir Waldock, op.cit., note 41, 31. For a different opinion on the 
issue see Yturriaga, "Non-Self-Governing Territories: The Law 
and Practice of the United Nations", Yearbook of World Affairs, 
Vol. 18 (1974), 178, 209, 212; Jennings, op.cit., note 42. 
47. Resolution 1514 (XV) for instance was adopted by a majority of 
89 votes to 0 with 9 abstensions. Resolution 2625 (XXV) was 
adopted without a vote. 
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resolutions therefore has the status of a norm of international law 
and serves as a valid juridical right in decolonization. 
Alien domination which necessitates the right of self-determina-
tion is an ethical issue. However, the development of rules in inter-
national law to ensure and protect the right is a legal and not an 
ethical exercise. Any rules evolved are nevertheless a set of ethical 
values translated into legal postulates. The legal in this case 
however, is only a means and not an end in itself. It requires the 
direct political action of States in the international community to 
48 
make it operative. Given the preponderance of the ethical and poli-
tical elements of self-determination, it is hardly surprising that 
some writers consider it a moral^and at best a political principle. 
Such writers deny self-determination the status of a putative legal 
49 
right in international law. Their views notwithstanding, there is 
considerable authority for the proposition that the right of self-
determination has juridical validity in modern international law. 
In the Western Sahara Opinion Judge Dillard observed: 
48. For a detailed discussion on the relationship between ethics, 
law and political action in respect of group protection, see 
Lador Lederer, International Group Protection (1968), 12. 
49. Green, Report of the l.L.A. (1965), 58; In 1971 however. Green 
admitted thaf'there is...no right of self-determination in posi-
tive international law, although since 1966 there may be one in 
nascendi" (P.A.S.I.L., Vol. 55, 1971), 46. schwarzenberger, A 
Manual of International Law, (1976),49; Emerson, Self-Determin-
ation Revisited in the Era of Decolonization (1964), 63-54; 
From Empire to Nation (1960),307; Eagleton, "Excesses of Self-
Determination", Foreign Affairs, Vol. 31 (1953); Stone, Israel 
and Palestine: Assault on the Law of Nations (1981), Ch.5; 
Devine, "The Status .of Rhodesia in International Law", Acta 
Juridica (1974), 183-209, "There is no legal right to self-deter-
mination and no legal duty to accord it" (208); Ramazini, P.A.S.I.L, 
(1955),51; Gross, P.A.S.I.L. (1965), 451# Bowett describes it 
as a "quasi-legal idea" ("Self-Determination and Political Rights 
in the Developing Countries", P.A.S.I.L. (1956), 129,131). It is 
however important to note that a lot of writers were prepared to 
admit that the principle was perhaps a legal right in nascendi. 
Since most of their assertions were made, some of them could have 
changed their position. See for instance the implications of the 
comments by Emerson in A.J.I.L., Vol. 72 (1978), 696-697. 
20. 
At the broadest level there is the problem of deter-
mining whether the right of self-determination can 
qualify as a norm of international law...I need not 
dwell on the theoretical aspects of this problem... 
suffice to call attention to the fact that the present 
opinion is forthright in proclaiming the existence of 
the right. ^ ° 
In the Barcelona Traction Case Judge Ammoun took this point further 
and noted that the principle of self-determination has the status 
51 52 
of JUS cogens. Even though this view has juristic support it 
remains controversial. 
Apart from these pronouncements by the International Court of 
Justice, a number of publicists also supported the juridical 
validity of the principle. E. Lauterpacht argues that international 
customary law acknowledges the right of self-determination and that 
this provides "the meeting point of customary law towards democratic 
54 principle (s) ". Nawaz describes self-deteirmination as "one of the 
modern principles of international law", while Brownlie emphatically 
56 
states: "the present position is that [it] is a legal principle". 
50. I.C.J. Reports (1975), 12, 120-121. Namibia Opinion, I.C.J. 
Reports (1971). 
51. Separate Opinion, id. (1970)(Second Phase), 304. 
52. Espiell, Special Rapporteur, Implementation of U.N. Resolutions 
Relating to the Right of Peoples Under Colonial and Alien Domina-
tion to Self-Determination. Study for the Sub-Commission on Preven-
tion of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/Sub-2/390, (1977), 17-19. Espiell maintains the same posi-
tion in a subsequent and similar study in 1978. See also the 
study for the sub-commission in 1980. U.N.E/CN.4/Sub.2/403/Rev.l, 
12-13; "Self-Determination and Jus Cogens", Cassese (ed.). U.N. 
Law, Fundamental Rights Two Topics in International Law (1979), 
167; Abi Saab, The Concept of Jus Cogens in International Law (1967) 
13. Alexide, "Problems of Jus Cogens in Contemporary International 
Law",Sov.Y.B.I.L. (1969-70), 148; Brownlie, Principles, 87. 
53. Pomerance, Self-Determination in Law and Practice (1982), 
Chapter XI; Cristescu, op.cit., note 32, 23. 
54. E. Lauterpacht, "Some Aspects of Human Rights", Howard Law 
Journ., Vol. II (1965). 
55. Nawaz, "The Meaning and Range of Self-Determination", Duke 
University Law Journal (1965), 99. 
55. Brownlie, Principles, 259. 
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Similarly/ Rosalyn Higgins argues that it is undisputed "that self-
57 determination has developed into an international legal right". 
The juridical status of the principle is enhanced by its incorp-
oration in the League Covenant, Atlantic Charter, the United 
60 61 
Nations Charter, and other multilateral eind regional treaties. 
57. Higgins, op.cit., note 40, 103. 
58. In the Aaland Island Case, The Commision of Jurists took the view 
that "the principle is not properly speaking a rule of internation-
al law and the League of Nations has not entered it in its Coven-
ant". In another report, a Committee o;f ^ Rapporteurs supported 
this statement (L.N.O.J.,Suppl.No.3 (1920),5-6; Report of Committee 
of Rapporteurs, L.N.Council Doc. B7/21 58/108(VII)(1921),28). It 
must however be noted that both reports only dealt with the general 
application of self-determination in relation to the rights of a 
people within the frontiers of a state. The principle was not 
considered in respect of the rights and obligations within the 
framework of the Mandate System. It is sxibmitted that the Mandate 
System under Article 22 of the League Covenant incorporated the 
spirit,if not the letter of self-determiantion. As an integral 
part of the substantial provisions of the League Covenant, the 
principle of self-determination as expressed through the Mandate 
System^ assumed a legal basis giving rise to definite legal rights 
and obligations. See also Wright, 
Mandates Under the League of Nations (1968),534-35; the "Hyman 
Report", L.N.O.J., I (1920),334-41. This report dealt with the 
legal basis of the Mandate System. It indicated that responsibi-
lity of the League under the Mandate was moral rather than legal 
(338-39). It did not however dispute the legal validity of the 
Mandate System. It must however be pointed out that the validity 
of the principle under the Covenant was in specific relation to 
Mandated Territories only. 
59. The Atlantic Charter was the first instrioment to recognize the 
general application of the principle to all non-self-governing 
peoples. Despite Churchill's initial objections to such a wider 
interpretation under the Charter, the latter played a significant 
role in the evolution of the principle among the Allies through 
the war period and in the immediate post-WWII arrangements. 
See page 9, supra. 
60. Korowicz observes that there is' 
little reason to doubt that the principle is recognized by the 
Charter as a principle of international law, all the more since 
it is combined with equal rights of peoples; and the principle 
of equal rights of states and nations certainly is a principle 
of international law. (Korowicz, Introduction to International 
Law (1959),285) See also Wright, "Recognition and Self-Determin-
ation", P.A.S.I.L. (1954), 30; Hague Recueil, Vol. 98 (VIII)(1959), 
'. 193. The Role of Law (1961), 135; Bokor Szag«, op.cit., note 35, 
25-27. 
61. Such treaties include: The OAU Charter(I.L.M.(1963),756); SEATO 
(U.N.T.S.(1965),28); The Helsinki Accord (A.J.I.L.,Vol.70 (1976), 
417); The Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1952 (U.N.T.S.(1952),157); 
(contd) 
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CONCLUSION 
In its formative years, self-determination was neither a legal 
principle nor a general right recognized for all peoples. Deeply 
rooted in the evolution of the nation-state and nationalism, self-
determination was regarded as a political principle which embodied an 
institutional mechanism for expressing the consent of the governed. 
Even though this democratic element received considerable emphasis in 
the years of the First World War, and was subsequently adopted as a 
guiding principle in the post-war settlements, self-determination was 
not accorded the status of a legal norm. However, developments in 
international relations since 1945 have changed the nature and 
status of the principle. Firstly, the incorporation of self-determin-
ation in the Charter of the United Nations provided the basis 
for the international recognition of the principle as a legal norm. 
This has been manifested particularly in the pronouncements of 
the United Nations and the general acceptance of the principle by the 
members of the organization. Secondly, the exercise of self-determin-
ation has come to be associated with the enjoyment of fundamental 
human rights and the notion of equality of peoples. Within the frame-
work of these developments, self-determination has crystallized into 
a putative legal right and provided the juridical basis for decoloniza-
tion in modern international law. 
Given its inherent democratic ideal as a right of all peoples 
to self-government, its recognition as a pre-condition for the enjoy-
ment of human rights, and its general acceptance as a legal norm, the 
emergence of self-determination after 1945 has not only resulted in 
decolonization, but has also affected relationships beyond the colonial 
51. (contd) The Algiers Declaration (Cassese (ed.), U.N. Funda-
mental Rights (1979), 219-223). 
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context. A basic point about self-determination is that, in all its 
aspects, it involves an inter-play of people and territory. Above all, 
it also regulates the political relationship between peoples. We 
have seen that in its early evolutionary stages the idea of self-
determination was used as the basis for the grouping of nationalities 
that subsequently became the basis of the modern State in Europe. In 
the years after WWl/ the democratic ideal of the principle 
was employed as a guide in the post-war international relations 
albeit to a limited extent. Within the context of decolonization 
(after 1945), self-determination received yet greater emphasis as a 
norm to regulate the relationship between imperial powers and their 
colonies. Out of the process of decolonization, almost all former 
colonies have now become independent and established as sovereign states. 
With the end of decolonization fast approaching, the right of self-
determination of peoples now poses a complex dilemma. As a norm 
founded on democratic principles,is self-determination relevant to 
the relationship between the peoples of a sovereign state? In other 
words, having emerged as a norm in modern international law, the 
difficulty with self-determination is whether it is still a valid 
juridical basis for regulating societal relations in the post-colonial 
context. 
The issue of the validity of self-determination in the post-
colonial context has generated a debate among modern international 
lawyers. Out of the debate there has emerged the view among a consid-
erable number of authors that, as an institutional mechanism for decol-j 
onization, the principle of self-determination is only applicable to 
colonial territories. According to this view, once a colony has 
exercised self-determination, the right cannot be extended beyond the 
context of colonialism. Generally, established practice lends 
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considerable weight to this view. Claims to self-determination by 
"colonial" peoples receive immediate recognition and are considered 
legitimate. On the other hand, there is a general tendency to deny 
recognition to claims by 'non-colonial' peoples. In view of the 
existing dichotomy between 'colonial' and 'non-colonial' people, the 
questions that arise are: What is a colony; what criteria are used 
to decide which territories are colonies; when do we say a colonial 
people have exercised an act of self-determination; what is the role 
of self-determination within the colonial context that presumably 
justifies its confinement to colonial territories? It is proposed 
to address these issues in the next chapter. 
25. 
CHAPTER TWO 
THE ACT OF SELF-DETERMINATION IN 
THE CONTEXT OF DECOLONIZATION. 
1. The Beneficiaries of Self-Determination 
Under Resolution 1514 (XV), and indeed \inder subsequent resolu-
tions on the principle "all peoples have a right to self-determination". 
Thus the beneficiaries of the principle are simply "peoples". As 
one commentator notes in this well-known passage, "on the face of it, 
it (seems) reasonable: let the people decide (their political future). 
It (is) in fact ridiculous because the people cannot decide \intil 
somebody decides who the people are". Who then is a "people" for 
the purposes of self-determination? 
In 1952, the United Nations Third Committee expressed the view 
that a "people" was the multiplicity of human beings constituting a 
nation or the aggregate of various nationalities governed by a single 
2 
authority. This definition is circular and tends to raise a further 
question: What then is a nation for the purposes of self-determination? 
Emerson advises that one must avoid the temptation of defining the 
nation with any precision. He consequently argues that the nation 
can only be determined as existing when it has emerged in full bloom 
and leaves little doubt. Emerson's position tends to beg the question. 
This is because to determine whether a nation has emerged in full 
bloom or not, one must know what constitutes a nation. Cobban on the 
other hand, suggests that "any territorial community, the members of 
which are conscious of themselves as belonging to the same community 
1. Jennings, Approach to Self-Government (1955), 56. 
2. 6 U.N. G.A.O.R., 3rdC'ttee (1952), 300. 
3. Emerson, "Progress and Nationalism", in Philip Thorpen (ed.), 
Nationalism and Progress, In Free Asia, (1955), 717-78. 
25. 
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or wish to maintain their identity" constitutes a nation. 
Claude supports this view when he argues that, 
nationality is in essence a subjective phenomenon -
a group of people constitute a nation when they feel 
that they do...These feelings may be related but there 
is no uniform or necessary pattern of objective factors 
whence a national feeling is derived or in which it 
manifests itself. 
Claude's "svibjective approach" in defining a nation may have a socio-
logical value. It, however, fails to hold good in the face of General 
Assembly practice in decolonization. To ascertain the wishes of "a 
nation" for self-determination, the General Assembly usually uses 
plebiscites. In each such exercise, the nation that is consulted is 
not just a group of people each of whom believes himself to be part of 
a community. There are usually definite objective criteria applied 
to determine who belongs to the nation to be consulted. In the case 
of the Southern Camerouns, one of the interested political parties 
insisted that the "nation" that had to "determine" the territory's 
political future in a plebiscite had to comprise all British subjects 
ordinarily resident within the \init. However, the opposing parties 
argued that a person could only be considered as part of the determin-
ing group if he had either been born in the unit or one of his parents 
had been born in it. The latter view prevailed. In British Togoland, 
a U.N. Visiting Mission to the territory recommended that for the 
7 
purposes of Article 75(b) of The Charter, the "people" who comprised 
4. Cobban,101. 
5. Claude, National Minorities (1955), 2. 
6. A/C/SR.820 (25th Feb. 1959). 
7. Article 75(b) of the Charter of the United Nations provides that 
the basic objectives of the Trusteeship System in accordance 
with the purposes of the United Nations laid down in Article 1... 
shall be to promote the political, economic, social and education-
al advancement of the inhabitants of the trust territories and 
their progressive development towards self-government or independ-
ence as may be appropriate to the particular circumstances of 
(contd) 
27, 
the "nation" which had to be consulted in the plebiscite were only 
8 
those persons who were bona fide residents of the unit. In both the 
Southern Camerouns and British Togoland, we see that the General 
Assembly did not adopt the same criteria to identify the nation. How-
ever, a definite objective criteria was adopted in each case. 
Clyde Eagleton argues that in identifying a nation for self-
determination, the test ought to be the desire of a group to live 
9 
together under their own chosen political system. Eagleton's view 
is more of a normative proposition than a definitive statement. In any 
case, it is doiibtful whether the desire to live together is really a 
determinate factor. In the case of Cyprus, there were obvious poli-
tical, social and cultural differences between Greek and Turkish 
Cypriots. This notwithstanding, the General Assembly looked on Cyprus 
as one national unit for the puposes of self-determinaion. In Kenya, 
too, despite the demonstrated unwillingness of the ethnic Somalis to 
live with the rest of Kenya, the territory emerged as one unit com-
prising the "Kenyan people" to whom independence was granted in 1960. 
7. (contd) each territory and the freely expressed wishes of the 
people concerned.... 
8. T/1218 para. 149. 
9. Eagleton, "Excesses of Self-Determination", Foreign Affairs, 
Vol. 31 (1953), 592-604, at 595. 
10. G.A. Res. 1489 (XV). G.A. Res. 1976 (XVII), the recognition of 
Cyprus as a single unit was however the result of a negotiated 
settlement embodied in a series of agreements between Greece, 
Turkey, the United Kingdom and Cyprus. For a detailed treatment 
of the communal differences in Cyprus see Xydis, Cyprus: Conflict 
and Conciliation 1954-58 (19 ); Kyriakides, Cyprus: Constitution-
alism and Crisis Government (1958); Ehrlich, "Cyprus, the War-like 
Isle: Origins and Elements of the Current Crisis", Stanford L. 
Rev., Vol. 18, (1955-66), 1021,1021-1040; Evrivades, "The Legal 
Dimensions of the Cyprus Conflict", Texas Int'1.L.Journ., Vol. 
10/ (1975), 227. 
11. G.A. Res. 1976 (XVIII). On the reluctance of the Somalis to 
be incorporated into Kenya, see Drysdale, The Somali Dispute 
(1964), 140-142; The Issue of the NFD, White Paper by the Govern-
ment of the Somali Republic (May, 1963) , 10-15. See also the 
Report of the NFD Commission, Command Papers (1962),1900. In 
(contd) 
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Similarly, notwithstanding the differences between Papuans and New 
Guineans, Australia advocated the merger of both territories to form 
12 
Papua New Guinea for independence m 1975. 
In a recent study prepared for the United Nations S\ib-Commission 
on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, 
Gross Espiell attempts to deal with the problem but offers no solutions. 
He admits that "self-determination of peoples is a right of peoples" 
and that even though People and Nation are two closely related prin-
13 
ciples they are not synonymous. More significantly, he argues: 
Modern international law deliberately attributed the 
right to peoples and not to Nations or States. However 
when a People and the Nation are one and the same and 
when a People has established itself as a State, clearly 
that Nation and that State are, as forms or manifestations 
of the same people, implicitly entitled to the right 
of self-determination.1 
According to Espiell then, a "people" sometimes overlaps with the 
"nation". In other words, a "people" may sometimes be the ^ 'nation". 
However, he declines to define in any specific terms what a "people" 
is or when a "people" overlaps with or constitutes a ''nation". He 
consequently fails to explain the definitional criteria the General 
Assembly uses in identifying beneficiaries of self-determination in 
the colonial context. 
In another study prepared for the Sub-Commission, Aureliu 
Cristescu offers a definition of "peoples" and "nations". He notes: 
11. (contd) another piiblication by the Somali Govt, based on the NDF 
Report, it is reported that on the eve of Kenya's independence 
87% of Somali resident population wished to be associated with 
the Somali Republic (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Somali 
Peopled Quest for Unity (1955) , 11). 
12. G.A. Res. 3284 (XXIX). 
13. Espiell, The Right of Self-Determination; Implementation 
of United Nations Resolutions. Report of Special Rapporteur 
of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Pro-
tection of Minorities. E/CN.4/Sub.2/405/Rev./New York (198 ),9. 
14. Ibid. 
"yo, I 
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(a) the term "peoples" denotes a social entity, possessing a clear 
identity and its own characteristics. 
(b) It implies a relationship with a territory, even if the people 
in question have been wrongfully expelled from it and artifi-
cially replaced by another population. 
(c) A people should not be confused with ethnic, religious or 
linguistic minorities whose existence and rights are recognized 
in Article 27 of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights. 
Cristescu's treatment of "peoples" is rather vague and tends to 
avoid the central issues. Does a "social entity" become a "people" by 
reason of the relationship between it and a territory? In the context 
of decolonization, is "people" a social or a political concept? Is 
there a difference between "peoples" and "nations" in analysing the 
beneficiaries for self-determination in the colonial context? If 
there is, then when is a people a "people" and when is a nation a 
"nation" and when do they overlap if they ever do? 
\ In an earlier study prepared by the United Nations Secretariat, 
a "nation" was defined as a term that encompasses colonies, mandates, 
protectorates, quasi-states and states. "Peoples" was defined as 
groups of human beings who may or may not comprise a nation. This 
definition is preferable because it is a more realistic reflection 
of the practice of the United Nations in respect of self-determination. 
The cases of Cyprus, British Togoland, Kenya and Papua New Guinea indi-
1 cate the range of units for which the General Assembly has recognized 
the right. The practice of the Assembly in these cases supports the view 
that a "nation" as a self-determination unit, is a collection of human 
beings (i.e. "peoples") usually confined to a territorial base, the front-
j iers of which coincide with a colonial territory. The beneficiaries of self-
• • ^ _ _ 
51. Cristescu, The Right of Self-Determination, Historical and 
Current Developments on the Basis of United Nations Instruments, 
(1981), 41. 
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determination are the residents of the nation irrespective of their 
cultural or social differences. In other words, even though self-
determination is the "right of peoples" nations as such are the siib-
jects of the right. The nation in this regard is a geopolitical unit, 
often, but not always, historically determined and which may include 
all or part of one or more "people(s)". "Peoples" is an ethnographic 
concept. It is a collection of human beings knit together by a common 
cultural identity, manifested in common linguistic, religious and 
other traditional practices. A "people" may therefore be a tribe, 
an ethnic group, or a linguistic or religious stib-group. 
The relationship between a "people" and a "nation" in the context 
of decolonization is well illustrated in the case of the new states 
of Africa. On the eve of independence, the colonies that were regard-
ed as self-determination units were in fact a collection of "peoples" 
in each case. That is to say, each iinit was usually a cluster of 
heterogeneous tribal groups which had been administered as a single 
colonial polity. In the decolonization process, the ethnographic 
distinctions between the "peoples" and the "nation" assume relative 
significance. The General Assembly is inclined to the position 
that a territory is a prima facie self-determination unit where it 
is identifiable and has a population that shares a distinct identity 
founded on the common political experience of colonization. 
Even though the General Assembly adopts a geopolitical method 
to identify self-determination units in decolonization, it needs 
to be emphasized that this is only a general practice. There have 
been exceptions usually dictated by the interests of peace and security, 
or the peculiar circumstances of the units concerned. In such 
instances, the "nation" as a subject of self-determination is 
not necessarily seen as the single pre-existing colonial unit. The 
31. 
General Assembly may rather take cognizance of the ethnographic or 
religious constitution of the unit in granting or permitting the 
exercise of self-determination. For instance in Palestine, the Gen-
eral Assembly approved what came to be called the Partition Plan for 
16 17 
Jews and Palestinian Arabs. Other examples include the Camerouns 
18 
and the separation of the Gilbert and Elice Islands. The General 
Assembly also impliedly accepted the partition of India when it 
19 
admitted India and Pakistan as two separate members. 
On the basis of these exceptions, it is correct to suggest that 
the General Assembly is more likely, in a given case, to accept the 
division of a territorial unit as separate beneficiaries of self-deter-
mination where there are strong ethnic, religious or other divisional 
tendencies. 
Michla Pomerance describes the approach of the Assembly in these 
20 
exceptions as a mark of inconsistency. His criticism fails to take 
account of the pragmatism required in dealing with decolonization issues. 
It is sufficient to point out that the approach of the Assembly is 
attributable more to a sense of flexibility than an indication of in-
consistency. The identification of the beneficiary of self-determination 
is not subject to any rigid legal definitions; the identification pro-
cess itself is a political act but assxmies legal consequences once 
completed. The sole aim is decolonization as such and not necessarily 
the creation of single territorial units out of existing colonies even 
if conditions militate against such creations. 
15. G.A. Res. 181 (II). 17. G.A. Res. 63 (I). 
18. G.A. Res. 23/407 (1979). 
19. The General Assembly also accepted the division of Rwaunda-Urundi 
into Rwaunda and Burundi (G.A. Res. 1748 (XVI) and G.A. Res. 1949 
(XVI)). However in this case, the territory originally consisted 
of the two separate districts before it came under Belgian admini-
stration under the Mandate System. So the acceptance of the divi-
sion actually amounted to reverting to the status quo ante. 
20. Pomerance, Self-Determination in Law and Practice, The New 
Doctrine in the United Nations (1982), 19. 
32. 
In conclusion, the collectivity of peoples that make up a 
nation is the beneficiary of self-determination. The 
nation as a geopolitical entity is conterminous with the colony as a 
territorial lanit. In decolonization^the colony as such is a primary 
unit of self-determination. What then constitutes a colony? 
What is a Colony? 
In simple terms, a colony is a non-self-governing territory. 
In drawing the guidelines for the application of Article 73(e) of 
the Charter the General Assembly provided in the annex of Resolution 
1541 (XV) that a territory is prima facie non-self-governing when it 
is administered by another territory and it is "geographically separ-
ate and...distinct ethnically and or culturally from the coimtry 
administering it." The principles further provide that when such a 
prima facie case is established, other elements such as economic, 
administrative and judicial factors may then be considered. If such 
factors "affect the relationship between the metropolitan State and 
the territory concerned in a manner which arbitrarily places the 
latter in a position or status of subordination", they support the 
presumption that the territory is non-self-governing. Let us examine 
the principal features of a non-self-governing unit closely. 
Geographical Distinctions ^y 
Races inhabiting different territories tend to have separate 
21 
cultural and ethnic values. Thus ethnic and cultural separation 
22 
may sometimes,but not always,come with geographical separation. 
What then constitutes geographical separation in the context of 
21. Wright, Mandates Under the League of Nations (1930, 1950), 4. 
22. The exceptions may be the former British Dominions of Canada, 
New Zealand and Australia who maintained and still maintain 
fairly similar cultural and ethnic values despite the fact of 
geographical separation. 
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Resolution 1541 (XV)? It has been suggested that it implies a 
23 
"salt-water" separation. The salt-water approach has two possible 
interpretations. On the one hand, it could mean the absence of geo-
graphical contiguity between the administrative territory and the 
metropolis. This means that a territory cannot claim to be non-self-
governing if it is naturally and geographically contiguous to the 
administering state. Such an interpretation probably helps to explain 
the case of East Pakistan which some authorities classified as non-
24 
self-governing before the creation of Bangladesh. But it would not 
be useful in explaining the case of Namibia which shares a natural 
geographical territorial community with South Africa. 
On the other hand, the salt-water concept could mean a separation 
of the metropolis and the administered territory by actual salt-water 
- i.e. sea. In this case the concept would seem to mean that a terri-
tory is non-self-governing only when it is an overseas possession of a 
state. By implication, a territory administered by another on the 
same land mass cannot be non-self-governing despite any domination and 
exploitation inherent in their relationship. This view of salt-water 
separation is hardly correct. In the Western Saraha Case, despite 
the fact that Morocco and Western Sahara share common frontiers, the 
two territories were held to be geographically distinct from each 
25 
other. The decision suggests that the phrase "geographically 
distinct" implies a physical separation evidenced by territorial 
23. Nayar, "Self-Determination: The Bangladesh Experience", Revue des 
Droits de L'homme, Vol. 7 (1974), 231,233; See also Sill's (ed.), 
International Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences, Vol. 3 (1968), 
p.l. He writes that the institution of colonialism has "come to 
be identified with rule over peoples of different races inhabit-
ing lands separated by salt-water from the imperial centre". See 
also Wright, op.cit., note 21, "the colony is not territorially 
contiguous with the motherland. It is separated by such natural 
barriers as a range of mountains, a desert, and sea." 
24. Crawford, 115-117; Nayar, id., 233-4. 
25. I.C.J. Reports (1975), See particularly the opinion of Judge Castro, 
148, 152. 
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frontiers. This interpretation is consistent with the San Francisco 
discussions on Article 73 of the U.N. Charter. At the Conference, 
it was generally agreed that Article 73 did not apply to people 
within the metropolitan frontiers of any state. it is quite 
instructive to note that at San Francisco the delegates were keen on 
the distinction between metropolitan frontiers and those of the non-
self-governing frontiers. That distinction was not made on the basis 
27 
of the "salt-water" concept. 
One must admit that modern colonialism as motivated by the 
Industrial Revolution involved principally the acquisition of colonial 
markets overseas. It is important however to note that the issue of 
geographical location was only incidental to the colonial phenomenon. 
What made a territory a colony was not the fact that it was overseas. 
Colonialism with the general state of dependence is an insti-
tution premised on a relationship of domination, usually by a given 
"alien". Such a phenomenon could arise irrespective of an actual sea-
water separation. When taken literally, the salt-water approach is 
definitely an incorrect interpretation of geographical distinction. 
The United States, for instance, administered the Panama Canal Zone 
and Alaska as non-self-governing units. Both units are located on the 
mainland of North American just as is the United States. This did not 
make any difference in their status. Both units were however geo-
graphically distinct from the United States because they were located 
26. U.N. G.A.O.R. 8th Session, 4th C'ttee. 
27. See however Wright, "Recognition and Self-Determination", P.A.S.I.L. 
(1954), 23,30. "It seems clear that territories which are geo-
graphically distinct were in the minds of drafters, although it 
might well be that mountains, lakes, rivers, deserts or other 
barriers would establish that geographical distinctiveness as 
well as salt water." His view involves the risk of a fallacy. 
For instance, a desert cannot in itself divide two territories 
and make them distinct without the territories being necessarily 
contiguous. In any case, the existence of a desert between two 
territories is not what makes one a colony and the other a 
metropolis. 
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outside its frontiers. 
In sum, it is submitted that geographical distinctiveness within 
the context of decolonization implies the existence of a unit, 
distinct territorially from its administering power. In order to 
identify a unit as a colony, the test is whether as a territory, it 
exists or it is located outside the existing frontiers of the admin-
istering state. 
Status of Subordination 
The General Assembly resolutions do not define what may constitute 
a "status of subordination". However, the administration of a terri-
tory which is located outside the frontiers of the administering 
state, presupposes control over its political, economic, juridical 
and cultural affairs. It is this form of control that puts the admini-
stered territory in a status of subordination. When the relationship 
between two territories exhibits traces of such control, the General 
Assembly will consider the controlled territory as non-self-governing. 
In the case of the Status of the Sultanate of Muscat and Oman, 
a group of Arab states in 1963 asked the General Assembly to declare 
Oman as being a colonial situation in view of its subordinate rela-
28 
tionship with the United Kingdom. There had been a series of agree-
ments between the Sultan and the United Kingdom. It was generally 
believed that the agreements favoured the United Kingdom and bore 
out an unequal relationship. The United Kingdom initially protested 
on the grounds that "it was not true that the Sultan was pledged to 
29 
accept its advice in either external or internal matters". The 
General Assembly nevertheless established an Ad Hoc Committee to 
28. A/5492/Add.l. 
29. U.N. G.A.O.R., 18th Session, 4th C'ttee, 1499 meetings, 
para. 31. 
36. 
examine the relationship as evidenced in the agreements. 
At the end of its work the Committee noted that although each 
of the agreements was quite compatible with the sovereign status of 
the Sultanate, grave doubts arose when the agreements were considered 
collectively. The Committee consequently went on to say that: 
these dovibts are strengthened when it is also 
considered that the Sultan employs a senior British 
advisor, that his army is officered mainly by British 
subjects, that his case is presented at the U.N. by the 
U.K., that he was represented by the U.K. in negotiations 
with Saudi Arabia...and that it is a British company 
which is beginning to exploit the oil resources of the 
interior. 
Significantly enough, the Committee did not declare that Oman 
was a colony. It did however, admit that "the relationship of the 
United Kingdom with the Sultan enables it to exercise great influence 
31 
on the policies of the Sultanate". The General Assembly consequent-
ly decided by Resolution 2073 (XX) that Oman was a "colonial situation". 
The Omani case is quite interesting and deserves attention. The 
territory was not listed as non-self-governing; British presence 
there was more indirect. But such factors did not stop the General 
Assembly from seeing the territory as a colony. 
The criteria used by the Assembly was the degree of influence and 
control that one state has over the affairs of another territory. This 
test was applied in the recent case of Puerto Rico. After several 
years as an associated state of the United States, the territory was 
reinstated on the non-self-governing list. In doing so, the United 
Nations justified its action on the groionds that Puerto Rico occupied 
a "subordinate" status, because the United States still maintained 
considerable control over the territory's political, economic, admini-
. ... . , 32 
strative and juridical processes. The cases of Oma.n and Puerto Rico 
30. A/5548, para 418. 
31. Id., at para 519. 32. See note H I . infra. 
37. 
33 
will be discussed in more detail later in this work. 
On the basis of the foregoing analysis, it can be concluded 
that the formal administration of a territory located outside the 
frontiers of the administering power is prima facie evidence of 
the subordinate status of the administered unit. The state of sub-
ordination itself consists of the control of the internal and external 
affairs of the administered territory. Where these elements of 
control are present in the relationship between a state and another 
territory, the latter would be classified as non-self-governing. 
/ 
Termination of Colonial/Non-Self-Governing Status 
When does a territory become self-governing? One answer that 
immediately presents itself is: "when the territory exercises self-
determination". But this only leads to other questions: How does 
the territory exercise self-determination and when do we say a 
territory has exercised self-determination? 
In Resolutions 557 (VI) and 647 (VII)(of 1952) the General 
Assembly recognized the need to provide factors indicative of the 
exercise of self-determination and a full measure of self-government. 
These factors were to enable the Assembly to decide which territories 
were covered by Article 73(b). Conversely, the factors could help 
to determine which territories were no longer under Article 73(b) 
and on which transmission of information could be terminated. 
The General Assembly consequently appointed an Ad Hoc committee to 
conduct a study of factors to be taken into account in determining 
when information should cease to be transmitted on a non-self-
33. Pages 41-43 and 57-61 infra respectively. 
38. 
34 
governing territory. 
The committee recommended factors that fell under 3 main cate-
gories , viz.: 
- the attainment of independence or other separate system of 
self-government 
- the attainment of other system of self-government by association 
with the metropolitan state or in other form 
- free association of a territory with the metropolis or another 
35 
state as an integral part. 
In 1953 the General Assembly adopted a Fourth Committee draft 
resolution based on the report of the Committee on Factors. The 
resolution (G.A.Res.742(VIII) affirmed the competence of the Assembly 
to consider factors indicative of self-determination and to make appro-
priate recommendations. It provided that: 
For a territory to be deemed self-governing in economic, 
social or educational affairs, it is essential that its 
people shall have attained a full measure of self-government. 
It further listed factors indicative of the attainment of a full 
38 
measure of self-government. in the Principles annexed to Resolution 
1541 (XV) of 1950, the General Assembly affirmed the three alternative 
means of attaining a full measure of self-government. It also provid-
ed guidelines for implementing association and integration arrangements. 
Neither Resolution 1541 (XV) (rer^roduced in Appendix II) nor 
Resolution 742 (VIII) or Article 73 of the Charter provides for any 
definite supervisory or terminating functions for the General Assembly 
in respect of colonial territories. Neverthless, over the years, the 
34. The Committee comprised Australia, Belgium, Burma, Cuba, Guatemala, 
Iraq, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, the United States 
and Venezuela. 
35. A/2428(21-30th July, 1953). 
35. G.A. Res 742 (VIII). 37. Ibid. 
38. The list of factors is reproduced in full in Appendix I. 
39. 
Assembly has consistently asserted its competence to determine when 
information should be transmitted over a territory and when it should 
not be, and when the specific indicative factors are present with 
regard to a territory and when they are not. The Assembly has subse-
quently arrogated to itself a terminating and supervisory function 
in respect of all issues of decolonization. Today, the competence of 
the Assembly is hardly disputable. It is reinforced by consistent 
affirmation through the Assembly's resolutions which have given rise 
to customary law norms on the operation of self-determination in the 
colonial context. 
To ascertain whether a people has exercised its right to self-
determination, the General Assembly would normally consider the condi-
tion of the territory in the light of the Principles of Resolution 
1541 (XV) and the indicative factors of Resolution 742 (VIII). The 
practice of the assembly can be seen in more concrete terms by examin-
ing specific cases under the various alternatives of full self-
government. 
Sovereign Independent Status 
This is the most common form of self-determination exercise 
adopted by most non-self-governing territories. It constitutes the 
attainment of statehood in international law and the General Assembly 
readily endorses it. 
The principles of Resolution 1541 (XV) make no reference to the 
specific method for expressing a desire for sovereign status. However 
popular elections based on universal adult suffrage are usually regard-
ed as valid means of expression. So in colonies like Ghana, Nigeria, 
Kenya and Papua New Guinea, self-determination came with the election 
39. See pages 16-18, supra. 
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of an indigenous, independent parliamentary government. 
Sometimes, a group of colonies could merge to form a single state 
or a federation in exercising their right. In the case of the Gold 
Coast and British Togoland, the two territories had been administered 
jointly since the end of WWII. On the eve of independence in 1957, 
British Togoland opted in a plebiscite to be part of the then Gold 
Coast. Thus on 6th March of the same year, both territories emerged 
as the independent state of Ghana. Other similar mergers include 
the union of Papula and New Guinea to form Papua New Guinea for inde-
pendence in 1975, and the formation of the Mali federation by Senegal 
40 
and Mali m 1950. 
Under Resolution 742 (VIII) a territory has sovereign status 
when it: 
1. assumes full international responsibility for the acts inherent 
in the exercise of its external sovereignty and for the 
corresponding acts in the administration of its internal affairs, 
2. is eligible for United Nations membership, 
3. is capable of entering into international relations with other 
states, 
4. has complete freedom to choose the government it desires and 
has complete control over its internal affairs without any 
external intervention. 
Such a territory also has the sovereign right to organize its own 
system of defence. 
The foregoing factors are the normal attributes of a sovereign state. 
Consequently their absence tends to throw the sovereignty of the 
"state" concerned into serious doubt, in the eyes of the General 
40. The Federation was however short-lived. It was formed on 
the 20th Jvine 1950. It broke up on the 20th August the 
same year. 
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Assembly. The Assembly's general practice is evidenced in the 
following cases. 
(i) The Case of Oman: in the case of Oman we have indicated that the 
Sultan was apparently sovereign and had in fact entered into valid 
41 
agreements with the U.K. During the discussions on the Status of 
Oman, the Sultan, in correspondence to the President of the Assembly 
declared 
We...remind the...delegates that we continue to hold 
responsibility for all matters within our territories 
which are sovereign and independent, not siibject to 
any form of trusteeship nor in any sense non-self-
governing. 42 
In the discussions on the status of the Sultanate of Muscat and 
Oman, the Secretary-General's special representative who headed a U.N. 
Mission to the territory, noted that during discussions in the course 
of the Mission's work, "The Sultan emphasized...that the major policy-
43 
making decisions were his and his alone". The U.K. representative 
at the General Assembly confirmed this view in 1953 when he argued 
that the U.K. Parliament had never had the right to legislate in 
respect of Oman and Muscat and that "it was not true...that the 
Sultan was pledged to accept U.K. advice in either external or internal 
44 
matters". 
Despite the foregoing affirmations of the territory's apparent 
sovereign status, the Ad Hoc Committee investigating the issue foimd 
that there was no colonial case in the "formal sense" but the rela-
tionship of the U.K. with the "Sultan...enables it to exercise great 
45 influence on the policies of the Sultanate". The General Assembly 
41. See text accompanying notes 28-30, supra. 
42. A.5562 para. 164. 43. A/C 4/619. 
44. U.N. G.A.O.R., 18th Session, 1499th Meeting, para 31. 
45. Note 31, supra. On the Oman, see generally Kelly, Sultanate 
and Imamate in Oman. Cathan House Memoranda (1959) 29. See 
also Sureda 62, 253-6. 
42. 
46 declared Oman to be non-self-governing. As indicated earlier this 
action was based on the extent of British control over the territory. 
Within the context of decolonization, the Oman case was quite 
unprecedented at the time. In 1953 some political organizations in 
Puerto Rico appealed for oral hearings before the Fourth Committee on 
the subordinate status of the territory to the United States. On two 
47 
separate occasions the Committee rejected the requests to review 
the relationship between the United States and Puerto Rico. The 
48 
General Assembly affirmed the Committee's position. Before 1953, 
there had been at least one case of "sovereign" territory which exhib-
ited some of the Omani characteristics. In the U.S. Nationals in 
Morocco Case in 1952, the I.C.J, noted that Morocco had "made an 
arrangement...whereby France undertook to exercise certain sovereign 
powers in the name and on behalf of Morocco, and in principle, all of 
49 
the international relations of Morocco". Despite this, the court 
50 indicated that Morocco "remained a sovereign". It is important 
to note that the relationship between France and Morocco was one of 
subordination and not agency. As Brownlie notes: 
A protected state may provide an example of inter-
national representation which leaves the personality 
45. See page 36, supra. 
47. A majority of the members of the committee took the view that 
such an appeal or request did not constitute a petition on a 
non-self-governing territory under Article 87(b) of the Charter. 
Some members further argued that in any case the request came 
from a minority group within Puerto Rico. It was believed that 
a hearing could set a dangerous precedent. Any hearing in the 
view of the Committee could be entertained only when there were 
grave doubts about conditions in the territory. The Committee 
decided by 25 votes to 19 with 11 abstentions to reject the 
first request. On the second occasion the Committee decided 
by 29 votes to 17 with 8 abstentions to dismiss the request-
(A/C.4/236, A/c.4(239)) . 
48. G.A. Res. 748 (VIII). 
49. The U.S. Nationals in Morocco Case, I.C.J. Reports (1952),176,188, 
50. Ibid. 51. Brownlie, Principles, 79. 
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and statehood of the entity represented intact, 
though from the point of view of the incidents of 
personality, the entity may be "dependent" in one 
5? or more. . . senses. -"^  
The Omani case was a deviation from this practice in international 
law. Hence, its significance. In a way, it established a preced-
ent for the General Assembly to "lift the veil" and examine the rela-
tionships between one territory and another in endorsing its independence. 
Where the relationship manifests a sitviation of political siibordina-
tion, the General Assembly is most likely to reject any purported 
exercise of self-determination. This is well evidenced in the case of 
the Bantustans of South Africa. 
(ii) The Bantustans: In 1971 South Africa announced that it would 
grant "self-determination" or "sovereign independence" to ten tribal 
reserves which had been designated as homelands. Consequently in 
1975, Transkei was declared a sovereign state under a South African 
54 
Act. It became the first "independent" Bantustan and was followed 
52. Id., 78. 
53. Richardson, III, "Self-Determination, International Law and the 
Bantustan Policy", Colombia Journ.Transnational Law, Vol. 17 
(1978), 185-219, at 187. On the Bantustan Policy generally, see 
Butler et al., The Black Homelands of South Africa: The Politi-
cal Development of Bophuthatswana and Kowazulu (1977); Carter, 
South Africa's Battleground of Rival Nationalism, South Africa 
in Crisis (1977), 84; South Africa's Transkei (1967); Crawford, 
222-225; Hill, Bantustans, The Fragmentation of South Africa (1954). 
54. The South African Status of Transkei Act 1976. It provides in 
Section 1(1) The Territory known as Transkei and consisting of 
the districts mentioned in Schedule A, is hereby declared to be 
a sovereign and independent state and shall cease to be part of 
the Republic of South Africa. 
(2) The Republic of South Africa shall cease to exercise any 
authority over the said territory. 
The Act is reproduced in I.L.M., Vol.15 (1976),1175. See also the 
Constitution of Transkei Act 1976 reproduced in id.,1136. For the 
view that the South African parliament could still pass legislation 
on Transkei and for that matter other Bantustans seeKahn ^ "Some 
Thoughts on the Competency of the Transkei Legislative Assembly 
and the Sovereignty of the South African Parliament", South 
African Law Journ., Vol. 80 (1953), 473-82 particularly 481-82. 
But see also Richings, for a different opinion in "The Inapplica-
bility of South African legislation in the Self-Governing Bantu 
(contd) 
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55 in December by the "states" of Bophuthatswana, Ciskei and Venda. 
Despite the purported grant of self-determination, the General Assembly 
and the OAU have refused to endorse the independence of the Bantustans 
and have called on the international commionity not to recognize them. 
A brief examination of the Bantustans would explain the inter-
national attitude. They are confined to a total area which is less 
57 
than 13% of the national territory of South Africa. As a general 
rule,whites are prohibited from settling in the Bantustans. The 
Bantustans, with about 50% of the country's population,are located on 
58 
some of the least fertile and arable lands in South Africa. "The 
subsistence agricultural economy, the erosion of some 30% of the land, 
and over-population combine to make the economic and social develop-
59 
ment of the Bantustans quite difficult." All the Bantustans are 
landlocked and would have to rely on South Africa for their external 
links. 
The true nature of the Bantustans and the relationship envisaged 
between them and South Africa were summed up by a South African 
senator: 
How could small scattered states arise? These areas 
will be economically dependent on the Union. It 
stands to reason that when we talk of the Nation's 
right to self-determination we cannot mean that we 
intend by that to cut up large slices of South Africa 
to turn them into independent states. ^0 
54. (contd) Territories",South African Law Journ., Vol. 93 (1976), 
119-26. For a general commentary on the Transkei constitution 
see Witkin, "independence: Problems of Non-Recognition and 
Sovereignty", Harvard Int'1.Law Journ.,Vol. 18 (1977), 464-467; 
Norman, "The Transkei, South Africa's Illegitimate Child", 
New England L.Rev. , Vol. 12 (1977), 585-646. 
55. Slovo, "South Africa, No Middle Road", in Davidson, Slovo and 
Wilkins (eds), Southern Africa. The New Politics of Revolution 
(1976), 152. 
55. G.A. Res 3411D (XXX), 28th Nov. 1975; G.A. Res. 31/6A, 31 
G.A.O.R. G.A.Res 32/105N. For the OAU^see Res. 493 (XXVIII), 
15 I.L.M. 122, Supp. (No. 39). 
57. Richardson III, op.cit., note 134, 187. 
58. Ibid. 59. Ibid. 50. Quoted in Umozurike, 135. 
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In Resolution 2775E (XXVI), the General Assembly condemned the 
Bantustan Policy. It declared that the forcible removal of people 
to the homelands was "a violation of their inalienable rights, contr-
ary to the principle of self-determination and prejudicial to the 
territorial integrity of the countries and the units of their peoples". 
When Transkei was declared "independent", the Assembly again condemned 
the policy and referred to Transkei's status as "sham independence". 
The OAU called it a "fraudulent pseudo-independence". 
There could be two rational bases for the international 
negative response to the creation of 'states' like Transkei: (1) the 
violation of the territorial integrity of the country and (2) the 
lack of economic and political independence. However one looks at 
these bases, the Bantustan problem and the attendant international 
response raise interesting questions for the international lawyer. 
For instance, does the reference to territorial integrity relate to 
South Africans as a whole or is it only relevant to the 50% predomin-
antly black population affected by the policy? As a sovereign state, 
is the Republic of South Africa not allowed to cede part of its 
territory in any manner it chooses? Will the economic viability of 
the Bantustans be any different from that of the sovereign enclave 
state of Lesotho which relies totally on South Africa? 
The rejection of the Bantustans implies that within the philos-
ophy of the General Assembly, the people resident in each Bantustan 
do not constitute "a people" for the purposes of self-determination. 
Alternatively, each Bantustan unit does not constitute 
a legitimate unit for which self-determination could be claimed. The 
logical extension of this view is that,in terms of the right of self-
51. G.A. Res 2275E (XXVI), para. 1. 
62. OAU Res. 493 (XXVII). 
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determination. South Africa is an integral \init. Thus apart from the 
unsavoury economic and racial aspects, to accept the Bantustan policy 
will imply an endorsement of the dismemberment of the territory and 
the forced relocation or dispersal of its majority. 
We have indicated earlier that there have been instances in 
which the General Assembly either explicitly or implicitly accepted the 
divisions of a terriotiral unit for the purposes of self-determination. 
There is a fiondamental distinction between the Bantustan situation 
and such divided territories. In the case of such divided vinits the 
General Assembly's action has usually been a response to divisive 
demands by the peoples concerned. In the case of the Bantustans, there 
are no such divisive claims. The demands of Black South Africans as 
championed by the African National Congress (ANC) of South Africa and 
other nationalist forces there, are generally opposed to the Bantustan 
policy. Thus the creation of the Bantustans lacks the support of its 
intended "beneficiaries". This in itself throws doubt on the legi-
64 timacy of the entire policy. 
One must admit that "the principle of territorial integrity does 
not provide a permanent guarantee of present territorial divisions, 
nor does it preclude the granting of independence to (any) portion 
of the metropolitan territory even where such a grant is contrary 
65 
to the wishes of the majority of the metropolitan state". A 
corollary to this view might be that as a sovereign state , South 
Africa can dispose of its territorial possessions as it chooses. In 
response to this, it may be suggested that in examining South Africa's 
sovereign rights with respect to the Bantustans, one should look at 
63. See pages 31-32, supra. 
64. Witkin, "Transkei: An Analysis of the Practice of Recognition 
Political or Legal." Harvard Int'1.Law Journ., Vol. 18 (1977), 
505, 521. 
65. Crawford, 225. 
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the problem in a contextual framework, consider the peoples involved 
and the history of the territory concerned. Within this context it 
is subsequently argued by one commentator that the South African govern-
ment cannot dispose of part of the territory as it wishes, because 
the "Republic of South Africa" ought to be considered as holding the 
territory in trust pending the rise to power of the Black Majority. 
Assuming it is possible to draw a distinction between the Republic of 
South Africa on the one hand and the Black Majority on the other, 
this view would imply that every territorial transfer made by the 
South African Repiiblic is invalid. Such an implication would obviously 
be hard to sustain. The commentator therefore admits that perhaps 
not all transfers are invalid but that a more precise analogy on the 
limitations on the Republic "might be made to the prohibition against 
divertitude of part of the territory in contemplation of self-determin-
ation much as the common law prohibition of transfer in contemplation 
67 
of death". There seems to be no authority in international law for 
, , . 68 
this interesting proposition. In empirical terms, the closest the 
General Assembly has come to this analogy was the prohibition in relation 
69 
to the division of Mauritus prior to independence. But, the Assembly 
did not consider its actions in the' light of any common law principle as such, 
A more preferable argument is that the sovereign competence of 
56. Richardson, op.cit., note 53. 67. Ibid. 
68. Admittedly, Article 38(c) of the I.C.J. Statute lists the general 
principles of law recognized by civilized nations as a possible 
source of international law. However, the main spheres in which 
these principles have been held to apply have been either the 
general principles of legal liability and of the reparations 
for breaches of international obligations or the administration 
of justice. It is thus doiibtful whether one can cite a common 
law principle to draw an analogy in respect of South Africa's 
actions on the Bantustans. In any case, Article- 38 under which 
one can perhaps justify the use of common law principles, relates 
to the settlement of international disputes; one can classify 
the Bantustan issue as an international dispute. 
69. G.A. Res. 2056 (XX). See page 77, infra. 
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South Africa over its territorial possessions is beyond question in 
international law. However, the exercise of sovereign authority is 
conditioned by the state's international obligations. Territorial 
transfers that involve the forceful relocation and denationalization 
of a state's citizens and the perpetuation of racial inequalities con-
71 
stitute violations of fundamental norms of international law. 
These factors,,coupled with the need to respect the principle of terri-
torial integrity make the Bantustan policy unacceptable. 
Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Ciskei, Venda and the rest of the 
72 Bantustan 'states' to be created would not be possessed of all the 
indicia of sovereign statehood. It may well be that in this respect 
their disposition would not be any different from a considerable 
number of existing small states who have to rely on rich and powerful 
neighbours for existence. However a significant distinction between 
states in this category and the Bantustans is that the latter are 
deliberate creations in furtherance of racial inequalities contrary 
73 
to international law and jus cogens, and in violation of the principles 
of territorial integrity. Above all, their peculiar disposition 
perpetuates their subordination to South Africa politically and 
economically. The existing situation manifests a definite control 
over these "states" by South Africa and consequently undermines their 
exercise of genuine sovereignty. 
70. Nationality Decrees in Tunis and Morocco, P.c.i.J., Ser.B.No.4 
(1923), 24; Brownlie, Principles, 290-291. 
71. Witkin, op.cit., note 145, 621-625; Roth, "A Tale of Two 
Citizenships". NYUJILP, Vol. 9 (1976), 205-35, particularly at 
214-221. Oliver, "Statelessness and Transkei Nationality", 
South Africa YearBk.Intl'l.L. (1976), 142-154. 
72. There are nlhe Bantustans at present. The remaining five are 
Kwazulu, Labowa, Gazankulu, Swazi and Basotho Qwagua. 
73. Barcelona Traction Case (Phase II). I.e.J. Reports (1970), 
Witkin, op.cit., note 135, 457. "It is evident that the recogni-
tion of Transkei was denied not only because the Bantustan's 
complete economic dependence on South Africa renders independence 
questionable; but more importantly because it represents the 
ultimate application of apartheid policy." 
49. 
The indicative factors under Resolution 742 (VIII) are generally 
used as a guide to help promote a territory's enjoyment of self-
74 determination. Where/in a given situation, a strict adherence 
to the factors would impede a territory's enjoyment of the right, 
the General Assembly tends to adopt a flexible approach. One there-
fore sees a marked difference between the General Assembly's treatment 
of Bantustans and its "liberal" treatment of Guinea Bissau a year 
earlier. 
(iii) Guinea Bissau-. In the case of Guinea Bissau the African 
Independence Party of Guinea and the Cape Verde Islands (PAIGC) was 
formed in 1956 to secure the territory's independence from Portuguese 
75 
rule- In the mid-1960s, the PAIGC engaged in armed resistance 
against Portugal. By early 1970, it had "liberated" a s\ibstantial 
part of the territory. The PAIGC came to be recognized As the legi-
timate representative of the territory. In September 1973 it formed 
77 
a government over the areas it controlled and proclaimed independence. 
By late 1973, not less than forty countries had recognized the PAIGC 
78 
government and the state of Guinea Bissau. More significantly, the 
General Assembly in Resolution 3051 (XXVIII), recognized the "accession 
to independence of the people of Guinea Bissau, thereby creating the 
74. In approving the Committee's report on the indicative factors 
the members of the General Assembly took the view that the factors 
were only to serve as broad guidelines and that each case had to 
be examined within its own context. The rationale was to allow 
for flexibility in dealing with each case (see G.A. Res.648(VII). 
75. On the origins of the PAIGC and its later activities see generally 
Davidson, The Liberation of Guinea: Aspects of an African Revolu-
tion (1959); Cabral, Revolutions in Guinea: Selected Texts by 
Amilcar Cabral (1959); chaliand, Armed Struggle in Africa with 
the Guerrillas in Portuguese Guinea (1969); chilcott, "The Poli-
tical Thought of Amilcar Cabral", J.M.A.S., Vol.11 (1968), 373-88. 
75. S.C. Res. 322 (1972), S.C.p.R., 1677th m'tting. 
77. See generally the account by Cabral, "Political Mobilization 
for Development", J.M.A.S., Vol. 10 (1972). 
78. Among the countries were the U.S.S.R., China and India. 
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sovereign state of Guinea Bissau". The territory was subsequently 
admitted to United Nations membership after a unanimous Security 
79 
Council recommendation in 1974. 
The case of Guinea Bissau is significant for a number of 
reasons. For one thing, at the time when the Assembly endorsed inde-
pendence , the PAIGC did not have effective control over the entire 
territory. Secondly, Portugal still administered and controlled parts 
of Guinea Bissau. Thirdly, the territory had not been granted inde-
pendence. Fourthly, Portugal had still not recognized the PAIGC govern-
ment and state of Guinea Bissau. In effect, the PAIGC was still a 
rebel government vis-a-vis Portugal. So at the time of its recogntion 
as a state and its subsequent admission into the United Nations, 
Guinea Bissau lacked some of the fundamental attributes of sovereign 
statehood. This notwithstanding, the sovereignty of the territory 
and its genuine exercise of self-determination was never questioned. 
On the contrary, the General Assembly condemned the continued 
presence of Portugal in the unliberated parts of Guinea Bissau des-
cribing it as an illegal occupation and act of aggression committed 
against the people of the Republic. When approving the credentials 
of Portugal's representatives a month later, the General Assembly 
indicated that the approval was based on the 
understanding that the delegation represented only "Portugal as it 
exists within its frontiers in Europe and that they do not represent 
the Portuguese-dominated territories of Angola, Mozambique nor 
80 
could they represent Guinea Bissau, which is an independent state". 
Unlike the Bantustans, there was no doubt that the area control-
led by the PAIGC was politically independent of the former administer-
ing power, and that the new government constituted the genuine and 
79, S.C. Res. 356 (1974). 
80. G.A. Res. 3051 (XXVIII), 2 Nov. 1973 (emphasis mine) 
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legitimate representative of the peoples concerned. 
The practice of the General Assembly supports the following 
conclusions: For the purposes of decolonization, the test for 
independence is actual exercise of sovereign authority by the terri-
tory concerned and a manifestation of political independence from 
the former administering power. The Assembly is most likely to 
reject a purported grant of independence where there is evidence 
that a unit's peculiar political or economic disposition is likely to 
undermine the genuine exercise of its sovereignty or place it in a 
subordinate status vis-a-vis the former administering power. The 
Assembly would not support a grant of independence if the exercise 
of self-determination in the given context is in furtherance of an 
illegal policy. Finally, where a strict adherence to the indicative 
factors is likely to affect a self-determination unit adversely, 
the Assembly would overlook them and ensure the territory's 
independence. 
Association Status 
An association arrangement involves a union between a non-self-
governing territory and an existing state. The former however re-
tains complete control over its internal affairs while exercising joint 
sovereignty with the existing state on matters that may be agreed on. 
The arrangement represents a useful alternative particularly for 
small states which might lack the appropriate natural and human 
81 
resources to establish themselves as independent sovereign states. 
81. On the advantages of associated statehood for small states see 
Mautner, "West Bank and Gaza: The Case for Associate Statehood", 
Yale Studies in World Public Order, Vol. 5 (1980), 297-360, parti-
cularly 302-312; Keohane, "Small States in International Politics", 
Int.Org., Vol.23 (1969), 291. However as Mautner notes, no matter 
what the benefits of a state's participation in an association 
are, the relationship still entails significane constrictions on 
its authority and there could be a number of other viable and 
more preferable alternatives" {id., 314). 
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Resolution 1541 (XV) provides that: 
(1) Free association should be the result of a free 
and voluntary choice by the peoples of the territory 
concerned expressed through informed and democratic 
processes. It should be one which respects the 
individuality and the cultural characteristics of 
the territory and its peoples and retains for the 
peoples...the freedom to modify the status of that 
territory through the expression of their will by 
democratic means and through constitutional processes. 
(2) The associated territory should have the right to 
determine the internal constitution without outside 
interference, in accordance with due constitutional 
processes and the freely expressed wishes of the 
people. This does not preclude consultations as 
appropriate or necessary under the terms of the free 
association agreed upon. 
Apart from the foregoing requirements. Resolution 742 (VIII) 
provides additional criteria indicative of an associated status. The 
people of the associated territory must possess a level of political 
advancement sufficient to enable them to understand and decide on 
the status of their territory. There must also be evidence that 
there is joint exercise of sovereignty in matters common to both terri-
tories and that the people of the associated territory participate 
effectively in the central administration. The territory must have 
complete internal self-government as evidenced by its control of local 
executive, judicial and legislative organs and cultural economic and 
social matters. Under Resolution 742 (VIII) these factors are to be 
considered against a background of geographical, ethnic and cultural 
considerations in each context. 
We have indicated elsewhere that,even though no definite super-
visory or terminating roles are provided for the General Assembly 
under Article 73 or Resolution 742 (VIII) and 1541 (XV), it has assumed 
82 
these functions over time. Thus the Assembly's surveillance of a 
process of self-determination exercise is usually considered essential 
82. See pages 38,39, supra. 
to ensure the freedom of choice as required under Resolutions 742 (VIII) 
and 1541 (XV). It is also customary for the United Nations to send 
a visiting mission to a territory to ensure that there is a desirable 
level of political advancement and that the people of the territory to 
be associated are aware of all other alternatives and the implications. 
Where the United Nations' supervision is not secured the validity of 
the exercise could be doubtful. Similarly, where any of the 
requirements tinder Resolutions 742 (VIII) and 1514 (XV) are not met, 
the General Assembly would normally not endorse the self-determination 
exercise. The practice of the Assembly is evidenced by the following 
cases: 
(i) Afars and Issas: in the case of the French territory of the Afars 
and Issas (French Somali now independent as Djibouti) the General As-
sembly adopted a resolution requesting France to organize, in consulta-
tion with the Secretary General, arrangements for a U.N. supervised 
83 
referendum in the territory. The referendum was to help determine 
whether the people wanted an association with France or preferred to 
establish an independent state. France did not comply with the General 
Assembly recommendations when it conducted the referendum in the terri-
tory \anilaterally. Fifty-eight percent of the people voted for associ-
ation with France. But the General Assembly rejected the results of the 
referendum and retained the territory on the list of non-self-govern-
.^  . 84 
m g territories. 
(ii) The West Indian Associated States: In 1967, the British Parlia-
ment passed the West Indian Act which granted associated status to a 
85 
group of British colonies in the Caribbean. Under the Act, the 
83. G.A. Res. 2228 (XXI), para. 4. 
84. G.A. Res. 2356. 
85. The territories were: Antigua, Dominica, Grenada, St. Kitts-Nevis 
Anguilla, St. Lucia and St. Vincent. 
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United Kingdom was to be responsible for matters of nationality and 
citizenship and 
any matters which in the opinion of H.M.'s Government 
is a matter relative to defence (whether of an associ-
ated state or of the U.K. or any other territory for 
whose government H.M.'s Government in the U.K. is 
wholly or partly responsible) or to external affairs. 
In introducing the associated arrangement to the General Assembly 
Special Committee in 1967, the United Kingdom emphasized that the 
87 
territories had complete autonomy over their local affairs. But, 
in fact, the 1967 Act left "with the United Kingdom a substantial 
degree of power to intervene in local affairs, so the division of 
authority between defence and foreign affairs on the one hand, and 
88 internal matters on the other (was) not adhered to". 
In the Fourth Committee, the United Kingdom further indicated 
that the proposed association was based on the free consent of the 
peoples concerned,expressed through referenda and elections. Australia 
and the United States hailed the arrangement as a constructive new 
89 
approach to the problems of small coxintries. The rest of the Com-
mittee were of a different opinion. The general view was that the 
United Kingdom had not allowed a United Nations Mission into the terri-
tories; furthermore, the referendum and general elections were not 
supervised by the United Nations or any international group. The 
General Assembly was therefore in no position to confirm whether the 
association represented the genuine and free choice of the people or 
90 
whether they had been made aware of the other alternatives. 
In Resolution 2357 (XII), the General Assembly took note of the 
85. Section 2(1)(a) of the Act, text reproduced in U.K.Cmd.Papers (1967) 
87. Yearbook of the United Nations (1967), 581. 
88. Crawford, 374-375. 89. Note 86. 
90. The States opposed to the association included the U.S.S.R., 
Poland, Tunisia, Yugoslavia, Chile and Uruguay (Yearbook of the 
United Nations (1957), 683). 
55. 
proposed aasociation. However, on the 15th December 1967, the United 
Kingdom notified the Assembly that it was terminating the transmission 
91 
of information on the territories. The United Kingdom in effect 
took the view that it had discharged its obligations under Resolution 
1514 (XV) and that the proposed association was consistent with the 
requirements of Resolutions 1541 (XV) and 742 (VIII). The General 
Assembly disagreed. In Resolution 2422 (XXII), the Assembly "strongly 
regretted" the decision of the United Kingdom. It then called on the 
latter in Resolution 2701 (XXV) to continue to transmit information 
on the territories. 
The West Indian case is important because it underscores the 
suspicions and protectionist attitude of the General Assembly when 
dealing with the rights of dependent peoples vis-a-vis former colonial 
masters. Admittedly, the terms of the association did not conform to 
all the requirements of Resolution 742 (VIII). Nevertheless, there was 
the common view that the associated states enjoyed "a status which 
92 
conferred full internal self-government". In the Special Committee's 
debate on the territories, the issue as to the existence of internal 
self-government in the territories was not disputed. The 
Committee only questioned the issue of procedure in reject-
ing the association. The General Assembly's treatment of the West 
Indian Associated States was in sharp contrast to its acceptance 
of the Cook Islands' association with New Zealand in 1965. 
(iii) The Cook Islands: Discussions on the political future of the 
Cook Islands began in 1962 between the islands' Legislative Assembly 
91. Id., 727. 
92. Forbes, "Aspects of Administrative Law in the West Indies", I.C.L.Q. 
Vol. 21 (1972), 95. See however Broderick, "Associated State-
hood - A New Form of Decolonization", I.C.L.Q., Vol.17 (1958), 
358-390. On the constitutional developments of the West Indian 
States see generally, Sparkman, Constitutional Development in the 
West Indies, 1922-1968 (1975). 
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and New Zealand (the then administering power). The Assembly was asked 
to consider four main options: complete independence; a Polynesian 
93 
Federation; association or integration with New Zealand. 
In the debates that followed on the issue, the Islands opted 
for association with New Zealand. The Cook Islands Constitution Act 
1964 (as amended in 1955), subsequently conferred association status 
on the Islands. Unlike the case of the West Indian Associated States, 
the Cook Islands* arrangement was consistent in every way with the re-
quirements of Resolution 1541 (XV) and the general demands of the 
United Nations. The arrangement was preceded by free and open debates 
and general elections based on universal adult suffrage. "In accord-
ance with the recommendations to the General Assembly by the Committee 
of Twenty-four and at New Zealand's request, the elections were super-
vised, the constitutional debates and the decisions of the new Legis-
94 lative Assembly observed, by a panel of United Nations' observers. 
The substantive elements of the arrangements also met the indicat-
ive factors of Resolution 742 (VII). The Islands retain full internal 
95 
self-government. New Zealand legislation does not apply to the 
95 
Islands unless requested specifically. New Zealand is responsible 
for external affairs but subjdct to consultation with the Premier 
97 
of the Cook Islands. As Head of State of 
98 
New Zealand, the Queen is also the Head of State of the Islands. 
The citizeins are consequently British subjects and New Zealand citizens. 
The General Assembly approved of the arrangement in Resolution 
93. Kilbridge, "The Cook Islands Constitution", New Zealand 
Universities Law Journal, Vol . 1 (1963-65), 571-576, at 572. 
94. Ibid. See also the Report of the U.N. Representative for the 
supervision of Elections in the Cook Islands, A/AC.109/L.228, 
95. Article 39 of the Cook Islands Constitution. 
96. Id., Article 46. 
97. Section 5, Cook Islands Constitution Act 1964. 
98. Article 2, Cook Islands Constitution. 
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2064 (XX). It, however, declared that it retains the responsibility 
under Resolution 1514 (XV), "to assist the people of Cook Islands in 
the eventual achievement of full independence if they so wish at a 
future date". 
So far, the association has proved satisfactory to both New 
99 
Zealand and the Islands. The General Assembly's intervention has 
therefore not been necessary. It is important to note that in pursuit 
of what it regards as its responsibilities under Resolution 1514 (XV), 
the Assembly is most likely to intervene in the established association 
arrangement if the terms were to undermine the self-government of 
the Islands. This view is supported by the General Assembly's treat-
ment of Puerto Rico in recent years. 
(iv) Puerto Rico: We have already discussed Puerto Rico in relation 
to the General Assembly's perception of what constitutes a status 
of subordination. We noted that despite the longstanding 
association arrangement between the territory and the United States, 
the General Assembly has determined that Puerto Rico is still a non-
self-governing territory. The Assembly has consequently rejected 
association status for Puerto Rico. This action is of interest 
because in 1953 the Assembly admitted that the association arrange-
ment was valid. The operative part of the Assembly's resolution, 
accepting the arrangement, declared that on the basis of available 
documentation, 
the people of Puerto Rico have been vested with 
99. On the status of the Cook Islands under the association arrange-
ment generally see Northey, "Self-Determination in the Cook 
Islands", Journ.of Polynesian Society, Vol. 74,112. See also 
Broderick, op.cit., note 89, 390-403; Stone, "Self-Government 
in the Cook Islands", Journ.of Pacific History, Vol. 1 (1966), 
168; Aikman, Davidson and Wright, A Report to Members of the 
Legislative Assembly of the Cook Islands on Constitutional 
Development. Rarotonga (1968) . 
100. Page 36, supra. 
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the attributes of political sovereignty which 
clearly identify the status of self-government 
by the Puerto Rican people as that of an autonomous 
political entity, l^ l 
Under the terms of the arrangement, which is in the nature of 
a "pact", Puerto Rico enjoys what is described as a Commonwealth 
102 
Status. Puerto Rican citizens have automatic United States 
citizenship. The territory elects a President Coiranissioner who repre-
sents it in the United States. He is also a non-voting member of the 
House of Representatives in Washington. Puerto Rico has 
complete internal self-government and "control" over all its public 
104 domains. 
Despite these features, the association arrangement has several 
defects in the light of the requirements of Resolution 740 (VII) and 
Resolution 1541 (XV). The many defects are best summed up in the 
words of Rueben Beirios Martinez when he argues that under the 
association: 
Puerto Rico lacks the juridical power to modify the 
basic statutes which regulate its relationship with 
the metropolitan power. This is true not only in 
101. G.A. Res. 7480 (VIII). For a summary of the debate in the 4th 
Committee preceding the resolution on Puerto Rico see Sohn, 
Cases on United Nations Law (1956), 795-803; Yearbook of the 
United Nations (1953), 535-540. 
102. On the Commonwealth Status of Puerto Rico and the association 
arrangement see generally Jaime Benito, "Self-Determination in 
Puerto Rico", P.A.S.I.L., Vol. 57 (1973), 7-11; Berrios Martinez, 
"Self-Determination and Independence in Puerto Rico", P.A.S.I.L. 
Vol. 67 (1973), 11-17; Cabranes, "The Evolution of the American 
Empire",P.A.S.I.L., Vol. 67 (1973), 1-7; "The Status of Puerto 
Rico". I.C.L.Q., Vol. 15 (1967), 531-530. Reisman, Puerto Rico 
and the International Process, New Roles in Association (1975); 
Lewis, Puerto Rico: Freedom and Power in the Caribbean (1953); 
Freidrich, Puerto Rico: Middle R^ad to Freedom (1959); Leibowitz, 
"The Commonwealth of Puerto Rico ",Georgia Journ.Int'l.Comp.L., 
Vol. 11, 1981, 212-281. Mauero, "Puerto Rico's Status Debate", 
in Davison and Gordenker, Resolving Nationality Conflicts, The 
Role of Public Opinion Research (1980), 177-189; Snyder, Global 
Mini-Nationalisms-.Autonomy or Independence (1982), 219-222; 
Hector, "Puerto Rico: Colony or Commonwealth", NYUJILP, Vol. 6 
(1973) , 115. 
103. j'earbook of the United Nations (1953), 536. 
104. Ibid. 
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theory but in practice, for in the last 20 years 
the U.S. Congress has repeatedly refused to 
effectuate changes proposed by the Commonwealth 
Government. Neither can Puerto Rico freely make 
important amendments to its own internal Constitution 
as required by United Nations Law since most 
important aspects of internal affairs...fall within 
the control of the U.S. Government. Such modifications 
are always stobject to the will of the U.S. Congress 
which by disposition of the territorial clause in 
the U.S. Constitution has the power to regulate the 
territories belonging to that country. In fact, the 
measure of autonomy which Puerto Rico had in 1953 
has actually decreased, for the U.S. Federal Govern-
ment has fiirther pre-empted such areas as wages, 
labour relations, health measures, oil imports, 
pollution, transportation and the like. •^^-' 
The Puerto Rican case is unique because despite these severe 
shortcomings in the relationship, the people of Puerto Rico voted 
in a plebiscite in 1967 to affirm their support for the Commonwealth 
106 
status. As part of the plebiscite, it was made clear that a vote 
for the Commonwealth implied: 
The reaffirmation of the Commonwealth...as an 
autonomous community permanently associated with 
the United States and for the development of 
Commonwealth to a maximum of self-government 
compatible with a common defence, a common 
currency and the indissoluble link of the citizen-
ship of the United States.10^ 
It is important to point out that the plebiscite was not super-
vised by the United Nations or any other international body. And 
it is also arguable whether the people of Puerto Rico were presented 
with all the range of alternatives under Resolution 1541 (XV). 
It is however dovibtful whether the absence of international supervision 
was material to the validity of the results of the plebiscite. For 
105. Martinez, op.cit., note 102. 
106. 85% of the electorate were reported to have participated. 
60% of them voted in favour of the Commonwealth. See a detailed 
breakdown of the results in Benitz, op.cit., note 102,10. 
107. Ibid. 
108. Martinez argues that the plebiscite was "in reality limited to 
the defenders of two political formulas, the so-called associ-
ation (Commonwealth) and Integration "{op.cit., note 102, 15). 
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one thing, Puerto Rico was not a non-self-governing territory in 
1957. It is therefore not clear whether international supervision 
was a necessary prerequisite. However, given the United Nations' 
approach to the sensitive issues of integration and association, it 
would have been advisable to procure international supervision for 
the plebiscite. The United Nations' surveillance of the plebiscite 
would have only served an evidentiary role and attested to the true 
wishes of the people. 
Later United Nations ' Reactions to the Puerto Rican Case: After the 
1957 plebiscite, the Committee of Twenty-Four received a proposal to 
109 
examine the relationship between Puerto Rico and the United States. 
After a short debate the issue was adjourned indefinitely. Another 
attempt was made in 1971 but the issue was not put on the Assembly's 
agenda. in 1973, after considering a report on territories covered 
by Resolution 1514 (XV),the Special Committee adopted a resolution 
that 
(1) affirmed the inalienable rights of the People 
of Puerto Rico to self-determination, in 
accordance with Resolution 1514 (XV); (and) 
(2) requested the U.S. Government to refrain from 
taking any measures which might obstruct the 
full and free exercise of that and other rights. 
In the stibsequent years the Special Committee monitored develop-
ments in Puerto Rico. Finally in 1978 the Committee considered the 
status of Puerto Rico in more sxibstantive terms. The Committee heard 
evidence from thirty-three petitioners, twenty of whom pleaded that 
Puerto Rico was still a 'colony' and that it occupied a subordinate 
111 
status to the United States. At the end of its deliberations the 
109. Yearbook of the United Nations (1967) , 522-523 
110. A/8441. 
111. U.N. Monthly Chronicle, Vol. 3 (1978), 35-36. 
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Committee voted by 10 votes to none with 12 abstentions to reinstate 
112 
Puerto Rico on the non-self-governing list. 
The Puerto Rican case is very significant even though its full 
implications are not very clear. The Committee's considerations of 
the issue and siabsequent reinstatement of the territory on the non-
self-governing list supports the view that self-determination is a 
continuing right; and that in the specific case of association arrange-
ments the United Nations may well have the competence to intervene if 
existing relations are inconsistent with the required indicative 
factors. On the other hand, Puerto Rico is still an associated state 
of the United States for all practical purposes. At best, the indict-
ment by the Committee may have prompted the awareness for reforms in 
the relationship but the status of Puerto Rico remains fundamentally 
113 
unchanged. In the territory itself, nationalist demands now 
encompass commonwealth (i.e. association) status, statehood (i.e. 
incorporation as a state of the United States of America) and independ-
ence. Since 1976, the demand for statehood has assximed great promin-
ence in Puerto Rican politics under the New Progressive Party 
114 (P.N.P.). ^ 
113. In 1979 however, the U.S. Congress passed a resolution affirming 
its "commitment to the right of Puerto Rico to determine their 
own political future" (U.S. Con.Res.35, 95th Cong.1st Sess. 125 
Cong.Res.Sll,371(1979). This has been interpreted as a strong 
indication by the U.S. Congress to admit any possible changes 
in the Puerto Rica-American relationship based on the wishes of 
the Puerto Rican people. A favourable alternative for Puerto 
Rico's political future is generally thought to be an option 
for a statehood, i.e. incorporation into the U.S., see note 114. 
114. The New Progressive Party under Governor Carlos Romero Barcelo 
favours statehood as the best alternative for Puerto Rico. Under 
his leadership a plebiscite was scheduled for 1981 to determine 
the wishes of Puerto Ricans on the issue of incorporation into the 
United States. However, following a thin majority in the elections 
preceding the set date, the idea of the plebiscite was shelved 
indefinitely. See Mauero, op.cit.,note 102. On the statehood 
movement generally see the account by Cabranes, "Puerto Rico: 
Out of the Colonial Closet", Foreign Policy No.33(1978-79), 56-91. 
See however Martinez, "Independence for Puerto Rico: The Only 
(contd) 
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To stimmarize, the practice of the General Assembly supports the 
following conclusions on association arrangements. An associated 
status must be the free choice of the people of the associated terri-
tory. The choice process must be supervised by the United Nations 
or an impartial international agency and there must be evidence that 
the people have been made aware of other alternative means of exercis-
ing their right to self-determination. The associated territory must 
have full internal self-government evidenced by its control over its 
domestic affairs. This requirement is central to the entire arrange-
ment. The territory must also retain the option of terminating or 
modifying the relationship within the terms of the arrangement. The 
General Assembly will normally not insist on separate international 
participation by an associated territory. It will regard effective 
consultations in respect of the conduct of foreign affairs and the 
joint exercise of sovereign power as adequate. Where all such elements 
are lacking, the General Assembly considers itself competent to inter-
vene to ensure conformity with the factors indicative of the genuine 
exercise of self-determination. 
Integration Status 
Integration provides a means for a non-self-governing terri-
tory to exercise its right to self-determination by iiniting with 
an existing state. However, unlike association, integration makes 
the territory concerned an integral part of the existing state. 
For an integration to be valid under Resolutions 1541 (XV) and 
742 (VIII), it must be implemented "on the basis of complete equality 
114. (contd) Solution", Foreign Affairs, Vol. 55 (1977), 561-583, 
for the view that statehood (i.e. incorporation in the U.S.) 
could lead to a wave of violence and subsequent repression and 
that it is not a proper alternative. It is of interest to note 
that in considering Puerto Rico's case in 1978, the Decolonization 
Committee also took the position that statehood was not a 
suitable alternative and that in Puerto Rico's present situation 
it would constitute the culmination of colonialism (see the 
comments on this issue by Mauero id. 102. 
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between the peoples of both territories". The citizens should have 
equal rights and opportunities for representation and effective 
participation at all levels in the executive legislation and judicial 
organs of government. Resolution 1541 (XV) provides: 
(a) the integrating territory should have attained an 
advanced stage of self-government with free political 
institutions, so that its people would have the 
capacity to make a responsible choice through informed 
and democratic processes. 
(b) the integration should be the result of the freely 
expressed wishes of the territory's peoples acting 
with the full knowledge of the change in their status, 
their wishes having been expressed through informed 
and democratic processes impartially conducted and 
based on viniversal adult suffrage. The U.N. could 
when it deems it necessary, supervise these processes. 
Cases of such integration include the formation of the Malaysia 
Union in 1953, in which Singapore, Sarawak and Saban voted 
115 
to join the independent state of Malaya. In 1954 the protectorate 
of Zanzibar also voted to join the independent state of Tanzania. 
117 118 
Alaska and Hawaii are further examples. Both territories 
opted for integration with the U.S. The incorporation of the 
Northern Camerouns into the Republic of Nigeria in 1951 is another 
case of self-determination by integration. 
The Issue of Political Advancement in Cases of Integration 
Resolution 742 (VIII) provides that the people of an integrated 
territory should have a level of political advancement high enough 
to enable them to decide on the status of their territory. Resolution 
1541 (XV) affirms this requirement in more specific terms: "the 
115. Singapore later withdrew from the federation (1965). 
116. G.A. Res 1975 (XVIII). 
117. G.A. Res. 1469 (IXV) 
118. Ibid. 
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territory should have attained an advanced state of self-government 
with free political institutions..." 
The political requirement in both resolutions appears to contra-
dict the provisions of Resolution 1514 (XV) that: 
inadequancy of political economic,social or educational 
preparedness should never serve as a pretext for 
delaying independence. 
To resolve this contradiction, the General Assembly normally gives 
precedence to the provisions of Resolution 1541 (XV), depending on the 
peculiar circumstances of a territory. The test in each case is 
whether upholding the provisions of Resolution 1541 (XV) would be more 
beneficial to the integrating unit than insisting on an adequate 
level of political advancement or vice Versa. The Assembly's practice 
is illustrated in two contrasting cases - Namibia and West Irian. 
(i) The Case of South-West Africa (Nambia): The General Assembly 
dealt with the first case of integration in 1945 well before the 
formal adoption of Resolution 742. In the course of 1945-46 when 
South Africa indicated its intentions to annex the Mandated Territory 
of South-West Africa, it undertook consultations with the resident 
population. The method of consultation was a mixture of traditional 
tribal processes (for the Black peoples) and normal democratic forms 
(for the White population). South Africa justified its use of the 
tribal consultations by arguing that: 
in the less advanced commxmities such as comprise 
the Natives of South West Africa, the tribe is the 
recognized political unit...any form of consultation 
therefore which did not have proper regard to Native 
tribal customs and susceptibilities, which was not 
in accord with the form in which the Natives are 
consulted in the course of normal administration 
and government by the chiefs and councils, would 
not have resulted in a valid expression of their 
wishes. 
119. G.A.O.R. (1/2), 4th C'ttee, Annex 13a, 240, 
55. 
The results of these "consultations" favoured integration with 
South Africa. The latter consequently requested the Fourth Committee 
to support its incorporation of South West Africa. It indicated 
that "to give effect to the wishes of people would be the logical 
application of the democratic principles of political self-determin-
120 
ation". 
The Fourth Committee however was of the general view that an inte-
gration between the two territories was impermissible. India argued 
that "in view of the state of development of the native population, 
it was impossible to believe that the latter had fully understood 
12] the nature and extent of the consultation it had undergone". Itmam-
tained further that since South Africa itself adopted tribal methods 
of consultations instead of normal democratic processes in South West 
Africa, it could only be inferred that "the territory was not suffi-
122 
ciently developed to determine its own fate". The Chinese delega-
tion supported this view and argued that even though the consultations 
indicated the peoples wish for integration, "it was doubtful whether 
they had sufficient political advancement to permit a full understand-
123 ing of the purpose and consequences of their decision". In the 
view of the Czechoslovakian delegation, the wishes of the people of 
South West Africa expressed in the consultations were immaterial 
because the right to self-determination did not include the right to 
. . 124 
commit political suicide. 
The General Assembly rejected the claim for self-determination 
for South West Africa. It explained that: 
120. Ibid. 
121. G.A.O.R. 4 C'ttee, 15th meeting, Nov. 5th, 1946. 
122. Id., 19th meeting Nov 13, 1946; (A/C.4/68),288 (views presented 
by Cuba. 
123. Id., 15th meeting, Nov. 7th, 1946, 78. 
124. Id., 17th meeting, Nov. 8th, 1946, 86-87. 
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The African inhabitants of South West Africa have 
not as yet secured political autonomy or reached 
a stage of political development enabling them 
to express a considered opinion which the Assembly 
could recognize on such an important question as 
incorporation of their territory. 125 
As indicated earlier, the consultations in South West Africa 
were not supervised by the United Nations or any international agency. 
It is not clear whether the Assembly's decision would have been any 
different had there been international supervision. Apartheid had 
not become a significant international issue in 1946. It is thus 
doubtful whether the Assembly's decision was influenced by South 
Africa's racial policies. Its actions appear to have been motivated 
more by the immediate post-war policy to discourage annexations of 
mandated and trust territories. This is more so since the South West 
African issue was regarded by the Assembly as a case of annexation 
127 
and not integration. 
(ii) West Irian: when the issue of political advancement came up in 
the case of West Irian, the General Assembly reacted differently. 
Indonesia and the Netherlands had agreed in the New York Accord of 
1962 that the musjawarah system (a traditional form of consultation) 
was to be used to determine the "procedures and appropriate methods" 
128 
to be followed in the territory for the act of self-determination. 
125. G.A. Res 55(1). 
126. The United Nations' concern with apartheid begun in 1952 with 
the issue of the treatment of Indians in South Africa. In 1953 
the General Assembly declared the apartheid policy and its conse-
quenses to be contrary to the Charter. It was not until 1962 
that the Assembly established its Special Committee on apartheid. 
The Security Council concerned itself with the issue for the first 
time in 1960. Sohn and Buergenthal, International Protection of 
Human Rights (1973), 540). 
127. Suspicions of South Africa's annexation interests arose from the 
annexation proposals of General Smut in the post-war settlements 
and in South Africa's outright refusal to submit the mandated 
territory to the trusteeship system after WWII. See Zimmern, 
The League of Nations and the Rule of Law (19 ). 
128. Article 18(a) of the New York Agreement. See text in U.N.T.S., 
(contd) 
67. 
The Accord also provided rather ambiguously, that any method decided 
on had to be in "accordance with international practice". It was 
further agreed that any consultation had to involve the participation 
129 
of "all adults, males and females", of West Irian. 
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When the time came for a decision on the method to be used, Mr. 
Ortiz Sanz, the Secretary General's Representative in West Irian 
suggested that the "democratic, orthodox and xoniversally accepted 
130 
'one-man-one-vote' would be most appropriate". But he also admitted 
that "the geographical and human realities in some parts of the terri-
131 
tory required the application of realistic criterion". He conse-
quently proposed a normal adult suffrage for the city areas and a 
form of tribal consultation for the rural areas. Indonesia, on the 
other hand, favoured a wider use of the tribal system. In a special 
report, it maintained that West Irian was primitive and that the 
musjawarah traditional consultations would be most suitable for 
128. (contd) Vol. 437 (1962), No. 7311, I.L.M. (1962), 231. 
129. Id., Article 18(c) of the New York Accord. 
130. Report of the Secretary General's Representative on Indonesia, 
82. 
131. Ibid. 
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132 
the entire territory. It argued: 
In West Irian there exists, as is generally known, 
one of the most primitive and underdeveloped 
commvmities in the world. To measure the method 
and conduct of the act of free choice in such a 
community against purely Western democratic 
methods and procedures would indeed be erroneous 
and unrealistic. 133 
Indonesia further suggested that since West Irian was "known to be 
one of the most underdeveloped areas in the world, one should have 
134 
specific consideration for (its) specific circumstances". 
If the people of West Irian were too primitive to be suitable 
for normal democratic processes, it would be logical to conclude that 
they did not have the level of political advancement or the appro-
priate political institutions required for integration under the 
resolutions. Nevertheless the General Assembly overlooked the lack 
of political adequacy and accepted Indonesia's methods of consultation 
135 
and consequently endorsed the incorporation of West Irian. It must 
however be noted that unlike the case of South West Africa, the United 
135 
Nations sent observers to supervise the consultation process. 
132. Report by Indonesia to the Secretary-General, U.N.Doc.A/7723, 
Nov. 6th 1959, Annex II, particularly at para. 33. 
133. Id., para. 55. 
134. G.A.O.R. (XXIV) 4th C'ttee Plenary sess. 1810th Meeting, Nov.13, 
1959, para. 10. 
135. Black African states had misgivings about the Indonesian method. 
Ghana took the view that since the people were said to be primi-
tive they ought to be provided with an "accelerated economic 
development" under the auspices of the United Nations to help to 
bring them up to a level that could enable them to exercise their 
right (G.A.O.R. 4th C'ttee, Plenary sess. 1812th Meeting, paras. 
35-38). The Sierra Leonean delegate stressed that the people of 
West Irian deserved to be given the chance to use normal democratic 
processes because "No society could be so primitive... in the modern 
world that the vital exercise of democratic government should be 
indefinitely denied to its peoples" {Id., para.5). 
135. The participation of the U.N. was however very minimal. In all, 
it involved only 195 out of about 1000 consultative Assemblies 
(Report of the Sec.General's Representative in West Irian, paras. 
128-37).. On the dispute over West Irian and its settlements see 
generally Henderson, West New Guinea'. The Dispute and its Settlement 
(contd) 
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The West Irian case has a number of interesting features. 
Indonesia was not a colonial power. As a former colony, it justified 
its integration with West Irian on the basis of territorial integrity. 
The incorporation was regarded as the final solution to Dutch colonial-
137 ism over the territory. On the basis of the West Irian and the 
South West African cases a conclusion has been suggested by Michla 
Pomerance on integration: 
In the U.N....any act of self-determination (even one 
conducted by scrupulously democratic procedures) other 
than independence is suspect, this is so only where 
the outcome is seen as perpetuating a colonial relation-
ship. But where a claim to self-determination and inde-
pendence is pitted against a territorial integrity claim 
of a non-colonial power, the latter claim generally takes 
precedence. 138 
The logical extension of this view is that in such cases, the principle 
of territorial integrity overrides claims to self-determination as 
the basis for decolonization. It is submitted that this conclusion 
is incorrect and misleading given the evidence of existing cases. The 
136. (contd) (1973); Bone, The Dynamics of the Western New Guinea 
(Irian Barat) Problem (1962); Szudek, "Crisis in West Papua", 
New World (July, 1959); Sharp, The Rule of the Sword: The Story 
of West Irian (1977). There is evidence that the purported settle-
ment did not accord with the true wishes of the Irianese and that 
it has led to separatist agitation, see Henderson, "West Irian, 
A Problem Settled or Post-poned?", Current Affairs Bull.,Oct.1959; 
Separatist guerrilla activities have intensified in recent 
times (Sydney Morning Herald, 4th April 1984). 
137. Throughout the debates on West Irian, Indonesia took the view that 
the territory was an integral part of what used to be called 
Netherlands East Indies. It was argued that "West Irian...was 
part of the Netherlands East Indies, an entity that was distinctly 
recognized and recognizable which had functioned as a unitary and 
integral territory for over 50 years (G.A.O.R., 15th Sess.plen. 
mtg. 1055th, para. 100, cited in Sureda, 146) . The Burmese 
delegate cynically concluded the Indonesian argument by observing 
that the Netherlands East Indies had always been considered as 
an integral colonial unit. Such an "arrangement had continued 
until Indonesia had attained independence".It was only then that 
the Dutch had apparently become aware. New Guinea (West Irian) 
was not part of Indonesia. (U.N. G.A.O.R., 9th Sess. 1st C'ttee, 
729th meeting, para. 28.) 
138. Pomerance, "Method of Self-Determination and the Argument of 
Primitiveness". The Canadian Yearbook, of International Law, 
Vol. XII, (1974), 38-56, at 65. 
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General Assembly would not necessarily admit a territorial integrity 
claim if the people of the territory affected; oppose incorporation 
and request self-determination. The issue in these cases involves a 
conflict between self-determination and the principle of territorial 
integrity. In general terms, it is one reflection of the tensions 
that exist between the principle of self-determination and other 
Charter norms. These tensions require careful analysis which we 
shall attend to in our next chapter. 
CONCLUSION 
Self-determination is a right of peoples. In the context of 
decolonization, peoples as beneficiaries are the residents of colonial 
or non-self-governing territories. A non-self-governing territory is 
a distinct territorial unit which is administered by another territory 
and is subordinate in status. A territory is siibordinate in status 
when its internal and external affairs are controlled by the admini-
stering territory. 
Non-self-governing status is terminated when an administered 
territory exercises self-government. A territory attains full 
self-government when it emerges as a sovereign state or 
when it associates with an existing state or when it wilfully accepts 
to be integrated into an existing state. In all these forms of self-
determination exercises, the most material elements are the genuine 
expression of the will or wishes of the people concerned evidenced 
through plebiscites, referenda or elections or some other form of 
internationally supervised consultations and the actual control of 
the affairs of the territory by the peoples as beneficiaries. Where 
these important elements are found to be lacking, the United Nations 
General Assembly is likely to reject a purported grant or exercise 
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of self-determination. 
Within the context of decolonization then, self-determination 
plays the role of an institutional mechanism for "liberating" a siibject 
people. The full significance of this role can be analysed in terms 
of its external and internal consequences. Externally, self-determin-
ation guarantees the emergence of a unit into a legitimate state 
entity or as part of an existing state entity with the same rights 
and privileges accorded to all states irrespective of its size or 
wealth. Self-determination in this regard also ensures the unit's 
political independence through the requirement of respect for the 
principle of non-intervention. Internally, self-determination guaran-
tees that all peoples have a government of their choice which responds 
to their political economic and cultural needs. In this respect self-
determination also involves the right of the peoples of the unit to 
make inputs into the decision-making process of their community. 
It amounts to the right of participation. 
It needs to be emphasized that even though the right to partici-
pation is related to fundamental democratic ideals, nothing in the 
United Nations resolutions on self-determination requires that in 
exercising self-determination, a unit must adopt Western-style or 
any particular form of democratic government. However within the 
context of decolonization, popular representation and participation 
are in themselves the raison d'etre of the operation of self-deter-
mination insofar as the internal administration of the unit is concern-
ed. Under colonial rule, we have indicated that domination of the 
administered territory was manifested, inter alia in the absence of 
popular government. The decision-making process was usually the 
prerogative of the colonial administration. The essence of decoloni-
zation was to remedy this form of relationship through the application 
72. 
of self-determination. Consequently, where the exercise of the 
right of self-determination fails to guarantee popular participa-
tion in one form or the other, the role of self-determination in 
the decolonization process is vitiated. 
In effect, at the international level, self-determination 
guarantees the equal participation of the beneficiary unit in the 
international process. At the national level, self-determination 
ensures the participation of peoples in their national process. In 
either case, the operation of self-determination plays a primary 
role in decolonization. 
73. 
CHAPTER THREE 
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SELF-DETERMINATION 
AND OTHER NORMS IN THE 
CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS. 
In the last chapter, we indicated that within the context of 
decolonization, self-determination plays a primary role. In this 
role, the principle sometimes conflicts with other norms of inter-
national law enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations. In 
this chapter, it is intended to examine the relationship between 
self-determination and the other Charter norms. In specific terms, 
we would examine the relationship between the principle of self-
determination and (1) the principle of territorial integrity, 
(2) the prohibition of the use of force in international law and 
(3) the domestic jurisdiction principle. We have chosen these three 
areas because they are the most recurrent sources of conflict with 
claims of self-determination in decolonization. 
TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY VERSUS SELF-DETERMINATION IN DECOLONIZATION 
In the process of decolonization, the exercise of self-determina-
tion by a unit may sometimes conflict with the historic title of an 
existing state over the unit. In such cases, it is common for the 
state to claim the territory of the unit on the basis of the principle 
of territorial integrity. The question is, in the event of a conflict 
between the demands for self-determination by a unit and the claims 
of territorial integrity by a state, which takes precedence? 
As indicated, a claim of territorial integrity is usually 
founded on a historic title to or relationship with the unit claimed. 
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In simple terms, it implies a remedial right of the reintegration of 
a previously dismembered territory. In this context, it is an appeal 
that a historic past be given juridical recognition in modern times. 
International Law accepts the concept of historic titles. The 
United Nations Charter also recognizes the v^ alidity of the principle 
of territorial integrity. So it is generally thought that in the 
decolonization process, the United Nations General Assembly contem-
plated the relevance of territorial integrity claims with respect 
to some colonial units. The principle of territorial integrity was 
thus included as paragraph 6 of Resolution 1514 (XV): 
Any attempt aimed at the partial or total disruption of 
the national unity and the territorial integrity of a 
country is compatible with the purposes and principles 
of the Charter of the United Nations. 
Advocates of the territorial integrity principle argue that these pro-
visions are relevant in respect of colonial territories which may be 
the subjects of historic titles. To this extent, paragraph 6 is a 
limitation of, or a qualification to, the general application of 
paragraph 2 of Resolution 1514 (XV): 
All peoples have the right to self-determination; 
by virtue of that right they freely determine their 
political status and freely pursue their economic, 
social and cultiiral development. 
The wording of paragraph 5 is rather vague and therefore allows 
for several possible interpretations. The use of the word "country" 
instead of "state" is significant. The term "country" as used in 
the paragraph relates more to a geographical territorial unit. Thus 
it could well mean an existing sovereign state, or colonial entity 
or the totality of a previously dismembered territory. In view of this, 
the territorial integrity principle in paragraph 6 can be interpreted 
in terms of; (i) the reintegration of a precolonial territory, (ii) the 
1. See generally Blum, Historic Titles in International Law (196b). 
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non-dismemberment of a non-self-governing unit prior to independence, 
and (iii) the non-dismemberment of an existing sovereign state. 
(i) The reintegration of a precolonial territory. 
A demand for territorial integrity in pursuit of the reintegra-
tion of a pre-colonial territory is a historic claim. It implies 
a remedial action by virtue of the right of retrocession. During the 
drafting of paragraph 5, some delegates had interpreted its provisions 
in such terms. The Indonesian delegate had noted 
"My delegation was one of the sponsors of paragraph 6, 
and in bringing it into the draft resolution we had in 
mind that the continuation of Dutch colonialism in West 
Irian is a partial disruption of the national unity and 
territorial integrity of our country."2 
The Indonesian observation had eventually led to the withdrawal of a 
more categorical Guatemalian amendment which was framed as follows: 
"The principle of self-determination may in no case 
impair the right of territorial unity of any state 
or its rights to the recovery of territory."3 
4 
Considering the interests of Guatemala and Indonesia in Belize and 
5 
West Irian respectively, their interpretations were of direct relevance 
to the relationship between territorial integrity of a claimant state 
and the rights to self-determination of a colonial unit. Their views 
6 
were supported by a few other delegates. Their interpretations 
amounted to a demand for a recognition of the rights of retrocession 
in respect of colonies which were parts of their territories in 
2. 15 U.N. G.A.O.R., U.N.Doc.A/PV, 947 (1960) 1271. 
3. Id,, Annexes (Agenda Item No. 87). U.N.Doc. A/L.325 (1960) 7. 
4. The interest of Guatemala in Belize is discussed at pages 86-88, 
infra. 
5. See pages 66-59, supra. 
5. The Moroccan delegation for instance saw paragraph 6 in relation 
to the attempts by the French colonialists to partition Morocco 
and disrupt its national territorial unity, by setting up an 
artificial state in the area of Southern Morocco which the colon-
ialists call Mauritania" (id. ^ U.N.Doc.A/PV.947(1960) 81384): See 
also the views of the Jordanian delegation, id.,A/PV.946(1960) 1268, 
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pre-colonial times. 
The right of retrocession by virtue of a historic title entails 
a specific condition that the claimant state be identical to the pre-
colonial entity of which the territory being claimed was an integral 
7 
part. The arbitrariness with which the colonial powers demarcated 
colonial units has meant that except for a few exceptional cases the 
frontiers of the new emergent states do not necessarily coincide with 
those of the pre-colonial times. The rarity of the situation is mani-
fested in the reluctance of the General Assembly to support the terri-
torial integrity principle as a general rule, to override the self-
determination claims in decolonization. So far, the Assembly has 
accepted the interpretation of paragraph 6 in favour of the reinte-
gration of a pre-colonial territory in the very few cases of enclaves 
and to some extent in the case of the Falklands. These exceptions 
8 
are discussed elsewhere in this work. 
(ii) The non-dismemberment of a colonial or self-determination unit 
prior to independence. 
During the drafting of paragraph 6 a considerable number of dele-
gates interpreted the provisions in terms of the non-dismemberment of 
non-self-governing units. The Cyprus delegation succinctly summed 
up the raison d'etre of the territorial integrity principle of para-
graph 6 as being "to counter the consequences of the policy of 'divide 
and rule' which is the sad legacy of colonialism and carries its 
9 
evil effects further into the future". In supporting paragraph 6, 
many of the delegates appear to have been motivated by the need "to 
prevent a part of the non-self-governing territory, in particular the 
7. Crawford, 414. On the concept of retrocession generally Alexand-
drowcz, "New and Original States, the Issue of Reversion to 
Sovereignty", Int.Affairs, Vol.45 (1959), 455-80; Brownlie, 
Principles, 87. 
8. Pages 94 to 103 infra. 
9. 15 U.N. G.A.O.R., U.N. Doc. A/PV.945 (1960), 1247. 
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wealthiest part, from negotiating a separate agreement with the 
former colonial power. There were also fears that the wealthiest part 
might become, apart from the remainder of the territory, an associated 
10 
state of that power". 
In empirical terms, the General Assembly has always condemned and 
sought to prevent the divisions of a territory by the administering 
power, prior to independence. In 1965 when the United Kingdom decid-
ed to detach the British Indian Ocean Territories (BIOT) from the 
colonies of Mauritius and the Seychelles, the General Assembly reminded 
the United Kingdom that the separation of the islands was against 
paragraph 5 of the Resolution 1514 (XV). When the United Kingdom 
proceeded with the separation, the Assembly condemned the action as 
12 
a violation of the territorial integrity principle. It is import-
ant to note that in this case the territorial integrity principle 
was directed against conduct of an administering unit and to prevent 
the dismemberment of the non-self—governing unit as such. The issue 
in the BIOT instance was not whether the principle of territorial 
integrity pre-empted self-determination or vice Versa. It was whether 
an administering power could legally divide up a colonial unit prior 
to its independence. There is a definite distinction between this 
issue and a situation that involves a claim of territorial integrity 
by a state in respect of a colonial unit on the one hand and a claim 
to self-determination by that unit on the other. The General Assembly 
also upheld the territorial integrity principle in respect of the 
offshore islands of Aden and disapproved of the United Kingdom 
decision to detach the units from Aden prior to independence in 
10. Clark, "The Decolonization of East Timor and the United Nations 
Norms on Self-Determination and Aggression", Yale Studies in World 
Public Order, Vol. 7 (1980), 2,30. See also Franck and Hoffman, 
"Self-Determination in Very Small Places", NYUJILP, Vol. 8 (1975-
76), 331, 370, for the view that paragraph 5 was seen as a 
"grandfather clause to prevent 'Katanga-type' secessions". 
11. G.A. Res. 2056 (XX), 1965. 
12. G.A. Res. 2340 (XXIII), 2357 (XXII); U.N. Monthly Chronicle (1970), 
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1957. On the other hand, in the case of Papua New Guinea where 
there had been evidence of separatist tendencies to detach New Guinea 
from Papua, the Assembly "strongly endorsed the policies of the Ad-
ministering Power and Government of Papua New Guinea (i.e. Australia) 
aimed at discouraging separatist movements and at promoting national 
14 lonity" prior to Papua New Guinea's independence. 
In all these cases, territorial integrity was not upheld against 
the principle of self-determination as such. It was applied to pre-
serve the unity of a territory to enable it to exercise self-determin-
ation as a single vinit. In other words, it was not a question of one 
principle overriding the other, there was rather a unity of purpose 
in applying both principles with one being regarded as creative of 
the appropriate conditions for the exercise of the other. 
Where the General Assembly is unable to prevent a breakup of a 
territory by the colonial power prior to independence, it might 
continue to support the application of the territorial integrity 
principle even after independence and separation. Thus in modern 
times, the Assembly has supported the claims of the Comoro Islands 
to their integration with Mayotte over which the French retained 
control at the time of Comoro independence. Similarly, the Assembly 
has recognized the right of Madagascar to reintegration with the 
islands of Juana de Nova, Glorieuses, Europa and Bassas de India. 
The islands were administered as part of colonial Madagascar but 
remained under French control after Madagascar's independence. 
The claims of the Comoro Islands and Madagascar belong in a 
different category. They must not be confused with claims of territorial 
13. G.A. Res. 2523 (XX), 2183 (XXI). Despite the Assembly's 
opposition, the U.K. proceeded with the separation. See 
Sureda, 119-120. 
14. G.A. Res. 3109 (1973). 
15. G.A. Res. 34.91, 34/U.N. G.A.O.R. Supp (No. 46), 82. 
15. 35/43 (1980), U.N. Doc.GA/6375. 
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integrity premised on historic titlei The latter cases are founded 
on pre-colonial ties, and the former on the violations of paragraph 5 
of the Resolution 1514 (XV) which forbids the dismemberment of a 
colonial unit prior to its exercise of self-determination. 
(iii) The non-dismemberment of an existing sovereign state 
Where paragraph 6 is interpreted in terms of a sovereign state's 
frontiers, it implies that the unity and territorial integrity of 
the state cannot be impaired on the pretext of alien siibjugation, 
exploitation or domination. Paragraph 6 will apply in this regard 
to prohibit the secession of the Somalis from Ethiopia or Kenya or 
the Austrian-Germans from the South Tyrol of Italy in favour of their 
respective parent communities today. In other words, the operation 
of self-determination within the context of decolonization must be 
without prejudice to the existing frontiers of a sovereign state. 
In the 1970 Declaration on Friendly Relations, Resolution 2625 
(XXV), the General Assembly reaffirmed the relevance of the territor-
ial integrity principle to existing states with qualifications. 
The provisions on territorial integrity in the 1960 and 1970 declara-
tions are relevant to sovereign states only insofar as they relate 
to claims to self-determination by groups resident within the bound-
aries of such states. The territorial integrity principle in these 
instances has no relevance whatsoever with respect to claims to 
self-determination by a distinct colonial unit. 
Conclusions and General Empirical Observations 
The territorial integrity principle can be interpreted with 
respect to three different circumstances, viz.: in respect of 
17. The relevance of the territorial integrity principle and its 
attendant qualifications in respect of sovereign states are 
discussed in detail at page 190, infra. Resolution 2525 (XXV) 
is reproduced in Appendix IV. 
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(a) sovereign states,(b) colonies prior to independence, and (c) 
the reintegration of a pre-colonial territory. Where it is inter-
preted in terms of the rights of a sovereign state, the principle of 
territorial integrity has no relevance to a claim of self-determination 
of a colonial people resident in a separate territorial unit. In 
the case of colonial territories, the territorial integrity principle 
takes precedence over all claims of self-determination by the 
constituent units of the territory. However this cannot be taken to 
imply that territorial integrity overrides the principle of self-
determination in respect of these colonies since the role of the terri-
torial integrity principle is to provide a unified basis for the 
eventual exercise of self-determination. Furthermore, the operation 
of the territorial integrity principle in such instances relates only 
to the action of the administering power in dividing up the unit. 
It has no relationship with the demands of territorial integrity by 
a sovereign state on the one hand and the claims of self-determination 
of a unit on the other. Apart from an exceptional category of cases, 
the General Assembly does not admit claims to colonial units by 
. . 18 
existing states on the basis of territorial integrity principle. 
The practice of the Assembly indicates that as a general rule, the 
principle of self-determination stands erga omnes to all other claims 
in respect of a given colonial unit in the decolonization process. 
The general situation is well manifested in the following cases: 
East Timor 
On the eve of independence in East Timor, following the overthrow 
of the Caetano regime in Portugal, three political parties emerged 
in the territory. They were (i) Uniao Democratic de Timoe (UDT) 
which favoured the continued presence of Portugal, (2) Prete 
18. See pages 94-102. 
81. 
Revolucionarie de Timor Leste Independence (FRETELIN) which advocated 
independence and (3) Associacao Popular Democratic de Timor (APODETI) 
19 
that supported integration with Indonesia. 
As a result of their conflicting positions, civil war broke out 
before formal self-determination could be granted. Before the war, 
20 
the FRETELIN controlled a substantial part of the territory. How-
ever, the UDT later changed its position, moved to (Indonesian) West 
Timor and requested assistance from Indonesia. Indonesian troops 
consequently moved in and helped UDT and APODETI to establish a 
21 
Provisional Government of East Timor. For all practical purposes 
the territory has since been incorporated into Indonesia. 
Indonesia justifies its annexation of the territory on the basis 
19. On the background to the Timor question see generally Ormeling, 
The Timor Problem (1957) . For a detailed discussion on the 
various political parts, see Hastings, "The Timor Problem", 
Australian Outlook, Vol. 29, No. 1 (1975), 18-33, particularly 
27-29. See also Jolliffe, East Timor: Nationalism and Colonialism 
(1978); Europe Third World Research Centre, The Struggle for East 
Timor (1976). Suter, "The Conquest of East Timor", Contemporary 
Reviews (1978), 134-141; Lawless, "The Indonesian Take-Over of 
East Timor", Asian Survey, Vol. 16 (1976), 948-954. Kohen and 
Taylor, An Act Genocide: Indonesia's Invasion of East Timor 
(1979); Nichol, Timor The Still-Bom Child (1978); U.N.Dept. 
of Political Affairs, Decolonization - East Timor (1979); 
Alkatiri et al., East Timor Five Years After the Indonesian 
Invasion (1981); Franke, East Timor: The Hidden War (1976). For 
official accounts of the East Timor situation see Indonesian 
Ministry of Information, The Process of Decolonization in East 
Timor, Jakarta (1975); Dunn, The East Timor Situation, Report on 
Talks with East Timor Refugees in Portugal (1971); Clark, op. 
oit., note 10; see also authorities cited therein at page 2, note 1. 
20. The FRETELIN after taking over a substantial part of the territory 
proclaimed the Democratic Republic of East Timor (DRET) on the 
29th November 1975. Considering the chaotic situation in the terri-
tory, Portugal refused to recognize the proclamation and the 
purported establishment of the state of East Timor. The DRET 
was not recognized by any state till its demise in December 1975 
when Indonesia invaded the territory. Suter, "International Law 
and East Timor", Dyason House Papers, Vol. 5, No. 2 (December 
1978), 1-10, 1-2; Lawless, op.cit.. Note 18. 
21. Amankwah, "Self-Determination in the Spanish Sahara", Comparative 
and Int'l.Journ. of Southern Africa, Vol. 14 (1981), 34-35, 
44. 
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of territorial integrity founded on blood and culture and historic 
ties between the people of the East Timor and their kin in Indonesian 
Timor. It further defends the annexation on the basis of self 
defence and its long-term security interests which necessitate its 
control over East Timor. Indonesia also argued that it "invaded" 
East Timor on invitation and that the territory, without Indonesian 
presence would not be economically viable. The final defence put up 
by Indonesia is that given the chaotic situation in the territory 
after the departure of the Portuguese colonial administration, it 
intervened to help protect human rights on invitation. Thus its annex-
22 
ation is justifiable on the grounds of humanitarian intervention. 
Following the invasion of the territory, the Security Council 
adopted Resolution 384 (1975) in which it deplored the action and 
affirmed the inalienable right of the people of East Timor to self-
determination. It further called on Indonesia to withdraw its 
forces to enable the people to exercise their right to self-determin-
ation. Since the 1975 invasion, the General Assembly has consist-
ently adopted resolutions at each annual session to condemn the 
Indonesian presence in East Timor and to affirm the right of the 
people to self-determination. 
The first General Assembly resolution adopted on East Timor was 
3485 (XXX), passed five days after the invasion. Even though it has 
followed up with other resolutions similar in tone at every session, 
attitudes in the Assembly could possibly change in favour of Indonesia 
in the future. This is reflected in the dwindling votes in the 
Assembly on the resolutions against Indonesia. The general trend 
in the voting pattern has been as follows since 1979: 62 for, 31 against. 
22. Decolonization, cited note 18, 49. Clark, op.cit., note 10, 
12. See also the same author's analysis and critique of 
Indonesia's arguments in id., 12-32. 
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23 
With 45 abstentions; 1980: 58-35-46; 1981: 54-45-46 respectively. 
The general voting pattern indicates the possibility that in future 
the Assembly may not adopt any resolution against Indonesia on the 
issue. In fact, in its 1983 session, the U.N. Decolonization Committee 
postponed the discussion of the Timor case till 1984. 
23. For a recent treatment of the Timor issue see the Report of the 
Special Committee on East Timor in U.N.Doc. A/AC.109./623(1980). 
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Even though the general trend indicates diminishing support for 
Timor's claims to self-determination, it is doiibtful whether one can 
categorically argue that the East Timor case indicates a growing 
preference in the Assembly for the territorial integrity principle as 
opposed to self-determination. The situation rather shows an 
increasing recognition in the Assembly of the fact that the Indones-
ian take-over is now a fait accompli, in which case, even though the 
act itself was initially illegal, the Assembly may be willing to come 
to terms with the realities of the case and accord the Indonesian 
24 
action a sanction of legitimacy. Any conclusions in this regard 
are however, necessarily tentative since the existing figures, though 
diminishing, show a rejection of Indonesia's actions. 
The persistence in the United Nations for consultations in West 
Irian and the general rejections of the legitimacy of the Indonesian 
annexation of East Timor supports the proposition that in issues of 
decolonization, self-determination as manifested through popular 
and democratic consultations is an overriding factor. As a rule, 
competing claims based on historical considerations or territorial 
integrity are of relative significance and are at best only tangent-
ial to the claims for self-determination. 
It must be admitted that in the General Assembly the Indonesian 
invasion has met with the approval of the United States and other 
super powers(excluding the Soviet Union). In the Australasian region, 
Indonesia's action has also received the tacit support of Australia 
24. A legal title cannot be acquired through an illegal 
act. This is tne basis of the concept of ex injuria non oritur 
jus. However, international law may also make a concession to a 
situation of fact and occasionally allow this general maxim to be 
overruled by the rule of ex facto oritur jus.In other words, in 
certain exceptions circumstances, States may be "willing" to lend 
their sanction - for the sake of preserving peace and stability -
to certain situations of fact, even if the origins of such situ-
ations are not free from doubt" ( Blum, op.cit., note 1,4.) 
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and the States of South East Asia. However the support of these 
powers is dictated by political considerations and their perceptions 
of their strategic requirements against the possible spread of 
communism in the region. It is not based on any conviction that in 
the decolonization process territorial integrity overrides the demands 
25 for self-determination. 
The cases of East Timor and West Irian support the thesis 
that an integration of a territory must be preceded by consulta-
tions and the free choice of the peoples of the territory to be inte-
grated under impartial international supervision. Where these elements 
are lacking, the integration may well be treated as annexation irres-
pective of the preponderance of any competing claims. A logical 
corollary of this view is that in issues of decolonization, self-
determination is central and is categorically pre-emptory, except for 
a special regime of cases. The recent issue of Belize supports this 
contention. 
25. Aldrich. Statements made before the Sub-Committee on Internation-
al Organizations of the House Committee on International Relations, 
July (1977), Dept.State Bull. (1977), 326. "The U.S. Govern-
ment did not question the incorporation of East Timor into 
Indonesia...This did not represent a legal judgment or endorsement 
of what took place. It was simply the judgment of those respons-
ible for our policy in the area that the integration was an 
accomplished fact, that the realities of the situation would not 
be changed by our opposition to what had occurred, and that such a 
policy would not serve our best interests in the light of the 
importance of our relations with Indonesia." Another commentator 
took a more ideological approach in appraising the problem: "the 
truth is that Indonesia has become some kind of policeman in South-
East Asia. With the extraordinary victories of the heroic peoples 
of Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos, the balance of power in that region 
has been radically changed and Indonesia has perforce become the 
stronghold of imperialism...East Timor is situated in a strategic 
area vital to the imperialistic, economic and nuclear strategy in 
the region." (Jose, R. Horta (DRET representative submission to 
U.N. Decolonization Committee (Sept. 1976), A/AC.109/PV.1052,18. 
See also Suter, East Timor and West Irian, M.R.G. Rep. No. 42 
(1982 ed.), 16.) 
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Belize 
In September 1981, Belize emerged as a state in international 
law and was subsequently admitted to the United Nations. its 
independence had been preceded by a dispute between the United King-
27 dom (the administering power) and Guatemala for over three centuries. 
A brief discussion of the dispute would be helpful. Guatemala claim-
ed the territory on the basis of the principle of uti possidetis, a 
regional customary law principle among the Latin American States under 
which they agree that the boundaries of the newly independent states 
must remain the same as those of the former Spanish colonies they 
replaced. Guatemala's claim rested on the fact that Belize was admini-
stered as part of the former Spanish colony and now independent 
state of Guatemala. As a successor state it had a logical claim to 
Belize. Guatemala further reinforced its claims with the principle 
of territorial integrity and territorial contiguity. 
On the other hand, the people of Belize objected to any incorpora-
28 
tion of Guatemala and claimed the right to self-determination. In 
pursuance of its obligations under the United Nations Charter, the 
26. U.N. Monthly Chronicle (Nov. 1981), 7. 
27. For a comprehensive treatment of the U.K. Guatemala problem over 
Belize, see the following: Franck and Hoffman, op.cit., note 10, 
358-371; Humphreys, The Diplomatic History of British Honduras, 
1538-1901 (1961); Maguire, "The Decolonization of Belize, Self-
Determination V. Territorial Integrity, Va.J.Int'l.Law, Vol. 22 
(1982), 849, 851-959; Kunz, "Guatemala vs. Great Britain: In Re 
Belize", A. J.l.L. , Vol. 40 (1946), 383; Zammit, The Belize Issue 
(Latin American Bureau)(1978). For a treatment of the legal aspects 
of the dispute see Maguire, id., 858-879; Humphreys, "The Anglo-
Guatemala Dispute", Int.Aff., Vol. 24 (1948); Bloomfield, The 
British Honduras-Guatemala Dispute (1953); Clegern, "New Light on 
the Belize Dispute", A.J.I .L.,Vol. 52 (1958). For early attempts 
to resolve the issue as between the U.K. and Guatemala see 
Simmonds, "The Belize Mediation", I.C.L.Q., Vol.17 (1968), 996-
1009. See also Lauterpacht and Bowett, Joint Opinion (prepared 
for and on behalf of the government of Belize, 1978). 
28. Belize's initial claim was made in 1946. For a survey of 
the developments in the Belize position prior to independence 
see 31 U.N. G.A.O.R. Supp. (No.' 23, Vol.4), 23-45, U.N.Doc .A/31/23/ 
Rev (1977). 
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United Kingdom subsequently accepted the demands and granted self-
government to the territory in 1964 and promised to grant independence 
29 in due course. These developments prompted considerable diplomatic 
efforts by Guatemala to prevent the possible grant of independence 
30 
pending the settlement of its claims. In the United Nations, 
Guatemala emphasized its territorial and historical claims. The United 
Kingdom on the other hand, consistently maintained the rights of the 
people of Belize to self-determination in accordance with their 
expressed wishes. With its involvement in the dispute, the United 
Nations persistently rejected any settlement that did not accord with 
31 
such expressed wishes. In 1980 the General Assembly adopted resolu-
tion 35/20 demanding the Belize be granted independence in accordance 
with the wishes of its people as soon as possible and in any case 
before 1981, irrespective of the historical and territorial claims 
32 
of Guatemala. 
The accession of Belize to independence was the result of these 
developments and amounted to the most recent rejection of the terri-
torial integrity argument in decolonization in the United Nations. 
29. Prior to 1964 there had been indications of Britain's willingness 
to grant the territory's independence. See Zammit, op.cit., 
note 27, 19-20. After the 1964 period, the British granted the 
territory some privileges of functional independence. In 1971 
the British government allowed Belize to accede to a treaty that 
made it the 12th member of the Caribbean Free Trade Association 
(CARIFTA). In 1973 the CARIFTA states signed an agreement that 
expanded the free trade association into the Caribbean Common 
Market (CARICOM). In 1974 Britain permitted Belize to sign the 
CARICOM agreement. On Belize's accession to CARIFTA see Report 
of the Special Committee 27 U.N. G.A.O.R. Supp. (No. 23, Vol.V,51, 
183, 165. U.N. Doc.A/8723/Rev.1 (1972). With regard to CARICOM 
see Report of the Special Committee, 29 G.A.O.R. Supp. (No. 23, 
Vol.VI), 118, 124, U.N.Doc. A/9623/Add.6, Part II (1974). 
30. 27 U.N. G.A.O.R. 2049 (1972), 3. 
31. Since 1968 the United Kingdom Government has persistently declared 
that the dispute with Guatemala will not be settled on a basis which 
was not in accordance with the wishes of British Honduras 
(Belize). See Report of the Special Committee, 23 U.N. G.A.O.R. 
Annexes, Add 23, at 360. U.N.Doc. A/72O0/Rev.l(1968). 
32. 35 U.N. G.A.O.R. Supp. (No. 48), 214, U.N.Doc. A/35/48(1981). 
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It underscores the contention that where a given colonial people 
expressly reject incorporation in favour of independence, the General 
Assembly will, as a general rule, accept the pre-eminence of the 
principle of self-determination over any other competing claims as 
the basis of decolonization of the territory concerned. 
In recent times, it has been suggested that in the decolonization 
process, self-determination does not necessarily override other 
competing values as a general rule, and that the principle is not 
33 
"categorically pre-emptory". It is rather "contingently pre-emptory". 
In other words, in appropriate circumstances, "a strong historical 
claim overrides the right of an indigenous population to self-determin-
34 
ation even though the claim is centuries old". Conversely, a 
"weak claim will not affect the right of self-determination no matter 
35 how recently the claim arose. It is further suggested that the 
correct position in international law is that "when self-determination 
and historical claims clash, it is not a matter of categorically over-
riding one in favour of the other. It is instead a matter of weigh-
ing and balancing the merits on either side. There are a number of 
difficulties with this view. It presupposes that there is a 
standard for measuring the strength and weakness of a given historical 
claim. If we are to accept it, what would constitute a strong claim 
and when do we say a claim is strong enough to override a self-deter-
mination claim founded on the expressed wishes of a colonial people? 
Will the forceful integration of a territory on the basis of a 
historical claim against the expressed wishes of its "people" not 
33. Maguire, op.cit., note 27, 862-872. 
34. Id., 871. Maguire uses the cases of Ifni and Goa as the premises 
of his proposition. But see page 94 seq. infra, for a discussion 
of these peculiar cases. 
35. Maguire, id., 871-2. 
36. Id., 872. 
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provide the fundamental ingredient for irredentism? The many 
problems associated with the proposition make it hardly acceptable. 
In any case, as an empirical proposition, it is wrong because it is 
inconsistent with actual cases we have considered. It may perhaps be 
37 
sustainable by distorting available evidence and at the risk of 
confusing the special regime of enclaves and leased territories with 
38 
normal self-determination units. 
In the case of West Irian, East Timor and Belize, the General 
Assembly did not specifically consider the historical claims advanced 
on their merits before upholding the right of self-determination. 
In other words, the reasons for rejecting the historical claims in 
favour of self-determination in each case was not simply that the 
historical claims were weak. The general rationale in the Assembly 
appears to have been that whatever the merits of a historical claim 
might be, the wishes of the people took precedence in the disposal of 
their territories as a general rule. So far, one case in which the 
General Assembly seemed prepared to consider the merits of a historic 
claim in relation to the application of self-determination was that 
of Western Sahara. The Western Sahara case is therefore of great 
significance to the issue and deserves a careful examination. 
Western Sahara 
In 1959, 1970 and 1972, the General Assembly passed a series of 
resolutions requesting Spain as an administering power, to grant 
39 
self-determination to Western Sahara. In compliance with its obli-
gations, Spain announced that it would grant self-government to the 
territory in 1974 and organize a subsequent United Nations supervised 
37. See the cases discussed at pages 77-78, supra. 
But see Maguire, op.cit., note 27, 864, notes 91 and 92 
where the author uses the same cases to support a contrary opinion, 
38. Discussions at pages 94-102, infra. 
39. G.A. Res. 2229 (XXI), 2353-11 (XXII), 2428 (XXXIII), 2591 (XXIV), 
2711 (XXV). 
90. 
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plebiscite in 1975 for a final act of self-determination. Follow-
ing Spain' s announcement, Morocco and. Mauritania made claims to the 
territory demanding its incorporation. They indicated that they had 
historic ties with the territory originating from the pre-colonial 
period and that a grant of self-determination to the territory would 
be in breach of the territorial integrity principle. They, through 
41 the General Assembly, requested an advisory opinion on the issue. 
After the pleadings and an examination of the relevant historical 
42 
material, the majority in the Western Sahara Opinion concluded that: 
the materials and information presented to it [did not] 
establish any ties of territorial sovereignty between 
the territory of Western Sahara and the Kingdom of 
Morocco or the Mauritanian entity. Thus the Court [could 
not]find legal ties of such a nature as might affect 
the application of resolution 1514 (XV) in the decoloni-
zation of Western Sahara and, in particular, of the 
principle of self-determination through the free and 
genuine expression of the will of the peoples of the 
Territory. ^-^ 
In the absence of the appropriate "legal ties" the court did not find 
it necessary to pronounce on the relationship between territorial 
integrity manifested by pre-colonial sovereign ties on the one hand, 
and the application of self-determination on the other hand. The 
court's conclusion left open the possible interpretation that pre-
colonial sovereign legal ties could affect a claim of self-determina-
44 
tion. However the court also noted impliedly that such instances 
40. Letter communicated to the U.N. Secretary General by the 
Permanent Representative of Spain, 20 August, 1974, U.N.Doc. 
A/9655 (1974), 2. 
41. G.A. Res. 3292. In the resolution the questions put to the Court 
were as follows: (1) was the V?estern Sahara...at the time of 
colonization by Spain a territory belonging to no-one {terra 
nullius)? If the answer to the question is in the negative,(2) 
what were the legal ties between this territory and the Kingdom of 
Morocco and the Mauritanian entity? 
42. I.C.J. Reports (1975), 12. 
43. Id., 58, para. 152. 
44. Shaw, "The Western Sahara Case", B.Y.I.L., Vol.49 (1978) ,119,143. 
(contd) 
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FIGURE III. WESTERN SAHARA, MOROCCO AND MAURITANIA 
44. (contd) For other commentaries on the Western Sahara Opinion 
see Janis, "The I.C.J. Advisory Opinion on the Western Sahara:, 
Harvard Int.Law Journ., Vol.17 (1976), 609-21; Reidel, "Con-
frontation in the Western Sahara in the light of the Opinion 
of the I.C.J, of 16th October 1975 - a Critical Appraisal", 
German Y.B.I.L., Vol. 19 (1976), 405-42. Franck, "The Stealing 
of the Sahara",A.J.l.L.,Vol.70(1976), 695. Franck and Hoffman, 
op.cit., note 27, 335-342; Amankwah, op.cit., note 20; Crawford, 
95-99. "The Question of Western Sahara", at the U.N. in 
Decolonization No.16 (1980). 
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would have to be exceptions and could not be interpreted to mean 
that self-determination was not the overriding principle in decolon-
ization. It noted in relation to other similar instances: 
the validity of the principle of self-determination 
defined as the need to pay regard to the freely expressed 
will of the peoples is not affected by the fact that in 
certain instances, the General Assembly has dispensed with 
the requirement of consulting the inhabitants of a given 
territory. Those instances were based either on the consid-
eration that a certain population did not constitute a 
people entitled to self-determination or on the conviction 
that a consultation was totally unnecessary in view of the 
special circumstances.'^^ 
Throughout the opinion, the court's general position favoured the 
primacy of self-determination. A brief survey of the separate 
opinions of the judges clearly demonstrates this. Judge Dillard made 
reference to "the cardinal restraints which the legal right of self-
determination imposes" and noted that "viewed in this perspective, 
it becomes almost self-evident that the existence of ancient legal 
ties,.. .while they may influence some of the projected procedures for 
decolonization, can have only a tangential effect in the ultimate 
46 
choices available to the people". Judge Singh also emphasized 
that "consultation of the people awaiting decolonization is an ines-
capable imperative" and that it was "the very sine qua non of all 
47 decolonization". Judge Boni was more unequivocal and stated in 
express terms what the majority opinion failed to do. He observed 
that "even if the General Assembly had had before it an advisory 
opinion of the court declaring that there were... sovereign ties, the 
Assembly would have been obliged to consult the inhabitants in con-
48 formity with resolution 1514 (XV)". 
The advent of colonialism affected and displaced pre-colonial 
45. The Western Sahara Opinion, i.e.J. Reports (1975), 33. 
(Emphasis mine) 
46. Id., 122. 
47. Id., 81. 48. Id., 173-174. 
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sovereign authority in several colonies. Viewed from the inter-
temporal law perspective, it could be argued that colonial authority, 
having replaced pre-colonial sovereignty in such colonies, created a 
new regime that gave the territories a new status in international 
law. The development of decolonization in contemporary times has 
displaced colonial authority. A new regime of rights has emerged for 
the peoples of such colonies. On the basis of intertemporal law, 
it is therefore doubtful whether territorial integrity could be allow-
ed to override self-determination as such. In the Western Sahara 
Opinion Judge Castro took up this point. He noted that "colonization 
created ties and rights that must be adjudged with the law in force 
49 
at the time". Therefore, "whatever the existing legal ties with 
the territory may have been at the time of colonization,...legally, 
those ties remain siibject to intertemporal law and that as a conse-
quence they cannot stand in the way of the application of the princ-
50 iple of self-determination". 
The rest of the court did not address itself to this interesting 
approach to the problem. The intertemporal law view underscores an 
important element in the whole issue of the significance of pre-
colonial ties in the application of self-determination; the role of 
the law of decolonization is not to re-open old titles that were swept 
away by colonization. Its fundamental function is to create a new 
"higher law", based on the emergence of new values and attitudes in 
international law that give rise to specific rights for colonial peoples. 
Despite the ambiguity in the conclusion of the majority opinion, 
one can conclude that the general tenor of the court's judgement 
favoured the paramountcy of self-determination and that as a general 
rule, the self-determination xs erga omnes to all other competing 
49. Id., 159. 50. Id., 171. 
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claims in issues of decolonization. This proposition will however 
not be applicable to an exceptional category of cases in decoloniza-
tion listed belowl 
(i) The Falklands and Gibraltar 
The General Assembly has rejected the primacy of self-determination 
in the decolonization disputes over the Falkland Islands and Gib-
raltar. The two units however belong to a unique category of 
"colonies". Colonial rule which necessitates the appli-
cation of self-determination implies the subjection of a people to 
"alien subjugation". Neither the residents of the Falkland Islands 
nor Gibraltar are subject to alien rule. In fact, in either 
case, the prospective beneficiaries for whom self-determination is 
sought are nationals of the United Kingdom whe,for 
51. In the case of Gibraltar see G.A. Res 2231(XXI), G.A. Res 2353 
(XXII). With regard to the Falklands see G.A. Res. 2055 (20 U.N. 
G.A.O.R. Supp. 14), 57; U.N.Doc. A/5014(1975); G.A. Res 3150, 28 
U.N. G.A.O.R. Supp. 30, at 109, U.N.Doc. A/9030 (1973); G.A. Res. 
2055 (XX). For a comparative analysis of both cases see Franck 
and Yiof.tm.an,op.cit., note 10. The origins of the dispute and the 
peculiar character of the Gibraltar have been discussed elsewhere 
in this work (see text accompanying notes 72-75). The Falkland 
Islands are the subject of a dispute between Argentina and the U.K. 
The Islands are located about 800 kilometres off the Atlantic 
shores of Argentina. The U.K. colony was formerly administered 
by Spain together with some areas of Argentina during the Spanish 
colonial occupation. In modern times, Argentina as successor to 
the former Spanish colony that comprises the modern state, claims 
the islands on the basis of the uti possidetis rule. The inhabit-
ants, mostly British in origin, have demanded a continued association 
with the U.K. in the status of a colony. On the origins of the 
dispute see generally J. Goebelj The Struggle for the Falklands 
(1927); Metford, "Falklands or the Malvinas?, The Background to 
the Dispute", Int.Affairs, Vol.44 (1968), 463-81; Greig, "Sovereignty 
and the Falkland Crisis", Australian Yearbook of Int'l.L., Vol.8, 
(1983), 20, particularly 36-47. The dispute between Argentina and 
the U.K. resulted in the Falklands War in 1982. Since then several 
new works have come out on the issue, see generally Pinto, "Argen-
tina's Right to the Falklands/Malvinas Islands", Texas Int'l.Law 
Journ. ,Vol. 18 (1983.( , 1-10; Lindsey, "Conquest: A legal and Histori-
cal Analysis of the Roots of United Kingdom Title in the Falkland 
Islands", id., 11-35; Beck, "The Anglo-Argentinian Dispute over 
Title to the Falklands: Changing British Perceptions on Sovereignty", 
Journ.Int'1.Studies, Vol. 12 (1982), 6-24. Belgna, "Argentine 
Claims to the Malvinas Under International Law", id., 2539-48; 
(contd) 
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one reason or the other have settled in the territories. In this 
respect they could be described as "plantations" of the administer-
ing power - the United Kingdom. Not surprisingly, in the process of 
decolonization, both units have always insisted on maintaining the 
status quo or adopting some form of association arrangement 
with the United Kingdom. 
The General Assembly's recommendations on settlement of the dis-
putes over Gibraltar and the Falklands are discussed elsewhere in 
52 
this work. For our present purposes, it may just be noted that the 
Assembly's general attitude to the two territories, suggests that 
they do not constitute self-determination units. From the Assembly's 
point of view, what is at issue in the disputes over the Falklands 
and Gibraltar is not whether the "plantations" have a right to self-
determination or not. The issue rather relates to who has title to 
the territory on which the "plantations" are resident. In pursuance 
of the territorial integrity principle, the General Assembly has 
demonstrated a willingness to admit the claims of states which are 
able to prove that they have historic title to such territories. 
What is at issue here, is the rationalization of the 
Assembly's practice in respect of the units we have described as 
"plantations". The conclusion drawn does not for that matter prejudge 
the issue as to the desirability of resolving the conflict on the 
53 basis of self-determination. 
(ii) Colonial Enclaves 
For the purposes of decolonization, a colonial enclave is usually 
51. (contd) Mytre, "Title to the Falklands-Malvinas Under Inter-
National Law", id., 25-38; Perl, The Falkland Islands Dispute in 
International Law and Politics (1983), 18-39. 
52. See pages 101. 329-330, infra. 
53. In this regard see the discussion at pages 329-330. 
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a small territorial unit which is surrounded by an independent state 
on all frontiers except where it is limited by sea. In some cases, 
the enclave may have been part of the enclaving state in precolonial 
times. In the process of decolonization, it is not uncommon for the 
enclaving state to lay claim to the enclave for one reason or another. 
In such instances, the practice of the General Assembly has been to 
dispose of the territory not as a self-determination unit. The views 
of the residents are consequently not considered relevant and the 
territory may be awarded to the enclaving state. 
The exact legal basis for this practice is not clear. However, 
it is commonly believed that it draws its strength from the territorial 
integrity principle in Article 6 of the Declaration on Colonies: 
"any attempt aimed at the partial or total disruption of the national 
unity and the territorial integrity of a country is incompatible with 
the purposes of the Charter". The practice is generally accepted in 
international law. However, as Crawford points out, it is restricted 
to "minute territories which approximate in the geographical sense, 
to 'enclaves' of the claimant state, which are ethnically and economi-
cally parasitic upon or derivative of the State and which cannot be 
54 
said in any legitimate sense to constitute separate territorial units". 
Existing practice in respect of enclaves is evidenced by the follow-
ing cases: 
Goa 
Goa was a Portuguese enclave located on the Arabian seaboard 
of India. In 1962, India invaded and subsequently annexed the terri-
tory. It justified its action on the grounds that Goa was historical-
ly and legally Indian territory. Even though a majority of the 
54. Crawford, 377-378. 
55. U.N. S.C.O.R., 16th Year, 987th M'tting, para. 46. The view 
was advanced that Goa and other Portuguese colonies in India are 
(contd) 
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members of the Security Council took the view that India's action was 
contrary to Article 2(4) of the Charter, India escaped condemnation 
55 by the Council. Arguably, the seriousness of the illegal use of force 
must have been blunted by the fact that the issue involved decoloniza-
tion. The significance of decolonization in this context is not so 
much that "it cures illegality as that it may allow illegality to be 
more readily accommodated through the processes of recognition and 
prescription, whereas in other circumstances aggression partakes of the 
nature of a breach of jus cogens and is not or not readily curable 
57 by prescription, lapse of time or acquiescence". Despite the apparent 
illegality, India's absorption of Goa is now regarded as an acceptable 
58 
case of retrocession of a colonial enclave. 
It is not certain how the United Nations would have disposed of 
the enclave if India had not annexed it by force. It may well be that 
given its size and its peculiar location, the United"Nations would 
have eventually supported a transfer of the territory to India through 
59 
a peaceful change. The cases of Ifni and Walvis Bay support this 
55 (contd) "linked with the Indian Union both by reason of their 
geographical position and by their history, culture, language 
and traditions. They were wrested from the Indian state at the 
time when the countries were establishing their colonial empires". 
See also ibid., para.60, "India is one; Goa is an integral part 
of India". The Indian argument implies that Goa was taken 
from the Indian Union on the eve of colonization. However, given 
the fact that the Union only came into being after the 1947 
partition of the subcontinent, the Indian historic claim is 
rather dubious. Perhaps it may be possible to justify its claims 
on the grounds that the Union is successor to the precolonial 
Indian entity, but the difficulty with this view will be that 
pre-colonial India, and indeed colonial India comprised the 
modern day state of India and Pakistan. With the partition, 
it is doubtful whether India alone can claim to be the legitimate 
successor of the precolonial entity. See the arguments of the 
Portuguese delegate on the issue during the Council Debates on 
Goa {id., para. 39). 
55. Moves by the Security Council to condemn India's actions were 
prevented by a Soviet Veto: S/5033. 
57. Crawford, 113. 58. Maguire, op.cit., note 27, 870. 
59. For a different view see Wright, "The Goa Incident", A.J.I.L., 
(contd) 
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view. 
Ifni and Walvis Bay 
The territory of Ifni was a Spanish colonial enclave located on 
the Atlantic coast of Morocco. Covering an area of 1,500 square 
miles, the territory had a population of only 50,000. In the process 
of decolonization, the General Assembly repeatedly requested Spain 
as the administering unit and Morocco as the claimant state to settle 
the issue of the territory's disposal through negotiations. The 
requests culminated in the Treaty of Fez under which Spain agreed to 
the retrocession of Ifni to Morocco in 1969. The General Assembly 
subsequently endorsed the transfer. 
The practice of the Assembly indicates that it regards 
the enclaves as part of the enclaving states for all practical pur-
poses. It therefore accepts reversion or retrocession as the most 
appropriate method of resolving the claims that arise over such terri-
tories. The Assembly's position is dictated more by pragmatic 
considerations than by the need for a rigid adherence to the principle 
of territorial integrity. This is because even though reversion pre-
supposes previous ownership, the Assembly may still support a claim 
to an enclave by an enclaving state even where the available historical 
evidence does not indicate previous ownership • This seems to be 
the case with respect to Walvis Bay. 
Covering an area of only 434 sq. miles, Walvis Bay is a South 
African possession located on Namibia's Atlantic shore. In the 
59. '(contd) Vol. 56 (1962), 518. "Since legally, Goa was under the 
administration of Portugal, the latter was under the obligation 
to promote self-government in the territory, and the General 
Assembly was competent to see that this obligation was fulfilled" 
(525). See also Higgins, The Development of International Law 
Through the Political Organs of the United Nations (1963),187. 
50. G.A. Res. 2078 (XX), 2229 (XXI), 2354 (XXII), 2428 (XXIII). 
61. G.A. Res. 2354 (XXII). 
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decolonization of Namibia, SWAPO claims Walvis Bay. The enclave 
is of great economic importance to a future independent Namibia. It 
is the only deep water port in the territory and an active commercial 
centre with a flourishing fishing industry that employs a considerable 
number of Namibians. Walvis Bay is also a South African military 
base. Politically, it is very doubtful whether a future independent 
Namibia will find it desirable to have this piece of South African 
territory located on its shores. For all these reasons, the General 
64 Assembly has persistently supported SWAPO's claims to the enclave 
in spite of the fact that historical evidence indicates 
55 
South Africa may have a better title. 
(iii) Internal Self-Determination 
We have discussed that a non-self-governing territory exercises 
62. See statement by Sam Ngoma, SWAPO representative at the 9th 
Session of the General Assembly, Objective Justice, U.N. Office 
of Public Information Special Supplement No. 2 (June 1978), 4. 
See also Africa Research Bulletin, Vol. 15 (1978), 48-74. 
63. The industrial activities of Walvis Bay provides over 30,000 jobs 
for Africans most of whom are Namibians. See "South Africa's 
Legal Title to the Sovereignty over Walvis Bay", Release by the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Johannesburg, South Africa (1977). 
64. G.A. Res. 32, 19D November (1977). G.A. Res. 5-91 on the"Declar-
ation of Namibia and Program for Action in Support of Self-
Determination and Independence", S.C.Res. 432 (1978). During the 
9th session of the General Assembly some of the African delegates 
were very unequivocal about the political and economic aspects of 
the Walvis Bay issue. See for instance the statement by the Niger-
ian delegate,"Walvis Bay is Namibia's umbilical cord and to sever 
it from the rest of Namibia will adversely affect the economic 
viability of an independent Namibia" {Objective Justice, op.cit., 
note 62, 4); statement by the Ethiopian delegate: "There can be 
no independent state without Walvis Bay and this is certainly not 
an issue for equivocation {ibid.) . 
65. Walvis Bay was originally not part of the mandate of Namibia. 
The territory was a port settlement and 
not a colony. See: "South Africa Ministry of Foreign Affairs" 
Release, op.cit., note 63; Goeckner and Gunning, "Namibia, 
South Africa and the Walvis Bay Dispute", Yale Law Journ.,Vol. 89 
(1980), 915; Prescott, in South Africa News and Views, Vol. 4, 
No. 9 (Sept. 1980),5; Le Monde (9th Sept. 1977); African Diary, 
October 15-21 (1978), 9-22. For an opinion that upholds 
the claims of SWAPO on legal grounds see Huaraka, "Walvis Bay 
and International Law", I.J.I.L., Vol. 18 (1978), 160-175. 
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self-determination when it emerges as an independent sovereign state 
or associates or integrates with another state, depending on its 
wishes. In some cases, however, despite a unit's desires to be 
established as an independent state, the General Assembly may rather 
recommend only internal autonomy or internal self-determination for 
the territory. The Assembly's action could be the result of a number 
of factors ranging from the interests of peace to the peculiar loca-
tion of the territory. Eritrea is a typical example of such cases. 
Eritrea 
In the case of Eritrea, the territory applied for an independent 
status in a consultation undertaken in 1947. The option was later 
affirmed in another consultation in 1950. Notwithstanding such posi-
tive affirmations,the General Assembly decided to federate Eritrea 
with Ethiopia. The Assembly's action was rationalized on the basis 
of the need to protect Ethiopia's interests, and to ensure Eritrea's 
58 
economic viability. Eritrea was given an autonomous status m the 
federation. The federation was abolished in 1962 in favour of a 
59 
unitary state of Ethiopia. The current situation of Eritrea is 
discussed elsewhere in this work. 
(iv) Existing Right of Pre-emption over a Territory 
Where the territory of a non-self-governing unit is the subject 
of a treaty obligation, it could constitute an exception to the opera-
tion of self-determination. The General Assembly practice supports 
65. For details of the consultations see the Four Power Commission 
Report reproduced in Pankhurst, Ethiopia and Eritrea, 1941-1952. 
The Last Phase of the Union Struggle. (1953), 150-160. Report of 
the U.N. Commission for Eritrea, U.N. G.A.O.R., 5th Supplement 
No 8, A/1285 (1950). 
57. G.A. Res. 390A (V). 68. Ibid. 
69. On the events leading to the abolition of the federation see 
generally, Medhin, "Eritrea: Background to Revolution", Monthly 
Review, Vol. 28, No. 4 (1976), 29; Greenfield, Eritrea's Fight 
for Freedom (1978). 
70. Page 282, infra. 
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the view that where a state can prove an existing right of pre-
emption over a territory, its rights could take precedence over other 
71 
claims. The following cases illustrate the point: 
(Kbr altar 
In the case of Gibraltar, Spain ceded "the full and entire pro-
perty of the town and Castle" to Great Britain in 1913 under the 
72 
Treaty of Utrecht. It was agreed that "in case it shall hereafter 
seem [meet] to the Crown of Great Britain to grant, sell, or by any 
means alienate the property...the preference of having the same shall 
always be given to the Crown of Spain before any others". In the de-
colonization of Gibraltar, Spain contends that its rights of retro-
cession to the territory takes precedence over the claims of "any 
others". The crux of the Spanish argument being that the phrase 'any 
73 
others' under the Treaty includes the residents of Gibraltar. 
Great Britain on the other hand maintains Gibraltar is a self-deter-
mination unit and that no cession can be effected without the free 
consent of the residents. The latter have expressly indicated that 
74 
that they wish to be British subjects. Despite the British argu-
ment and the wishes of the residents the General Assembly has request-
ed the United Kingdom to negotiate a transfer of the territory to 
^ • 75 Spam. 
71. Crawford, 380. 
72. Article 10 of the Treaty. On the issue of Gibraltar see general-
ly Heasman,'"The Gibraltar Affair", Int.Journ. (Canada), Vol. 22 
(1957), 255-277; Fawcett, "Gibraltar, The Legal issues". Int.Affairs, 
Vol. 43 (1967), 236-251; Sureda, 190-198; Franck and Hoffman, 
op.cit., note 10, 371-379. 
73. But see the comments of Fawcett, id., 250. "The transfer of title 
which would take place upon a grant of independence, to Gibraltar 
would not be an alienation for the purpose of Article XI of the 
Treaty of Utrecht." 
74. See page 95 , supra. 
75. G.A. Res. 3286 (XXIX), p. 95. 
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Other cases in a similar situation include the leased territor-
ies of Hong Kong and the Panama Canal Zone. The very nature of 
a lease in international law presupposes the continuation of the 
sovereignty of the leaser state (albeit dormant) over the leased 
territory. To this extent the rights of reversion of the leaser pre-
empts all other claims in the event of a disposal of the terri-
tory or at the end of the term of the lease. 
It is of course possible to argue that as non-self-governing 
territories, these entities are within the regime of Chapter XI of 
the Charter and that the administering states have specific legal 
obligations in respect of such units under Article 72 of the United 
Nations Charter. Article 103 of the Charter provides that. 
In the event of a conflict between the obligations of 
the Members of the United Nations under the present 
Charter and their obligations under any other inter-
national agreements their obligations under the present 
Charter shall prevail. 
If one takes the view that the Treaty of Utrecht and the lease arrange-
ments constitute international agreements, it would follow that the 
obligations of the administering states under Article 72 take preced-
ence over their obligations under such international agreements. 
The only logical explanation of the Assembly's 
approach to the issue may be found in the support for the principle 
of territorial integrity in such cases. In other words, the exercise 
of a right of pre-emption is regarded as consistent with the notion 
of re-integration of a previously dismembered territory. 
76. Part of the territory was leased to United Kingdom in 1898 by 
China for a period of 99 years. In 1972 it was taken off the 
list of units to which Resolution 1514 (XV) were considered 
applicable (note 71, supra.). 
11. The Zone is the subject of a lease between the leaser, Panama 
and the leasee, the United States. It was part of a package 
of agreements labelled the Panama Canal Treaties. See I.L.M. 
(1977), 1021. 
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SELF-DETERMINATION AND THE USE OF FORCE 
The relationship between self-determination and the use of 
force in international law can be examined in two respects (1) in 
relation to the use of force to suppress the demands of a unit and 
(2) in relation to whether a unit can use force to pursue its claims. 
(1) The Use of Force to Suppress the Demands of a Unit 
Under Resolution 1514 (XV) "all armed action and repressive 
measures of all kind directed against dependent peoples are prohibited 
78 in order to enable them to exercise their right of self-determination". 
How consistent is this prohibition with the Charter prohibition of 
the use of force? Under the United Nations Charter, the use of force 
is regulated by Article 2(4) and Article 51. For our purposes 
Article 2(4) is relevant at this stage. It provides that 
All members shall refrain in their international 
relations from the threat or use of force against 
the territorial integrity or political independence 
of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent 
with the purposes of the United Nations. 
On the one hand, there is support for the argument that this provision 
relates specifically to the conduct of states as such, "in their 
relations, and that it is directly related to the use of force 
against "the territorial integrity or political independence of any 
State." Since colonial entities are not states. Article 2(4) does 
not apply to the use of force to suppress the demands of a self-deter-
79 
mination unit. There is therefore no relationship between the 
78. See also G.A. Resolutions: 2625 (XXV)(1970); 2787 (XXVI)(1971); 
3103 (XXVIII) (1973) ; 3314 (XXIX) (1974); 3382 (XXX) (1975) . Also 
S.C.Res. 269 (1959); 277 (1970); and 282 (1970). 
79. The general force of this proposition is premised on the view 
that in general, the use of force unaccompanied by an intent to 
violate the territorial integrity or political independence of a 
state is not contrary to Article 2(4); Brownlie, International 
Law and the Use of Force by States (1963), 258; Bowett, Self-
Defence in International Law (1958), 152. But see Bokor SzegO, 
New States in International Law (1970), 36. 
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prohibition of force in Resolution 1514 (XV) and Article 2(4). 
It has also been argued that in international law, colonial peoples 
assume the nationality of the metropolitan state. Consequently, the 
use of force by a state against its colonies could in fact amount 
to an action against its own nationals rather than an action against 
80 
another state. There is also support for the view that the provisions of 
Resolution 1514 (XV) do not relate easily to the definition of aggres-
81 
sion. For the purposes of aggression, the victim must be a state. 
Since colonial territories are not states one can not speak of the 
prohibition of the use of force against a colonial unit in terms of 
80. Dugard, "The Organization of African Unity and Colonialism. 
An Inquiry into the Plea of Self-Defence as a Justification for 
the Use of Force for the Eradication of Colonialism", I.C.L.Q., 
Vol. 16 (1957), 157,172. In the case of the Indonesia for 
instance, the Netherlands argued initially that its use of force 
in the Indonesia colony was a matter essentially within its 
domestic jurisdiction. Higgins suggests that "had the situation 
been put before the Council in terms of Article 2(4), it could 
equally well have been argued that the action of the Netherlands 
was not a use of force in international relations", op.cit., 
note 5 (221). During the drafting of the Resolution 2525 (XXV), 
The Declaration on Friendly Relations, a substantial number of 
states also took the view that the provisions of Art. 2(4) could 
not be stretched to cover internal disorders arising in non-
self-governing units. For this reason these types of situations 
should be viewed in the light of the principle of equality and 
self-determination and not the prohibition of the use of force. 
(Statements by U.S.A., Canada, Australia and U.K. in U.N. Doc. 
A.AC.125/Sr, 17, 66-68.) 
81. Aggression has been defined as "the use of force by a State 
against the sovereign, territorial integrity or political inde-
pendence of another state or in any other manner inconsistent 
with the Charter of the United Nations as set out in (the) 
definition". "The term state (a) is used without prejudice to the 
questions of recognition or to whether a state is a member of the 
United Nations and (b) includes the concept of a group of states 
where appropriate." (G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX). See the text in 
I.L.M., Vol. 13 (1974), 710.) For the view that the definition 
does not cover colonies and non-state entities see Stone, 
Conflict Through Consensus (1977), 130-131. On the definition 
of aggression generally see Ferencz, Defining International 
Aggression: The Search for World Peace (two Vols.)(1975), 
particularly Part 4. of Vol. 2. 
105, 
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the general prohibition of aggression. But on the other hand, it 
could be argued that in modern times, a colonial unit has a status and 
83 personality distinct from the administering unit. The use of force 
to suppress the demands of the colonial unit can therefore not be 
properly regarded as an action against the "nationals" of the admini-
stering power. Any resultant conflict is consequently not a civil 
84 
strife but an international war subject to the laws of war. In 
view of this, the disposition of the territory of a self-determination 
unit may well be equivalent to that of a State for the purposes of 
Article 2(4) prohibition, and aggression in international law. The 
difficulty is that this formidable proposition has no substantive 
authority as such in international law, apart from the simple analogical 
82. In this respect it is instructive to note that despite the 
constant condemnation of the use of force against colonial peoples., 
the General Assembly has generally been reluctant to brand such 
armed activities as aggression. The one occasion in which the 
Assembly freely accused a colonial power of aggression appears 
to be in the case of Portugal's presence in Guinea Bissau. How-
ever in this instance,the Assembly's assertions were based on the 
fact that Guinea Bissau had been declared independent. It was in 
other words, a state to which the definition of aggression fitted. 
(See G.A. Res. 3061 (XXVIII).) See also Stone^ Israel and Palestine. 
Assault on the Law of Nations (1981), 86-87. 
83. See G.A. Res. 2525 (XXV). "The territory of a colony or other 
Non-Self-Governing Territory has, under the Charter, a status 
separate and distinct from the territory of the State administer-
ing it; and such separate and distinct status under the Charter 
shall exist until the people of the colony or non-self-governing 
territory have exercised their right of self-determination in accord-
ance with the Charter and particularly its Purposes and Principles". 
See also Sureda 347, "For the purposes of the use of force, 
colonies are no longer considered to be an integral part of the 
metropolis". 
84. Espiell, The Right of Self-Determination, Implementation of 
United Nations Resolutions. E/CN.4/sub.2/405/Rev.l (1980), 4. 
"The Struggle of peoples for their self-determination in (the) 
face of colonial and alien domination gives rise to an internation-
al armed conflict and does not create a situation of civil war." 
The view that (colonial) self-determination conflicts are not civil 
wars for the metropolis has been affirmed in Article 1(4) of Pro-
tocol I to the Geneva Convention of 1949 which was approved by 
th6"Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development 
of International Humanitarian Law as Applicable in Armed Conflicts" 
(July 1977). See also Umozurike, "The 1949 Geneva Convention and 
Africa", I.J.I.L., Vol. 11 (1971), 205, 215; Travers, "The Legal 
(contd) 
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inference that, if colonial conflicts are international wars, then 
the colonies are equivalent to States for the purposes of the use of 
force. It is one thing to say that colonial conflicts are inter-
national wars and it is another thing to say that the territory of a 
colonial unit is equivalent to that of a state. The fact that colon-
ial conflicts are considered as international wars does not necessar-
ily transform the territory of a colonial unit into a state in inter-
. . 85 
national law. 
A more convincing argument about the link between the prohibition 
of the use of force against a self-determination unit and the Charter 
prohibition of the use of force lies in the interpretation of the 
"second limb" of Article 2(4). The article prohibits the use of 
force against states or the use of force in any manner inconsistent 
with the Purposes of the United Nations. Under the Charter, Chapter 
XII, territories have a right to independence. Since the objectives 
of Chapter XII are an integral part of the Purposes of the United 
Nations, the use of force to suppress a Chapter XII territory's claim 
would be contrary to the Purpose of the United Nations. Furthermore, 
one of the Purposes of the United Nations is 'to develop friendly 
84. (contd) Effect of United Nations Treatment of African Liberation 
Movements and the P..L.O.", Harvard Int'l.L. Journ. , Vol. 17 (1975), 
551-80. Pomerance, Self-Determination in Law and Practice 
(1982), 52-56. 
85. But see Boko-Szegfl, op.cit., note 79, 37."Since international 
law has recognised the right of self-determination, the use of 
force against a dependent territory could practically be qualified 
as being in defiance of the prohibition of the use of force 
against the territorial integrity or political independence of 
a State." Her argument is non sequitor. The fact that the right 
of self-determination has been recognized as a norm of internation-
al law does not mean that the use of force to prevent its exercise 
by a unit, can be qualified as the use of force against the 
territorial integrity of a state. This argument of course does 
not prejudice the issue as to whether the use of force against 
a self-determination unit is consistent with the Purposes of 
the United Nations. See the discussion in the text following 
Note 85. 
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relations among nations based on respect for the principles of equal 
rights and self-determination of peoples'. It is significant that 
the word "nations" was used instead of states. Since "nations" 
and "peoples" may well be colonial peoples, the use of force to sup-
press the demands for self-determination would be inconsistent with 
the Purposes of the United Nations and a consequent breach of the 
86 
"second limb" of Article 2(4) . In any case, the use of force or 
other measures against a colonial unit to suppress demands for self-
determination may ipso facto constitute a denial of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms. Since respect for human rights and fundamental 
freedoms are both Purposes of the United Nations, the use of force 
in such circumstances would be a breach of Article 2(4). 
After the adoption of Resolution 1514 (XV) in 1950, several sub-
sequent General Assembly resolutions affirmed the prohibition of the 
use of force to suppress the demands of colonial peoples. More signi-
ficantly the resolutions added a new dimension to the use of force 
in relation to the units by consistently declaring that colonial 
peoples ; 
(1) may resist by force,any suppression of their demands 
for self-determination; (and) 
(2) are entitled to seek and receive "moral and material 
assistance" in their resistance against such forms 
. • 87 
of suppression. 
This leads us to the second issue! 
85. Cristescu, The Right of Self-Determination, Historical and 
Current Developments on the Basis of U.N. Instruments, 
E/CN.4./Sub.2/404/Rev.l (1981), 30. 
87. Note 78, 
108. 
(ii) Whether a Self-Determination Unit Can Legally Use Force 
to Pursue its Demands 
This issue raises a number of difficulties in relation to exist-
ing Charter principles. For instance, is the use of force in such 
circumstances a breach of Article 2(4), and is it consistent with 
Article 51? Does it amount to aggression? We have indicated that 
in decolonization, a colonial unit has a status and personality dis-
88 tinct from the administering power. Consequently, the use of force 
by peoples of a colony inside the territory to expel the administering 
power cannot be a breach of Article 2(4) which prohibits armed action 
against "the territorial integrity or political independence of any 
State". In other words, for the purposes of self-determination in 
decolonization, the "territorial integrity of any State" referred to 
in Article 2(4) is exclusive of the territory of a self-determination 
unit. Bearing this interpretation in mind, the question is, will the 
use of force by a unit in itself, not be consistent with one of the 
Purposes of the United Nations, viz.: the maintenance of internation-
al peace and security? The answer, according to a number of authori-
89 ties,would seem to be 'no'. They argue that the use of force m 
88. Note 83, supra. 
89. In the Western Sahara Opinion, Judge Ammoun noted that in respect 
of the struggle of peoples for self-determination: "there is one 
case which deserves to be mentioned specifically: that is the 
legitimate struggle for liberation from foreign domination". His 
view was however not based on any specific relationship between 
the struggles in themselves and the purposes of the Charter as 
such. He based his point on the fact that "the General Assembly 
has affirmed the legitimacy of that struggle in at least four 
resolutions...which when taken together already constitute 
custom." (I.C.J. Report (1975),99.) During the drafting of Reso-
lution 2525 (XXIV), i.e. the Declaration on Friendly Relations, 
it was generally agreed the use of force by colonial peoples in 
order to exercise their right to self-determination was excluded 
from the general prohibition of force under Article 2(4); Sukovic, 
"Principle of Equal Rights and Self-Determination of Peoples" 
in Sahovic (ed.). Principles of International Law Concerning 
Friendly Relations and Co-operation (1972), 32,367 See also 
Espiell, op.cit., (1980), note 84, "the right of peoples to 
(contd) 
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pursuit of self-determination is consistent with the Purposes of the 
United Nations which include self-determination of peoples and the 
90 
respect for fundamental freedoms. 
It is submitted that with the exception of Articles 42 and 51 
cases, the use of force in international law is prima facie inconsist-
ent with the preservation of international peace and security, which 
is one of the purposes of the United Nations. Admittedly, respect 
for the principle of self-determination is also one of the aims of 
the organization. But the issue is whether within the terms'of Article 
2(4), it is permissible to use force to pursue one or any of the 
Purposes of the United Nations. In other words, does the use of force 
in pursuit of one purpose justify a breach of Article 2 (4)? The 
answer must necessarily be in the negative because no provision in 
the United Nations Charter suggests otherwise. 
The use of force in a war of national liberation to pursue self-
determination could undoubtedly disturb peace and security and there-
fore be inconsistent with one of the Purposes of the United Nations. 
This is to say that the use of force for self-determination could well 
89. (contd) self-determination necessarily implies the right of 
peoples to struggle by every means available to them when the 
possibilities of obtaining the right...by peaceful means have 
been exhausted"; Bokor Szegdi, op.cit., note 79, 37-38; Ronzitti, 
"Resort to Force in Wars of National Liberation" in Cassese 
(ed.), Current Problems of International Law. Essays on U.N. Law 
and the Law of Armed Conflict (1975), 350; Bowett, "Reprisals 
Involving Recourse to Armed Force", A.J.I.L., Vol. 56 (1972), 12, 
19. Akehurst also notes that "there is general agreement that 
peoples who have a legal right to self-determination are entitled 
to fight a war of national liberation". (Akehurst, A Modem 
Introduction to International Law (1982), 256.) 
90. A number of authorities take a different view based on the 
intended use and origins of Article 2(4). See Henkin, How Nations 
Behave, Law and Foreign Policy (1958),229,152; Dugard, op.cit., 
note 80, 175, the U.N. envisages decolonization by peaceful means: 
Wright, "The Goa Incident", A.J.I.L., Vol. 55 (1962), 628; 
Brownlie, op.cit., note 79, 258, the "second limb" of Art. 2(4) 
was not intended to restrict prohibition of force in favour of 
self help. 
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be a contradiction of the "second limb" of Article 2(4). The contra-
diction can only be resolved on the basis that within the context of 
decolonization, respect for self-determination and fundamental human 
rights enjoys primacy among the Purposes of the United Nations. In 
view of this, where the maintenance of the international peace and 
security would lead to condoning a denial of self-determination and 
fundamental freedoms, the United Nations would accept the use of 
force as appropriate. The rationale would seem to be that in the long 
term, the Purposes of the United Nations are best served through this 
option since a continued deprivation of self-determination and denials 
of fundamental freedoms are bound to disturb peace and security. 
Sureda defends this reasoning by arguing that in adopting this option 
it is up to the United Nations organs to weigh whether condemning 
the use of force to eliminate a given situation is more desirable 
for maintaining peace than allowing the situation to deteriorate to 
become more explosive in future. In permitting the use of force, it 
is also up to them to balance the possible advantages against any dis-
advantages which may arise from the gradual erosion of the absolute 
91 
character of the prohibition of the use of force. 
It must be emphasized that nothing in the United Nations Charter 
suggests that the Purposes of the organization can be viewed in a 
hierarchical order which permits self-determination to assume primacy. 
However, it can be argued that in a situation of colonial domination 
and a general denial of self-determination of peoples, it is doubtful 
whether the maintenance of peace and security in particular and the 
respect for other Purposes of the United Nations would be a reality. 
There is a complementary relationshp between the Purposes of the 
United Nations. The compliance with one purpose is in itself a pre-
91. Sureda, 350-51, 
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requisite for achieving or upholding other purposes. In more specific 
terms, it can be said that the compliance with or respect for the 
principle of self-determination of peoples is an essential basis 
for peace and security. In issues of decolonization, the position 
of a majority of the members of the United Nations therefore appears 
to be a paradoxical one that permits the use of force in decolonization 
on the basis that the achievement of self-determination by all peoples 
is the pre-condition for lasting international peace and security. 
Aggression - Self-Defence 
Can the use of force by a self-determination unit be justified 
on the basis of a continuing state of aggression that gives rise to 
the right of self-defence? The right of self-defence accrues to a 
state under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, in the event of 
an aggression or threat thereof against the State. Self-defence 
is therefore a right for a specific category of international sub-
jects - states. Since self-determination units are not states, it 
would seem to follow that they cannot use force by virtue of the 
92 
right of self-defence. In response to this, it 
has been suggested that since the use of force is prima facie legal, 
93 
the resort to the right of self-defence is superfluous. The flaw 
in this argument is that it fails to take into account the debates 
on the issue of self-defence and colonial peoples in the United 
Nations. If therefore confuses the question of the legitimacy of 
the use of force as such by colonial peoples with the right of self-
defence in international law. While every action of self-defence 
would amount to a legitimate use of force, it is not every legitimate 
use of force that amounts to self-defence. So far, the debates in 
92. Dugard, op.cit., note 80, 172 
93. Ronzitti, op.cit., note 89. 
112. 
the United Nations clearly indicate that while there is a general 
consensus on the legitimacy of the use of force to expel a colonial 
power, there is no such agreement to extend the right of self-
defence to colonial peoples. During the drafting of the Declaration 
on Friendly Relations, Third World States had taken the view that 
colonial peoples' rights to self-defence were inherent in their right 
to use force to prevent repressive measures by colonial powers to deny 
their right to self-determination. The Third World States had there-
fore advocated for the right to self-defence for all liberation move-
ments. There was little agreement with this view. The general 
opinion that prevailed and led to the express exclusion of self-
defence in the declaration was that its recognition for the libera-
tion movements would have no basis in the Charter which restricts 
94 Article 51 to sovereign states. 
On the other hand, it has also been argued that since self-deter-
mination units are potential states, should a forceful repression of 
their claims not be considered as aggression for which they are 
entitled to self-defence? This argument appears to be one of the 
theoretical foundations of the Soviet view on aggression and self-
defence with respect to dependent territories. It is argued that 
"national sovereignty" is both spiritually and materially the inalienable 
right of every human group^that every nation by virtue of its natural 
endowment with sovereignty is a fully-fledged person in international 
law. Consequently a nation struggling for self-liberation automatically 
satisfies whatever criteria is required for it to enjoy or take 
94. See the statements made by U.K., Australia, Argentina, U.S.A., 
Japan, Canada, Netherlands, Sweden and Lebanon. U.N.Doc.A/AC. 
125/SR.7-17,44, 59-70. It is of interest to note that Nigeria 
came up with similar views. A/AC.125/SR 7. See also comments on 
the debates in Sinclair, "Principles of International Law Concern-
ing Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States", in Nawaz, 
Essays in International Law (1974), 107; Sukovic, op.cit.. 
Note 89. 
113. 
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advantage of a given international right. 
The basis of this argument is rather dubious. Firstly there is 
a definite distinction between a state in international law and an 
entity (e.g. a mandate or a colony or a protectorate) which is capable 
of becoming a state. The rules on aggression relate specifically to 
states. This argument is reinforced by the fact that the 
preamble of the Consensus Definition of Aggression (i.e. G.A. Resolu-
tion 3314 (XXIX) only reaffirms "the duty of states not to use armed 
force to deprive peoples of their right to self-determination, free-
dom and independence") . The word "states" is used in contradiction 
with peoples of non-self-governing territories. General opinion dur-
ing the debates on the consensus definition of aggression did not 
favour the inclusion of non-state entities in the definition of ag-
gression. This explains why there is no mention of non-self-governing 
95b 
territories in the substantive part of the resolution. 
In conclusion, it is submitted that in modern international law, 
the use of force by self-determination units is accepted as a quali-
fication to the Charter provisions in Article 2(4). However, the 
use of force in itself cannot be necessarily rationalized as an act 
of self-defence unless one adopts the view that for the purposes 
of self-determination, the territory of a unit is equivalent to that 
of a "state" and that the presence of the administering power consti-
tutes aggression for which self-defence arises in favour of that unit. 
Alternatively, it may well be that on the basis of the series of General 
Assembly resolutions recognizing the right of colonial peoples to resist 
95a. See Ginsburg , "Wars of National Liberation and the Modern 
Law of Nations, The Soviet Thesis", in Baade, Soviet Impact 
on International Law, 66-68, 75-76. 
95b. For a critical commentary on the relationship between the 
Definition of Aggression and non-state entities see Stone, 
"Hopes and Loopholes in the 1974 Definition of Aggression, 
A.J.I.L., Vol. 71 (1977), 224-245. 
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the armed repression in pursuit of self-determination, there has 
emerged new norms in customary international law which admit the 
right of self-defence for colonial peoples, as represented by the 
various liberation forces. In contemporary times, the widespread 
international recognition of these forces and acceptance of the "legi-
timacy" of the use of force against South Africa in Namibia and form-
erly, against the Portuguese in Mozambique, Guinea Bissau and Angola, 
are eloquent manifestations of the emergence of these 
95 
new norms as custom. The general point about these developments in 
the United Nations and in international law is that they amount to 
a derogation from the unqualified ban on the use of force under 
Article 2(4). Above all, the developments admit the legitimacy of 
a new basis for the use of force (i.e. apart from Articles 42 and 51 
cases under the Charter), and consequently bring the international 
community back to the era of "just" and "unjust" war dichotomy, with wars 
of national liberation considered as "just" war. 
A considerable number of authorities have taken a rather cata-
97 
clymic view of these developments. It is submitted that whatever 
its evils, the admission of the just and unjust war dichotomy within 
the context of decolonization is a desirable alternative particularly 
in the entrenched cases of colonial domination such as in Namibia and 
96. On the basis of a similar reasoning, Abi-Saab suggests that 
the liberation movements have a jus ad bellum subsequently their 
conduct and their treatment are subject to jus in bello ("Wars 
of National Liberation and Law of War", Annales D'Etude Inter-
nationales, Vol. 3 (1972) 93. 
97. See Claude, "Just Wars: Doctrines and Institutions", Pol.Science 
Quarterly (1980), Vol. 95, 83-95; Baxter, "Humanitarian Law or 
Humanitarian Politics, The 1974 Diplomatic Conference on Humani-
tarian Law", Harvard Int'l.L.Journ., Vol. 16, 1-25, particularly 
11-18; "The Geneva Conventions of 1949 and Wars of National Liber-
ation", Revista di Diritto Internazionale (1974), Vol. 57, 199; 
Graham, "The 1974 Diplomatic Conference on the Law of War: A 
Victory for Political Causes and a Return to the Just War Concept 
of the Eleventh Century", Washington and Lee, Law Rev. (1975). 
(contd) 
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in the former Portuguese colonies. These developments represent new 
trends in contemporary values among the majority of the members of 
the international community and underscore the great significance of 
self-determination in the decolonization process. 
The Case of Third Parties Assisting in the Use of Force in 
Pursuit of Self-Determination 
98 
As indicated earlier. General Assembly resolutions have consist-
ently affirmed the right of colonial peoples to seek and receive 
moral or material assistance in resisting colonial rule. The resolu-
tions also emphasize that Member states of the United Nations have a 
"duty" to assist such peoples. What is the legal position in respect 
of third parties who assist self-determination units in the use of 
99 
force? We have concluded earlier that the use of force by self-
determination units is a qualification to Article 2(4). It therefore 
is submitted that the action of third parties who assist such units 
in response to General Assembly resolutions are not in breach of 
100 
Article 2(4). Furthermore, bearing in mind our conclusion that 
in contemporary times there are new norms of customary international 
law that recognize the right of self-defence for the colonies, it may 
well be argued that assisting states can justify their action on the 
101 
basis of collective self-defence. 
97. (contd). Vol. 32, 25-63. See also Kunz, "Bellum Justum and 
Bellum legale", A.J.I.L., Vol.45 (1951). See also Pomerance, 
op.cit., note 84, 57-60. 
98. Page 107, supra. 99. Page 113, supra. 
100. Pages 113-11 A,supra. 
101. On this point see the comments of Akehurst, op.cit., note 89, 
244-245. See however the critical observations of Dugard,op. 
cit., note 80, 150-187; also Wohlgemuth, "The Portuguese Terri-
tories and the United Nations", Int.Cone.No.544 (1963) ,57. On the 
other hand, Henkin, admits the possibility of this defence. He 
however restricts it to the Gea-type situations, i.e. where the 
assisting state basis its actions on historic title (Henkin, 
"Force, Intervention and Neutrality in Contemporary International 
Law", P.A.S.I.L. (1953), 147, particularly at 152-153. 
116. 
The 1970 Declaration on Friendly Relations affirms that, "in 
their actions against and resistance to...forcible action in pursuit 
of the exercise of their right to self-determination,(colonial) 
peoples are entitled to seek and receive support in accordance with 
the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations". 
However, the Declaration also stipulates that 
Every State has the duty to refrain from organizing 
or encouraging the organization of irregular forces 
or armed bands including mercenaries for incursion 
into the territory of another state. 
Every State has the duty to refrain from...assisting 
...in acts of civil strife or terrorist acts in another 
State or acquiescing in organized activities within its 
territory directed towards the commission of such acts... 
On the face of it, it would seem that the assistance to a colonial 
people to expel a colonial power would be in breach of these provis-
ions. However a careful analysis of the provisions indicates that 
assistance offered by a third state to a colonial people is consist-
ent with the Declaration. For one thing, the Declaration prohibits 
assistance to acts:(l) directed against the territory of a state, or 
(2) of violence in another state. According to the Declaration, 
"the territory of a colony or other non-self-governing territory has, 
under the Charter of the United Nations, a status separate and dis-
tinct from the State administering it". Consequently assistance to 
a dependent people in pursuit of self-determination inside the de-
pendent territory does not constitute assistance to acts against the 
territory of the administering state or to acts of violence in the 
administering state. 
In Article 3(g) of the Consensus Definition of Aggression, an 
act of aggression is defined to include: 
The sending by or on behalf of a State of armed bands, 
groups, irregulars or mercenaries which carry out acts 
of armed force against another state or of such gravity 
as to amount to the acts listed above or its substantial 
involvement therein. 
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However, Article 7 provides a definite qualification to Article 3(g) 
by stating that 
Nothing in this Definition, and in particular Article 3, 
could in any way prejudice the right of self-determination, 
freedom and independence, as derived from the Charter, of 
peoples forcibly deprived of that right, and referred to 
in the Declaration on Friendly Relations particularly to 
peoples under colonial and racist regimes or other forms of 
alien domination, nor the right of these peoples to struggle 
to that end and to seek and receive support in accordance 
with the principles of the Charter and in conformity with 
the above mentioned Declaration. 
This qualification is significant because it reinforces the legi-
timate basis of the assistance by states to colonial proples. 
There is however, a problem with the issue of assistance. General 
Assembly resolutions request assisting states to provide "material" and 
"moral" assistance. The exact form or meaning of material assistance 
is open to debate in the absence of any specific definitions by the 
General Assembly. It is not clear whether the resolutions permit an 
assisting state to commit its own forces to aid a self-determination 
unit in a colonial struggle or not. In other words, it is not clear 
whether "material" assistance means material aid in the form of combat 
troops, weapons or logistics, medical supplies and financial assistance. 
In terms of actual practice, the bulk of material assistance supplied 
by States has usually taken the form of logistics, territorial sanctu-
aries and financial assistance. The few cases in which assisting 
states committed combat troops includes the Cuban involvement in Angola 
and the Indian assistance to Bangladesh. However, these two instances 
are of relative significance because in the case of Angola,the Cuban 
troops did not assist in the expulsion of a colonial power as such. 
The troops only fought on the side of the MPLA (Popular Movement for 
the Liberation of Angola) as against other competing nationalist move-
ments, after the withdrawal of Portugal, the administering power. 
Bangladesh, on the other hand, was not a case of decolonization. 
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In conclusion, we can say that for the purposes of decolonization , 
assistance to colonial peoples is permissible in modern international 
law. However, in the absence of clear directives on what form any 
assistance offered should take, the exact limits of permissible assist-
ance to colonial peoples is quite debatable. In more specific terms 
the issue of assistance raises questions as to who decides which 
colonial situations merit assistance, which of the several competing 
groups in a colonial territory (as in the case of Angola) can legally 
be assisted in a colonial struggle, at what point should the assist-
ance be terminated, etc? 
SELF-DETERMINATION VERSUS THE PRINCIPLE.OF DQIffiSTIC JURISDICTION 
The domestic jurisdiction principle is founded on the concept 
of sovereignty of states and their recognized rights to non-inter-
vention in their internal affairs as sovereign entities. In the 
United Nations Charter, the Domestic Jurisdiction Principle is em-
bodied in the provisions of Article 2(7) which provide that 
Nothing contained in the....Charter shall authorize 
the United Nations to intervene in matters which are 
essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any 
State or shall require the members to submit such 
matters to settlement under the Charter. 
The question is, within the context of decolonization, are issues of 
self-determination precluded from the operation of this provision? 
We have indicated earlier that under Resolution 1514 (XV), the sub-
jection of peoples to alien subjugation,domination and exploitation 
is contrary to the Charter of the United Nations and it is an impedi-
102 
ment to the promotion of world peace and co-operation. Under the 
United Nations Charter, issues affecting international peace and co-
operation are precluded from the operation of Article 2(7). Thus by 
102. See pages 15-16 supra. 
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drawing a link between "alien subjugation, domination and exploitation" 
on the one hand and international peace and co-operation on the other 
hand, the resolution implied that issues of self-determination are 
103 
not covered by Article 2(7). 
Within the context of decolonization, how valid is the implied 
exclusion of issues of self-determination from Article 2(7) in the 
light of the provisions of the United Nations Charter on self-deter-
mination generally? We discussed earlier that the Charter recognizes 
respect for the principle of self-determination of peoples as one of 
the purposes of the United Nations. The inclusion of self-determina-
tion in the Charter amounts to an institutional recognition of the 
principle in international relations. Consequently, issues relating to 
cases of respect for or violations of the right of self-determination 
are matters of legitimate international concern to which Article 2(7) 
does not apply. Furthermore, Chapters XI and XII of the Charter im-
pose definite obligations on administering powers regarding the 
administration of non-self-governing territories. Under Chapter XII, 
the administration of Trust Territories is made subject to inter-
national supervision through the Trusteeship Council. The issue of 
self-determination in respect of a Trust Territory is therefore not 
one that is "essentially within the domestic jurisdiction" of the 
administering power. 
Under Article 73 of Chapter XI however, similar international 
supervision is not required for non-Trust Territories. Nevertheless, 
The Charter imposes other obligations in respect of such territories. 
Under paragraph 73 administering powers accept to transmit regularly 
to the Secretary General, for the purposes of information, "statistical 
103. In this regard see the comments by Bokor-Szegfl, op.cit., 
note 79, 21. For a treatment of the relationship between 
Article 2(7) and Resolution 1514 (XV) and self-determination 
(contd) 
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and other information of a technical nature relating to economic, 
social and educational conditions in the territories for which they 
are respectively responsible" other than the trust territories. 
Under paragraph 'b' they also undertake to develop self-government 
in the colonial territories, taking into account "the political aspira-
tons of the peoples and to assist them in the progressive development 
of their political institutions. The progressive development of the 
political institutions in non-Trust Territories is consequently a 
definite international obligation over which an administering state 
cannot have a right of domestic jurisdiction. It would be ludicrous 
for a state to accept an obligation under an international agreement 
to develop a dependent territory towards self-government and later 
claim that the question as to whether it fulfils this obligation is 
104 
one which is essentially within its domestic jurisdiction. 
In modern times, the right of self-determination has been affirm-
ed in such significant resolutions as the Declaration on Colonies and 
the Declaration on Friendly Relations. In view of the lack of any 
opposition to the international recognition of the principle in these 
resolutions, and in view of the fact that colonialism has virtually 
been eliminated through the United Nations, it has become academic 
and rather unrealistic to suggest that a state can invoke Article 2(7) 
as a defence against the implementation of self-determination in the 
context of decolonization. 
103.(contd) generally see, Jones, The United Nations and the 
Domestic Jurisdiction of States (1979), particularly Chapter 
IV; Higgins, The Development of International Law Through the 
Political Organs of the United Nations (1963), 90-106. 
See generally also. Rajan. The United Nations and Domestic 
Jurisdiction (1961). 
104. Kelsen, The Law of the United Nations (1951), 565, note 9. 
For a different view see Jones, op.cit., note 103. 
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CONCLUSION 
Since 1945, by far the greatest revolution in international 
relations has been decolonization. The basis for decolonization has 
been self-determination in the status of an institutionalized legal 
right. Given the prominence of decolonization after 1945, the right 
of self-determination has acquired pre-eminence among the other inter-
national law norms in modern times. It has been suggested that self-
determination is not a juggernaut - that tramples upon all other 
principles of international law. Par from being an absolute right, 
its exercise must have due regard for other principles of internation-
al law. It needs to be noted in response that the pre-emin-
ence of self-determination does not make it a "juggernaut". It only 
implies that within the context of decolonization modern internation-
al law would not admit the denial of self-determination to a depend-
ent people founded on some other norms of international law apart 
from an exceptional category of cases. 
In more specific terms, we can make the following conclusions on 
the relationship between self-determination and the other three 
Charter norms we have considered: In decolonization, the principle 
of self-determination categorically pre-empts territorial integrity 
claims of a state where a self-determination unit demands an exercise 
of the right as a separate entity. This proposition however does 
not apply to the exceptional cases of units which are the subjects 
of rights of pre-emption or to "plantations", enclaves and leased 
territories. In these exceptions, the territorial integrity principle 
overrides self-determination. 
The use of force to pursue self-determination where all peace-
ful means have been exhausted is considered a qualification to 
105. Umozurike, 273. 
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the general prohibition of the use of force under Article 2(4) of 
the United Nations Charter. Even though other states can legiti-
mately assist a colonial unit in its struggle for self-determination, 
the exact scope of permissible assistance is not clear. Finally, the 
provisions of Article 2(7) are not a defence to the respect for and 
implementation of self-determination in the context of decolonization. 
In this discussion,the emphasis has been on the singular import-
ance of self-determination within the context of decolonization. Our 
pre-occupation with the decolonization content is necessitated by the 
fact that it is within this context that the principle's recognition 
as a legal norm has come about. It is consequently within this con-
text that one can properly establish the scope of self-determination 
as lex lata. Bearing in mind the emergence of self-determination as 
lex lata in the decolonization context, the question is, does the 
scope of self-determination, as a right of all peoples to freely deter-
mine their political status, extend beyond decolonization? In our 
concluding remarks in Chapter One it was indicated that this question 
has generated a debate among international lawyers and that there is 
now a general view that as the basis for decolonization, self-deter-
mination is only applicable to non-self-governing peoples. We conse-
quently devoted Chapter Two to an analysis of what constitutes a non-
self-governing territory and the role of self-determination in the 
context of decolonization. We established that the role of the prin-
ciple to guarantee among others, the equality of the individual in 
his society and to provide the basis for his participation in the 
decision-making processes of his community. In view of these roles, 
is the principle of self-determination still relevant to community 
relations in the post-colonial context? In our next chapter, it is 
intended to address the issue as to whether there is a right to self-
determination after decolonization. 
CHAPTER FOUR 
IS THERE A RIGHT OF SELF-DETERMINATION 
IN THE POST-COLONIAL CONTEXT? 
The question of the existence of a right of self-determination 
in the post-colonial context is concerned with whether international 
law as such, recognizes self-deteirmination as a putative right for 
all peoples after decolonization or in a non-colonial setting. This 
must not be confused, as is often the case, with the issue as to 
whether it is desirable or not for international law to recognize 
the general right of self-determination in the post-colonial context. 
The two issues are different. The former is concerned with whether 
self-determination exists as lex lata in the post-colonial context. 
The latter, on the other hand, relates to a normative inquiry, based 
on self-determination as de lege ferenda. In this section of the work, 
the focus of discussion is on whether self-determination exists 
as lex lata. We are thus concerned with a definitive, as opposed 
to a normative inquiry, into the status of self-determination in 
the post-colonial context. 
In order to admit a rule as law in a given legal system, it 
needs to be shown that the rule is the product of one or more law 
creating processes in that system. Consequently, the inquiry into 
the existence of a legal right of self-determination in the post-
colonial context must be made by reference to the principal and 
subsidiary sources of law in international law, namely: conventions, 
international customary law, the general principles of law recog-
nized by civilized nations, the decisions of tribunals and thg teach-
ing of the most highly qualified publicists. 
1. These law determining agencies are provided as the areas to 
(contd) 
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CONVEl^ JTIONS OR TREATIES 
Treaties in themselves are,strictly speaking, sources of obli-
gations rather than sources of law. Sometimes however,a treaty 
may be a codification of existing law. In such cases, the treaty 
becomes a convenient statement and vital evidence of what the law is. 
The treaty would of course not be the source of law. On the other 
hand, a treaty may sometimes incorporate a new rule by which the parties 
may consent to be bound, under the doctrine of pacta sunt servanda. 
In such cases, the rule incorporated may not necessarily be law,but 
the consent to observe the rule, amounts to a recognition of its 
validity and provides the basis for legal obligations in respect 
2 
of the rule. Hence the importance of treaties in our 
enquiry. 
3 
As indicated earlier, a number of treaties embody the right of 
self-determination. However, no existing treaty expressly rejects or 
1. (contd) which the International Court of Justice may resort 
in identifying rules of law in the settlement of international 
disputes under Article 38(1) of the Court's Statute. The 
Statute does not state categorically that provisions of Article 
38(1) are the sources of international law. However, the 
provisions are generally considered as a complete statement 
of the sources of law in international law. See Brownlie, 
Principles, 3. On the sources of law, see generally Parry, 
Sources and Evidence of International Law (1965); Verzijl, 
International Law from a Historical Perspective H (1968),1-89; 
Brierly, The Law of Nations (1963), 55-65; Harris, Cases and 
Materials on International Law (1979), 22-54; See also the 
cases discussed in relation to the sources of law and the editor's 
note on the subject in Briggs, The Law of Nations (1952), 
25-52. 
2. Fitzmaurice, "Some Problems Regarding the Formal Sources of 
Law", Symbolae Verzijl (1958), 153. See generally also McNair, 
Treaties (1951), 51, 749-52; "The Differing Legal Character of 
Treaties", B.Y.I.L., Vol.11 (1930), 100-8; Stark, "Treaties as 
a Source of International Law", B.Y.I.L., Vol. 23 (1945), 341-
46; Tunkin,"Co-existence in International Law", Hague Recueil, 
Vol. 95, (1958,III),5-78, particularly 8-21, Brownlie, 
Principles, 12-15. 
3. Page 21, supra. 
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recognizes self-determination in the post-colonial context. 
So to find out whether the parties to a given treaty, by incorporat-
ing self-determination, envisaged its relevance to the post-colonial 
contexts or not, one must consider the interpretation of self-deter-
mination within the context of the treaty as a whole and against a 
background of the traveaux preparatoires. Let us consider specific 
treaties briefly. 
The United Nations Charter 
As stated earlier, the principle of self-determination 
was incorporated in the United Nations Charter at the insistence of 
4 
the Soviet Union at San Francisco. During the debates, it was empha-
sized that the right of self-determination "conformed to the purposes 
of the Charter only insofar as it implied the right to self-govern-
ment of peoples and not the right of secession". By implication self-
determination was not considered as a right for non-colonial peoples 
or for peoples resident in sovereign states. 
In other developments during the San Francisco debates, France 
specifically requested the Technical Committee to explain whether 
self-determination as incorporated in the Charter implied "the right 
of a state to have its own democratic institutions or the right of 
secession". In the reply the chairman of the Technical Committee 
explained rather ambiguously: "The right of self-determination meant 
7 
that a people may establish any regime they favoured". He did not 
explain whether this implied that people within a sovereign state 
could exercise the right. Despite the ambiguity, general opinion in 
4. Page 10, supra. 
5. Doc. 343, 1/1/16, 7 U.N.C.I.O.Docs. 293 (1945). 
5. Doc. WD. 410, 17 U.N.C.I.O. Docs.(1945) 142. 
7. Doc. WD. 424, 17 U.N.C.I.O. Docs. (1954), 163. 
126. 
the United Nations did not favour the extension of self-determination 
beyond the colonial context. In the years after San Francisco, 
Belgium's attempts to interpret self-determination in the Charter 
to include such peoples as the Pathans, Kurds, Nagas and Karens were 
p 
persistently rejected by the United Nations. 
In all, it can be said that nothing in the United Nations 
Charter suggests that the principle of self-determination was meant 
to cover cases in the post-colonial context. 
The Charter of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) (196S) 
The Charter of the OAU does not make any explicit references 
to the right of self-determination. However, support for the right 
within the colonial context is implied in the Organization's objective 
to "eradicate all forms of colonialism from the continent". On the 
other hand, there is an implicit rejection of any right of self-
determination in the post-colonial context. This is reflected in the 
members' pledge under the Charter to "defend their sovereignty, their 
territorial integrity and independence". In conclusion, the OAU 
Charter does not support the existence of a right of self-determina-
9 
tion m the post-colonial context. 
The International Covenants on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights and on Civil and Political Rights (1966) 
Article 1 of both covenants provide that "all peoples have the 
right of self-determination", and that "by virtue of that right they 
8. On the Belgian position see generally. The Sacred Mission of 
Civilization: The Belgian Thesis (1953). See also Kunz, 
"Chapter XI of the U.N. Charter in Action", A.J.I.L., Vol. 48 
(1954) . 
9. Kamanu, "Secession and the Right of Self-Determination: An OAU 
Dilemma", J.M.A.S., Vol. 12 (1974), 355-376, particularly at 
372-373. Nayar, "Self-Determination Beyond the Colonial 
Context, Biafra Retrospect",Texas Int'1.L.Journ., Vol. 10(1975), 
321, 326-328. 
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freely determine their political status and freely pursue their 
economic, social and cultural development". The provision in both 
instruments is a verbatim affirmation of the principle of self-deter-
mination in the Declaration on Colonies and other United Nations 
statements on the principle. The provision relates to the recognition 
of self-determination as a right in the colonial context. This is 
because in Article 1(3) of both covenants, the respect for and reali-
zation of the right of self-determination is related to the admini-
stration of "Non-Self-Governing and Trust Territories". Neither 
covenant makes mention of self-determination as a general right that 
transcends the colonial context. 
During the drafting stages, there were debates on whether self-
determination as in Article 1 of the covenants applied in the non-
colonial context or not. There was the view that a distinction had 
to be made between the rights of individuals in a sovereign state in 
relation to their government on the one hand, and the question of 
collective rights of international consequences such as self-deter-
mination on the other hand. The latter issues concerned the rights of 
peoples in the post-colonial context to which many members were not 
10 
willing to extend the right of self-determination. The issue, as 
the British delegation later noted, was "whether ... States having no 
colonies were indeed prepared to face the consequences of assuming 
11 
a legal obligation to promote self-determination within their borders". 
The delegates were divided on the question. Egypt argued that the 
right of self-determination of peoples "was the right to free expres-
sion of popular will (and that) whether that will was in favour of 
10. 10 U.N. G.A.O.R., 3rd Comm. 542d. m'tting, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR. 
642 (1955), 90-91, para. 15. 
11. 16 U.N. E.C.O.S.O.C.. Suppl. 8. U.N. Doc. E/2447 (1953), para. 159, 
128, 
12 
secession or association, it had to be respected". While New 
13 
Zealand found this interpretation of self-determination unacceptable, 
Panama took the view that attempts to exclude groups resident in 
sovereign states from the right of self-determination, would only 
14 drive such groups to resort to violence to claim it. The delegate 
from Ireland thought that the right of self-determination ought to 
be validly applicable to a group in the post-colonial context "where 
., 15 political, economic, national or cultural rights were not secured . 
General opinion in the Commission did not favour broad inter-
pretations of self-determination to include a right in the post-
colonial context. In the end, the draft that was adopted as 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights implicitly 
distinguished the rights of non-self-governing peoples to self-deter-
mination and the rights of minorities in a sovereign state. 
While Article 1,as indicated earlier, provides for the rights of Non-
Self-Governing and Trust Territories, Article 27 deals with the 
rights of minorities separately. It provides that: 
in those states in which ethnic, religious or 
linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging 
to such minorities shall not be denied the right, 
in community with other members of their group, 
to enjoy their own culture, to progress and practice 
their own religion, or to use their own language. 
Today, there is considerable juristic support for the view that the 
separate provisions for non-self-governing peoples on the one hand, 
and minorities on the other hand,is an implied rejection of any 
12. 7 U.N. G.A.O.R. 3rd C'ttee, 454th m'tting, para. 36. 
U.N. Doc. A/C. 3/SR.454 (1952). 
13. Id., 460 m'tting, at 260, para. 24. 
14. 12 U.N. G.A.O.R. 3rd C'ttee, 827th m'tting, at 322, para 32. 
U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.827 (1957). 
15. 13 U.N. G.A.O.B. 3rd c'ttee, 887 meeting, 253, para 8, 
U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.887 (1958). 
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right of self-determination for minorities (in the post-colonial 
context). 
fhe Helsinki Accord (1975) 
The Helsinki Accord, adopted as the Final Act of the Conference 
on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) incorporates the 
17 principle of self-determination. In Section VIII, the participating 
States accept to respect "the equal rights of peoples and their right 
to self-determination". More significantly the section also provides 
that: 
By virtue of the principle of equal rights and self-
determination of peoples, all peoples always have 
the right, in full freedom, to determine, when and 
as they wish, their internal and external political 
status, without external interference and to pursue 
as they wish their political, economic, social and 
cultural development. 
A very significant feature of the Helsinki Accord's provisions 
is that they were not made in reference to Non-Self-Governing and 
Trust Territories. Section VIII therefore stated self-determination 
as a general right applicable to the constituent communities of the 
participating states. The formulation of self-determination in the 
16. Cassese, "Self-Determination of Peoples" in Henkin (ed.). The 
International Bill of Rights. The Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (1981), 92-113; Espiell, The Right of Self-Determination, 
Implementation of United Nations Resolutions, E/CN.4/Sub.2/ 
2405/Rev.l (1980), 9; Cristescu, The Right of Self-Determination, 
Historical and Current Developments on the Basis of United Nations 
Instruments, E/CN.4/Sub.2/404/ Rev.l (1981), 41; Capotorti, 
Studies on the Right of Persons Belonging to Ethnic, Religious 
and Linguistic Minorities, E/CN.4/Sub.2/384/Rev.l (1979), 35. 
See however the different views expressed by Anderson, "The 
Indigenous People of Saskatchewan: Their Role Under International 
Law", American Indian Journ., Vol. 7 (1981), 4-21. Bennet, 
Aboriginal Rights in International Low (1978), particularly at 
50 seq. ; Meissner, "The Right of Self-Determination After 
Helsinki and its Significance for the Baltic Nations", Case W. 
Res. J.Int'l.L., Vol. 13 (1982), 375, 376-377. 
17. The Final Act is reproduced in 14 I.L.M. (1975), 1293. 
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text of the Accords was the result of intense negotiations between 
the Western state participants and the Eastern Bloc countries, parti-
18 
cularly the Soviet Union. In pursuing the inclusion of self-deter-
mination in the Accords, the Western States had been motivated prim-
arily by the desire to restrain the Soviet Union from any future 
Czechoslovakian-style invasion under what is usually described as 
the Brezhnev Doctrine, and to provide a recognised basis for the claims 
19 
to self-determination by the Baltic Nations under Soviet rule. In 
specific reference to the Baltic Nations, it has thus been suggested that 
self-determination as incorporated in the Accords is a recogni-
tion of the "universal nature of (the principle) for all peoples who 
have lost their political independence through force or who have been 
20 
separated against their will". 
21 
The provisions of the Accord are not legally binding. In 
pressing for the inclusion of self-determination, the West had there-
fore been aware that its practical effects could well be marginal for the 
22 intended beneficiaries. Today, the Baltic Nations are still integral 
parts of the Soviet Union. The apparent recognition of self-determination 
in the post-colonial context in the Accords has made no difference. 
18. Cassese, "The Helsinki Declaration and Self-Determination", in 
Human Rights, International Lew and Helsinki (1979), 72. 
19. Russell, "The Helsinki Declaration: Brobdingnag or Lilliput?", 
A.J.I.L., Vol. 70 (1976), 242, 253-256. The case of the Baltic 
Nations is discussed in detail at page 279, 
20. Meissner, "The Right of Self-Determination After Helsinki and its 
Significance for the Baltic Nations", Case W. Res.J.Int'l.L., 
Vol. 13, 375, 378. 
21. In this regard see the comments by Schachter, "The Twilight 
Existence of Non-binding International Agreements", A.J.I.L., 
Vol. 71 (1977), 296; also, Russell, op.cit., note 19, 
246-249. 
22. Russell, op.cit., note 19, 256. 
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To summarise, the Helsinki Accords recognize self-determination 
as applicable to the constituent communities of the signatory states. 
In effect, the Accords admit a right of self-determination in the 
post-colonial context. However, the provisions of the Accords are 
not legally binding, and their practical significance for the intended 
beneficiaries remains to be seen. 
The African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights 
The African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights, otherwise 
23 
known as the Banjul Charter, provides for a "bundle" of individual 
human rights on the one hand, and collective human rights on the other 
24 
hand, hence the name "Charter on Human and Peoples Rights". In 
Article 20 the Charter provides that: 
(1) ...all peoples...shall have the unquestionable 
and inalienable right to self-determination. 
They shall freely determine their political status 
and shall pursue their economic and social develop-
ment according to the policy they have freely chosen. 
(2) Colonized or oppressed peoples have the right to 
free themselves from the bonds of domination by 
resorting to any means recognized by the inter-
national community, (emphasis mine) 
The use of the phrase "all peoples" in paragraph 1 when contrasted 
with the phrase "colonized or oppressed peoples" in paragraph 2 leads 
to a rather interesting conclusion: within the context of the 
Charter, the word "peoples" is a general term or category of which 
"colonized or oppressed people" constitute a sub-category. In other 
words, the specific reference to "colonized or oppressed peoples" 
indicates that such peoples constitute a distinct beneficiary group 
23. The text of the Banjul Charter is reproduced in I.L.M., 
Vol. 21 (1982), 59. 
24. For a recent commentary on the Charter see Umozurike, "The 
African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights", A.J.I.L., 
Vol. 71 (1983), 902-912. 
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as opposed to "all peoples" . Throughout the Charter the 
phrase "all peoples" is used consistently in contradistinction to 
"every individual". The Charter does not define peoples. However, 
within the context of the provisions it could be said that "all peoples" 
refers to the collection of individuals who make up the constituent 
communities of Africa and to whom the collective rights provided in 
the Charter are applicable. It is therefore logical to suggest that 
within the framework of the Banjul Charter, "all peoples" as such 
(including the distinct category of colonized and oppressed peoples) 
have a right to self-determination. By implication, it is possible 
to interpret self-determination in the Charter as applicable to peoples 
in a post-colonial context. The possibility of this interpretation 
is enhanced by the fact that in the Charter, there is no mention of 
the affirmation of "territorial integrity" which is a very signifi-
cant feature of the OAU Charter and other OAU pronouncements. 
This is not to say that under the Banjul Charter, the signatory 
states pledge themselves to support self-determination demands in 
the post-colonial context. The essential point, in analysing the 
provisions in the Charter, is to indicate the possibility of interpre-
ting the provisions on self-determination broadly to go beyond the 
colonial context. During the drafting of the Charter, in 1979, the 
possibility of this interpretation was raised by some of the 
25 
experts. Consequently, in 1981 when the OAU Secretary General 
presented his report before the Plenary Session of the OAU Council of 
Ministers, there were considerable objections on the grounds, inter 
alia, that the provisions, broad as they were, were capable of 
25. For a report on the various views expressed by the experts 
see Reunion des experts pour I'elaboration d'un avant-projet 
de Charte Afrique de droits de l'homme et des peuples (on 
file with the International Human Rights Law Group, Washington 
D.C., 1979). 
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misinterpretation. Despite these objections, the OAU's Eighteenth 
27 
Assembly of Heads of Government adopted the Charter without changes. 
In drafting the Charter the experts aimed at preparing a 
human rights instrument derived from African legal philosophies and 
responsive to contemporary African needs. In so doing they 
chose not to foreclose the issue of post-colonial self-determination 
altogether as was the case under the OAU Charter. On the other 
hand, they refrained from an explicit recognition of the right of 
self-determination in the post-colonial context. In the end, the 
Banjul Charter provisions on the principle appeared vague and left 
open the possibility of a broad interpretation which could be applic-
able to peoples in the post-colonial context. 
To sum up our discusssion on conventions, it may be noted that 
apart from the possible exception of the Banjul Charter, no instrument 
of legal consequence recognizes the right of self-determination. In 
stating that the Banjul Charter is a possible exception, we must 
hasten to add a caveat that the interpretation of its provisions on 
self-determination is rather contentious particularly in view of the 
28 
practice of the African states. 
INTERNATIONAL CUSTOMARY LAW AS EVIDENCED BY STATE PRACTICE 
The formation of international customary law requires similar 
and repeated acts or practice of states, repeated with the conviction 
that in so doing, they are acting in conformity with existing 
26. See OAU Doc. CM/1149 (XXXVII), 1981; OAU Doc. CM/Plen Draft. 
Rapporteurs Report (XXXVI)(1981), 60. 
27. The Assembly only deleted the word 'Africa' from the title 
African Charter of Human and Peoples Rights and replaced it 
with 'Banjul', the capital of the Republic of Gambia where most 
of the deliberations on the draft and the Assembly itself were 
held. The change was instituted to avoid any confusions between 
a title such as African Charter... with the "Charter of the 
Organization of African Unity" (OAU Diary, June 1981). 
28. The practice of the African States is discussed at page 159 ,infra. 
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29 law. For the purposes of our inquiry, the issues are whether there 
is a consistent practice of states in respect of post-colonial self-
determination and whether such practice is founded on a conviction 
that it is in accordance with existing law. In dealing with these 
issues, we would analyse the conduct of states as reflected in the 
practice of the United Nations. The choice of the United Nations is 
considered appropriate for a number of reasons. Firstly, its practice 
is a reflection of the general position of the majority of the member 
states. Secondly, the organization has dealt with issues of post-
colonial self-determination in the past and therefore provides an 
immediate source of reference for our inquiry. Thirdly, since the pro-
nouncements of the United Nations Security Council and General Assembly 
could have legal effect in some cases, the organizations' reactions 
and resolutions on specific claims of post-colonial self-determination 
could be a vital source of evidence to the existence or non-existence 
of the right. 
We would also analyse the practice of African States as manifested 
in the reactions of the OAU to claims of post-colonial self-determina-
tion. Africa necessarily deserves a special and a detailed treatment be-
cause since the early 1960s when most of the states attained their inde-
pendence, the continent has become the arena for a series of separatist 
activities. The proliferation of separatist groups has resulted in 
the evolution of specific community responses to post-colonial self-
determination. The practice of the African States is consequently 
29. The North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, I.C.J.Reports 1959, 3. 
Koppelmanas, "Custom as a means of the Creation of International 
Law", B.Y.I.L,, Vol.18 (1937), 129. On international customary 
law generally, see D'Amato, The Concept of Custom in Internation-
al Law (1971), particularly Chapter 3; Thirlway, International 
Customary Law and Codification (1972), particularly at Chapter 
Four, 46-60; Akehurst, "Custom as a Source of International 
Law", B.Y.I.L., Vol. 47 (1974-5), 1. See also The Asylum Case, 
I.C.J. Reports (1950), 266; The Lotus Case, P.C.I.J. Reports 
Series A, No. 10; The Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case, I.C.J. 
Reports (1951), 115. 
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a unique source for our inquiry in establishing at least the existence 
of a regional customary law rule on the issue. 
(1) The Practice of the United Nations 
The organization has dealt with a number of separatist claims. 
For the purposes of clarity we will examine each case separately. 
(i) The Katanga Secession 
The 1960 Katanga secession was the first test of the United 
Nations position on post-colonial self-determination. A few days 
after the independence celebrations of the Congo Republic, civil un-
rest broke out in the country. In the midst of the crisis, the copper-
rich Katanga Province seceded from the rest of the country and de-
clared its independence. It subsequently invited Belgium to assist 
it in maintaining law and order. Belgium obliged to the invitation 
and dispatched its troops to the rebel territory. 
Following the Belgium intervention, the Congolese Government 
requested United Nations' assistance. In a cable to the Security 
Council, the government expressly stated that the assistance had been 
necessitated by the "dispatch to the Congo of metropolitan Belgian 
troops". The government further explained: 
The essential purpose of the required military aid 
is to protect the national territory of the Congo 
against present external aggression which is a threat 
to international peace.31 
The purpose of the Congolese request was therefore not the Katanga 
secession as such. The initial United Nations' response conformed 
strictly to the letter of the request. The Security Council author-
ized the dispatch of United Nations' troops (ONUCJ to the Congo. It 
30. The Katanga Case is treated in detail later in this work. 
See page 256, infra. 
31. U.N. Doc. S/4382. 
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32 then called on Belgium to withdraw its forces from the territory. 
Even though Chapter VII of the Charter was invoked as the basis of 
the Council's actions, no specific article was cited. However, a 
careful analysis of the language and the subsequent United Nations' 
actions in the Congo indicates that Article 40 could be 
33 
considered as the applicable provision under Chapter VII. 
Article 40 provides that: 
in order to prevent an aggravation of the situation, 
the Security Council may, before making recommendations 
for deciding upon the measures provided for in Article 
39, call upon the parties concerned to comply with 
such provisional measures as it deems necessary or 
desirable. Such provisional measures shall be without 
prejudice to the rights, claims or position of the 
parties concerned. 
Arguably, the "provisional measures" under Article 40 constitute a 
different regime and are thus distinct from "making recommendations" 
or deciding upon measures provided for in Article 29. Assuming 
Article 40 is applicable, two implications would seem to follow: 
(1) the provisional measures did not constitute enforcement actions 
34 
under the Charter. Any actions taken under Article 40 were 
32. U.N. Doc. S/4387 (14th July 1950). 
33. For a commentary on the legal aspects of the United Nations 
operations in the Congo see generally, Schachter, "Legal Aspects 
of the U.N. Action in the Congo", A.J.I.L., Vol. 55 (1961), 
1-28; Wright, "The Legal Aspects of the Congo Situation", 
Int. Studies, Vol. 4,(1962) ; Lemarchand, "The Limits of Self-
Determination: The Case of the Katanga Secession", American 
Political Science Rev. (1962), 404. Frank and Carey, The Legal 
Aspects of the United Nations Action in the Congo (1963). 
34. In the Certain Expenses Case, the majority opinion took the 
view that the operations of the ONUC were not enforcement 
actions within the compass of the Charter (I.C.J. Reports, (1962), 
151, 165). The Court later explained that this was because the 
operations of ONUC "did not involve 'preventive or enforcement 
measures' against any State under Chapter VII and therefore 
did not constitute "action" as that term is used under Article 
11 {id.. 111). See however the different views expressed by 
Judge Quintana in his dissenting opinion: "any armed force 
intended for whatever purpose implies by definition enforce-
ment action" {id., 245). 
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consequently subject to Article 2(7) . (2) The measures could not 
be used to prejudice the position of the parties. 
36 
Even though Katanga was not a state, these two implications 
were reflected in the initial United Nations' handling of the Congo 
crisis. Both the Security Council and the Secretariat went to great 
lengths to explain that given the withdrawal of Belgium, (1) the 
secessionist conflict was a domestic issue; (2) the United 
Nations had a duty not to influence any particular form of settlement 
in favour of any party. With the arrival of the ONUC in the Congo, 
the Secretary General stressed that the forces were not going to "take 
any action which would make them a party to internal conflicts in 
37 
the country". The Security Council reaffirmed this by declaring 
that the ONUC would not be a party to or in any way intervene to influ-
ence the outcome of any internal conflict constitutional or other-
38 
wise. By implication,the United Nations was to remain neutral be-
yond the Belgian intervention. By virtue of this the organization 
was to treat both the secessionists and the central government equally. 
In a significant development, the Congolese Government requested 
the assistance of the ONUC to crush the secession. It justified its 
35. The Secretary General confirmed this view in the interpretation 
of his mandate in respect of the Katanga crisis. He stated: 
"in the light of the domestic jurisdiction (provisions) of the 
Charter, it must be assumed that the Council did not authorize 
the Secretary General to intervene with armed troops in an 
internal conflict when the Council has not adopted enforcement 
measures under Article 41 or 42 of Chapter VII". (U.N.Doc. 
S/P.V. 887, 17). In another statement, it was further noted 
that the Security Council resolutions on the Cfengo could not be 
construed as "endowing the United Nations with the right to 
interfere in the domestic affairs of a State and to assume re-
sponsibility for a country's domestic laws"(S/P.V. 879, para. 
115 and 120). 
36. Certain Expenses Case, i.e.J.Reports(1962),177. See also the dis-
cussion on the status of Katanga in Crawford. 264. In the 
Certain Expenses Case, Judge Quintana held the view that Katanga 
was arguably "a belligerent community recognised under internat-
ional law as possessing a legal personality" (246). 
37. U.N.Deo . S/P.V.873, 11-2. 38. U.N. DOC. S/4426. 
138. 
request on the grounds that the Security Council had put ONUC at its 
disposal until its own forces could take up the task of maintaining 
law and order. The Secretary General interpreted the mandate of the 
ONUC differently^ maintaining the neutral position. He turned down 
the request declaring that: 
(1) United Nations' forces could not be used on behalf of the Central 
Government to subdue or to force Katanga to a specific line of 
action. 
(2) United Nations' facilities could not be used to transport civil 
or military representatives of the Central Government to 
Katanga without the consent of the Katanga government. 
(3) The United Nations had no duty to protect civilian or military 
personnel representing the Central Government arriving in 
Katanga beyond what followed from its general duty to maintain 
law and order. 
(4) The United Nations had no right to prevent the Central Government 
from taking any actions which,by its own means in accordance with 
the principles of the Charter,it could carry through in relation 
to Katanga. 
39 
These points were to apply mutatis mutandis to Katanga. 
At that stage of the crisis certain logical inferences could be 
drawn to establish the policy of the United Nations: (1) a claim to 
self-determination in the post-colonial context was neither legal 
nor illegal in international law; there were no rules on separatist 
conflicts as such. (2) Beyond the threat to international peace and 
security, the only relevant international law rule applicable to such 
cases was the inviolability of domestic jurisdiction; by virtue of that, 
the United Nations, like any other entity, was precluded from inter-
39. Miller, "Legal Aspects of the United Nations Action in the 
Congo", A.J.I.L., Vol. 55 (1961), 1-28, particularly at 16-17, 
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vening to effect any settlement. The parties were thus at liberty to 
pursue any solutions (relying on their own means) in accordance with 
40 
the Charter". 
In late 1951, following the assassination of the leftist Congo-
lese Prime Minister, Patrice Lumumba, and the death of Dag Hammarsk-
jold, the United Nations Secretary General, in a plane crash in the 
Congo, the Security Council changed its position on the crisis. On 
the 3rd November 1951, Ceylon, Liberia and the United Arab Republic 
submitted a draft resolution on the Congo to the Council. In its re-
vised form, the draft required the Council to: 
1. affirm the territorial integrity and political independence of 
the Congo; 
2. deplore the secession and reject the Katangan claim to secession 
and statehood; 
3. declare that the secession was contrary to the loi fondamentale 
(the constitution of the Congo) and to Security Council decisions; 
4. demand the termination of all secessionist activities; 
5. give the Secretary General a clear mandate to deal with the 
problem. 
All the members of the Council expressed opposition to the 
secession. There were, however, some reservations on the proposed 
draft. France took the view that the problem in the Congo ought to 
be resolved through persuasion and negotiation. It argued further 
that the issue was an internal one in which the United Nations could 
not intervene. Sweden and China supported this view. The United 
Kingdom argued that the problem required pacification and reconciliation 
and not force. The United States called for the strengthening of the 
40. Apart from the issue of threat to peace however, the Secretary 
General did indicate at one stage that human rights violations, 
e.g., the murder of civilians including women and children, 
could not be regarded as an internal issue (U.N.DOC.S/P.V.895,58). 
41. U.N.DOC. S/4985 and Rev. 1. See also id., S/5002. 
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Central Government's forces. Ecuador, Chile and the Soviet Union 
42 
on the other hand, supported the draft. in the end, the three-power 
draft was adopted as Resolution S/5002 on the 24th November with 
43 
France and the United Kingdom abstaining and none voting against. 
The resolution was the most significant declaration of the Council 
on the crisis. It marked a change in policy and led to its active inter-
vention in the conflict itself and subsequently influenced a specific 
settlement in favour of the Central Government. At the end of the 
crisis, U Thant declared that the United Nations had "avoided any inter-
vention in the internal politics of the (Congo) beyond the opposition 
to secession in general (as) required by the Security Council reso-
44 
lutions". 
In the Katanga crisis, the United Nations unequivocally rejected 
the existence of any right of self-determination in the post-colonial 
context. We have noted earlier that in the formation of international 
customary law, mere practice or action is not enough. It has to be 
supported by opinio juris sive necessitatis, that is, the subjective 
or psychological element that the practice or action is rendered neces-
sary by the existence of a rule of law requiring it. The question 
then is: in rejecting the right of self-determination for Katanga, 
did the United Nations Security Council consider its action as render-
ed necessary by existing law? Was the Council in any case competent 
to deal with the secession of the Katanga Province? The Council did 
not reject the claims of Katanga on the basis of any pre-existing 
international law norms. In its condemnation of the secession, it had 
only noted that the secession was contrary to the loi fondamentale 
(i.e., the constitution of the Congo) and the decisions of the Council. 
42. For detailed discussion on the debates see Yearbook of the United 
Nations (1961), 65-71. 
43. U.N.Doc. S/5002. 
44. 18 U.N. S.C.O.R. Supp, Jan-March 1953, 103, para. 37. 
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Assuming the secession was in fact a breach of the loi fondamentale, 
was the Council the competent authority to make such a judgment, 
particularly since the loi fondamentale was a domestic legislation 
under the jurisdiction of the Congolese government? Arguably, the 
pronouncement of the Counil on the legality of the actions of Katanga 
under the municipal laws of the Congo had no validity. On the other 
hand, if one takes the view that the secession was a threat to inter-
national peace and security, then it would follow that the Council was 
competent to issue any directives in that respect in pursuance of 
the United Nations Charter and its directives were in conformity with 
existing law. But was the secession in itself a threat to peace and 
security? 
In his first report on the crisis to the Secvirity Council, the 
Secretary General had noted that the breakdown of the government in 
the Congo 
represented a threat to peace justifying United Nations' 
intervention on the basis of the explicit request of the 
Government of the Republic of Congo. 
Thus in the opinion of the Secretary General, "the two main elements 
from the legal point of view, were on the one hand (the) request and 
on the other hand, the finding that the circumstances-.-were such as 
46 to justify United Nations' action". It needs to be noted at this 
juncture that there were three features of the crisis in the Congo, 
namely: (1) the breakdown of Government; (2) the secession; and (3) 
the Belgian intervention. The breakdown in government was accompanied 
by intense faction fighting and occasional threats of intervention by 
the super powers to support some of the internal groups. The breakdown 
consequently constituted a threat to peace. Given the possibility of 
45. Quoted in Higgins, The Development of International Law through 
the Political Organs of the United Nations (1963), 225. 
46. Ibid. 
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confrontation between Congolese forces and Belgian troops, the Belgian 
intervention also amounted to a threat to peace. However, the 
secession of the Katanga Province in itself did not amount to a threat 
to international peace and security, it was felt that the breakdown 
in government and the Belgian intervention could be resolved by the 
United Nations without having to deal with the issue of secession. 
The Security Council and the United Nations Secretariat attested to 
this by admitting earlier in the conflict that the secession per se 
was an issue which was essentially within the domestic jurisdiction 
of the Congo. By implication, the United Nations did not consider 
the Katanga secession in itself to be a threat to international peace 
and security when it intervened in the Congo. In view of this it is 
submitted the basis for the general opposition to the secession in 
the Security Counil as expressed in Resolution S/5002 in late 1951 was 
not because the Council considered secession to be a threat to peace. 
Consequently the Council's action on Katanga was not based on any 
opinio juris as such. 
There are two possible alternative conclusions in respect of the 
Council's opposition to the Katanga secession: (1) the secession was 
not a threat to peace and was for that matter an internal issue; the 
47 . . 
Council's actions were therefore ultra v^res and lacked any opvmo 
juris; (2) on the other hand, it could be said that the Council's 
action was a belated response to the Congolese Government's earlier 
request for United Nations assistance to crush the secession. In 
international law, an incumbent government can request assistance to 
47. In the Certain Expenses Case,the majority opinion took the view 
that the actions of the U.N. in respect of the crisis were intra 
vires. However, it must be noted that the opinion did not relate 
specifically to the issue of the authority of the U.N. to inter-
vene to declare the secession illegal as such. It concerned the 
authority of the U.N. to commit its forces to maintain peace in 
the Congo. 
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resolve an internal disorder. Consequently, by opposing the Katanga 
secession, the Security Council was obliging to the Congolese Govern-
ment's request in pursuance of existing international law rules. 
The latter conclusion seems preferable given the express requests 
of the Congolese Government. It however raises a number of problems. 
In the event of a secessionist conflict, can the parent state request 
and expect military assistance from the United Nations? Would attempts 
to assist the parent state be consistent with the.peace-keeping efforts 
of the United Nations? Would the latter not be bound by international 
49 law to respect the rules on belligerency? There are no definite 
48. In 1958, the U.K. and the U.S. used this "request" argument as 
the basis for intervention in Jordan and in Lebanon. In 1965, 
the U.S. again used it to intervene in Santa Domingo. In 
more recent times, the involvement of troops and other multi-
lateral forces in Lebanon has also been justified on the "request" 
thesis. There is however, the view that any assistance offered 
to the incumbent state must be restricted to the pre-insurgency 
stage. In other words, where an internal conflict assumes the 
form of a civil war, and the rebels are consequently recognised 
as insurgents, assistance to the incumbent may not be permissible. 
Norton Moore, "Towards an Applied Theory for the Regulation of 
Intervention", in Norton Moore (ed.). Law and Civil War in the 
Modern World (1974), 3-37,24. But see also Bowett, "The Interre-
lated Theories of Intervention and Self-Defence", in id., 
38-50, 42-43. It has also been suggested that any assistance 
should be limited to tactical support in the form of advisers, 
volunteers, etc. and not military equipment. Farer, "Intervention 
in Civil Wars: A Modest Proposal", Col.L.Rev., Vol. 67 (1967), 266, 
275. See also the views expressed on the issue by Friedman, 
"Intervention and the Developing Countries", Va.J.Int'1,L., 
Vol. 10 (1970), 205, 210. 
49. Higgins gives a negative answer to this question. She suggests 
that in civil conflicts, 'intervention by invitation' is permis-
sible "provided that the insurrection has not yet reached the 
dimensions of a civil war (thus giving rise to rights of belli-
gerency in favour of the insurgents)". Higgins, op.cit., note 
45, 230. She however observes that in the case of secessionist 
conflicts this may not necessarily be the case because the doctrine 
of belligerency "applies to a civil war situation, which implies 
the existence of two parties engaged in a military dispute (and 
that) it is not absolutely clear that it applies both to the 
situation where these two parties are each claiming the right to 
rule the whole state...and to the situation where one party is 
attempting to secede". She therefore cautions that the reference 
to rights of non-intervention in civil war is ambiguous and that 
"the desirability of applying the doctrine to modern Africa is 
perhaps doubtful". More significantly, she notes: 
(contd) 
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answers to these questions in view of the fact that the limits of 
permissible intervention in civil life generally and secessionist 
conflicts in particular are not well defined. 
Is Katanga a Precedent? 
There is the general view that the United Nations is, as a rule, 
opposed to self-determination claims in the post-colonial context. 
The Katanga case is frequently used as one of the authorities for this 
49. (contd) 
The existence of a legal right to revolution is a much 
debated rule of international law, gaining in stature; 
the existence of a right to secession...is even more 
moot; and when it is coupled with undoiibted foreign 
support and intervention causing a threat to the peace 
...it should not be canvassed with any assurance. 
{id. ,231) . 
50. Thomas and Thomas, Non-intervention (1955), 67. "... there is 
no satisfactory agreement among jurists as to the meaning and 
content of intervention in international law;...not only the 
authorities but even the practice of states are in confusion." 
Arguably, customary international law recognizes a level of per-
missible intervention for humanitarian purposes. However, in 
the post-Charter period, given the emphasis on Article 2(7) 
and the prohibitions of force under Article 2(4), the value of 
these customary law rules on intervention has been thrown into 
doubt. For a general survey on the problem, see Brownlie, 
"Humanitarian Intervention" in Moore (ed.). Law and Civil War 
in the Modem World (1974), 217. Lillich, "Humanitarian 
Intervention: A Reply to Dr. Brownlie and a Plea forConstruct-
ive Alternatives", in id., 229; Moore, "Towards an Applied Theory 
for the Regulation of Intervention" ,ici. , 3. See also Bowett, 
"Interrelated Theories of Intervention and Self-Defense" in 
Black and Falk (eds). The Future of the International Legal 
Order, Vol. Ill, 1971, 38, 45, "...it is believed that the 
recognition of a general right of intervention is neither legally 
nor politically acceptable". Chilstrolm, on the other hand 
takes the view that intervention for humanitarian purposes "... 
would serve as an effective remedy to redress current violations 
of human rights and would provide a credible deterrent to future 
deprivations", in "Humanitarian Intervention Under Customary 
International Law: A Policy Oriented Approach", Yale Journ. of 
World Public Order, Vol. 1, (1974), 93, 147. See also 
Fonteyne, "The Customary International Law Doctrines of 
Humanitarian Intervention: Its Current Validity Under the United 
Nations Charter", Cal.W.Int' l.L. Journ. (1973"-74) , Vol. 4, 203. 
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51 proposition. 
Buchheit, for instance notes that : 
in retrospect, the action in the Congo stands as 
a major precedent against an international recognition 
of secessionist legitimacy in circumstances similar 
to those surrounding the Congo at independence. ^ 2 
The value of the Katanga case as a precedent is rather limited. For 
one thing, the circumstances surrounding the United Nations actions 
were quite unique. There had been signs of the secession just 
prior to independence, and since the secession had 
in fact occurred almost immediately after independence with the help 
53 
of Belgium^ the latter's role as a former metropolitan country could 
well have been equivalent to that of an administering power fostering 
the dismemberment of a self-determination unit in violation of the 
territorial integrity principle. This and the deaths of Dag Hammarsk-
j(31d and Patrice Lumumba had all contributed to the United Nation' s 
decision to assist the Congo in crushing the rebellion. Given the 
uniqueness of the circumstances, it would be misleading to suggest 
that at some future date, the United Nations would, as a rule, inter-
vene militarily to deny the legitimacy of a separatist claim and 
assist the incumbent, if and when such assistance is requested to 
crush a separatist movement. On the other hand, it is conceded that 
by virtue of the Charter, the United Nations may well intervene in 
a separatist conflict and indeed any other type of conflict where it 
threatens international peace and security. However, in such 
cases, it must be emphasized that the basis of the organization's 
51. Collins,"Self-Determination in International Law: The Palestin-
ians'; Case W. Res.Journ.Int'l.Law,Vol. 2 (1980), 137,152; Nanda, 
"Self-Determination Under International Law, the Validity of 
Claims to Secede", id., Vol.13 (1981), 257,274; "Self-Determin-
ation Outside the Colonial Context: The Birth of Bangladesh in 
Retrospect", Houston, Journ.Int'l.Law (1979), Vol.1, 71,83. 
52. Buchheit, Secession, 151. 
53. See pages 256-257, infra. 
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actions will be the maintenance of international peace and security 
and not any pre-existing rule against self-determination claims 
in the post-colonial context. 
The United Nations and the Case of Biafra 
In May 1957, the Eastern region of Nigeria seceded and declared 
54 itself the Republic of Biafra. 
The United Nations' response to the Biafran case was totally 
different from that of Katanga. At best it was passive. It refrained 
from either discussing the issue or issuing any statement on the Biafran 
claims to self-determination. The then Secretary General, U Thant, 
attempted to rationalize the United Nations' failure to respond to the 
crisis. He said: 
the issue must be brought to the attention of the United 
Nations. So far not one single Member State out of 126 
has brought the question of the civil conflict in Nigeria 
to the United Nations, not one Government...^^ 
The Secretary General's remarks were rather curious. Admittedly 
no state had brought the issue to the United Nations. However, under 
Article 99 of the Charter, the Secretary General himself could have 
drawn the Security Council's attention to the issue. Article 99 pro-
vides that; 
The Secretary General may bring to the attention of 
the Security Council any matter which in his opinion 
may threaten the maintenance of international peace and 
security. 
Given the extent of external intervention in the conflict the mas-
sive costs in terms of human and material resources, and the general 
repercussions for regional security, the Secretary General, like all 
other members of the United Nations owed a duty to bring the issue to 
the Security Council. 
54. The Biafran case is discussed in detail at page 2121, infra. 
55. U.N. Monthly Chronicle, No. 7, February 4th (1970). 
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It has been suggested that one reason for the "hesitancy of 
member states to bring the Nigerian crisis before the U.N....was their 
knowledge that the United Nations would simply refuse to discuss it". 
If this view is right, it would put the passive reactions of the United 
Nations members in this case in sharp contrast with their responses to 
the Katanga crisis. It is important to note that in declining to raise 
the Biafran case before the United Nations, the member states did not 
consider themselves compelled to act in conformity with any existing 
law. A fortiori they did not consider themselves obliged to oppose, or 
support, the secession in pursuance of any international law rule. In 
other words, their action was not based on any opinio juris. The United 
Nations' Secretary General on the other hand, had his own preconceptions 
about the position of the organization. In an interview on Biafra, 
he declared, rather emphatically: 
as far as the question of secession of a particular 
section of a Member State is concerned, the United Nations' 
attitude is unequivocable. As an international organiza-
tion, the United Nations has never accepted and does not 
accept and I do not believe it will ever accept, the 
principle of secession of a part of its Member States. 
In another interview he again emphasized: "self-determination of the 
peoples does not imply self-determination of a section of a population 
58 
of a particular Member State". 
The authority behind U Thant's statements at the time is not clear. 
By 1970, the only similar case that had gone before the United Nations 
was Katanga. As indicated earlier, Katanga does not provide a proper 
basis for a reliable precedent. It is therefore submitted that U. 
Thant's views had a rather doubtful empirical basis. Secondly, they 
55. Buchheit, Secession, 159. 
57. U.N. Monthly Chronicle, Vol. 7 (1970), 36, 
58. Id., 39. 
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did not amount to a statement of the United Nations' rules (if any) 
on the subject. Legally, his views were therefore of no value. Thirdly, 
if his observations were a purported exposition on or evidence of the 
practice of the United Nations, then he was wrong. The creation of 
.Bangladesh about twelve months later confirmed the error in his judg-
ment. 
The United Nations and Bangladesh 
Bangladesh, formerly East Pakistan,seceded from the Republic of 
59 
Pakistan following a wave of anti-Bengali massacres in the country. 
Unlike the case of Biafra, Bangladesh was brought to the attention 
of the United Nations through many channels. For the purposes of 
clarity, it is necessary to trace the treatment of the case in the United 
Nations by its various organs. 
ECOSOC: In May 1971, India submitted the issue to the Social Committee 
of ECOSOC. However, the discussions were confined to the humanitar-
ian aspects of the crisis. In August 1971, 22 Non-Governmental Organi-
zations (NGOs ) also raised the issue before the United Nations Sub-
Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and the Protection of 
Minorities. The NGOs requested the Sub-Commission to "examine all 
available information regarding the allegations of the violation of 
human rights and fundamental freedoms of East Pakistan and to recommend 
to the Commission on Human Rights, measures which might be taken to pro-
tect the human rights and the fundamental freedoms of the people of 
East Pakistan". A representative of the international Commission of 
59. The Bangladesh case is discussed in detail at page 215, infra. 
60. External Affairs Ministry (New Delhi) Bangladesh Documents 
(1971), 518-623. 
51. U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/NGO, 46 (July 23rd 1971). 
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Jurists gave evidence on the situation before the Sub-Commission. 
Despite his testimony of the atrocities and the bizarre conditions 
in East Pakistan, the Sub-Commission did not discuss the matter any 
further. 
The Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination: The issue 
was raised before the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrim-
ination in April 1971. The Committee considered a preliminary report 
by Pakistan and decided that the information available was inadequate. 
It subsequently requested Pakistan to submit a supplementary report for 
64 
consideration m its August-September session. The report was 
never submitted and the matter was not discussed again by the Committee. 
The General Assembly: The Bangladesh case was brought to the atten-
65 55 
tion of the General Assembly by India and at least three other states. 
However, the discussions in the Third Committee on the matter were con-
fined to the humanitarian aspects of the problem even though the 
Republic of Bangladesh had been proclaimed as far back as April, the 
secession itself was never discussed. 
The Secretary General/Security Council: m stark contrast to his 
negative reaction to the Biafran case, the Secretary, in pursuance of 
his authority under Article 99 of the Charter, drew the attention of 
the Security Council to the Bangladesh crisis. In his report to the 
President of the Council in July 1971, three months after the declaration 
62. External Affairs Ministry, op.cit., note 64, 664-668. 
63. For a critical account of the treatment of the issue by the Sub-
Commission see Salzberg, "U.N. Prevention of Human Rights 
Violations: The Bangladesh Case", Int.Org., Vol. 27 (1973), 115. 
64. U.N. G.A.O.R., 26th Sess. (1971). Supple. 18 (A/8418) 8. 
55. The submissions by India and the response by Pakistan on the 
events in East Pakistan are summarized in U.N. Monthly Chronicle, 
Vol. 8, No. 9 (Oct. 1971), 189-192. 
55. Sweden, id., 201; U.K. id., 215-216, Iceland, id., 219. 
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of Bangladesh, he described the events in Pakistan as a "potential 
67 
threat to peace and security". Contrary to his previous assertions 
on the issue of self-determination, he acknowledged this time that there 
was a problem between the pursuit of the principle and the need to main-
tain the territorial integrity of states. He also admitted that there 
was a need to evolve some form of regulations for separatist agitation. 
He added: 
"the tragic situation in which humanitarian, economic and 
political problems are mixed in such a way as almost to 
defy any distinctions between them, represents a challenge 
to the United Nations as a whole which must be met. Other 
situations may well occur in the future. If the Organization 
faces up to such a situation now, it may be able to develop 
the new skills and the new strength required to face future 
situations of this kind." 8^ 
Despite the passionate plea of the Secretary General, the Security 
Council did not seriously consider his view. Meanwhile, war broke out 
between India and Pakistan over India's support for the secession. With 
the outbreak of the Indo-Pakistan war in December 1971, the Council made 
attempts to call on the parties to end hostilities. Following a Soviet 
veto of two draft resolutions on the conflict, the issue was referred to 
the General Assembly under the "Uniting for Peace Resolution". On 7th 
December,the Assembly adopted Resolution 2793 (XXVI), calling on India 
and Pakistan to cease fire. In the debates that preceded the resolution, 
Ceylon and a number of members argued that "a peaceful resolution of the 
conflict depended on the will of the people of that area as expressed 
59 
by their representatives". Given that the Awami League, the accepted 
representative body of East Pakistan, had indicated the desire to secede 
and had in fact organized the secession of the region, the views expres-
sed by the members indicated some support for the secession of East 
67. U.N. Doc. S/10410, p. 3. 
68. Ibid.; U.N. G.A.O.R., 26th Sess. Suppl. lA (A/8401/Add.1) 
(emphasis mine). 
69. Yearbook of the United Nations (1971), 152. Emphasis mine. 
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Pakistan. Their views, however, remained the only ones ever expressed 
on the secession in Assembly. 
General Assembly Resolution 2793 (XXVI) produced no positive 
results. The discussion of the conflict was subsequently returned to 
the Security Council. But before the Council could take any signifi-
cant action, India announced that Pakistani forces in Bangladesh had 
surrendered, Bangladesh was free, and that it had ordered its troops 
70 
to cease fire. 
For all practical purposes the Indo-Pakistan war ended with that 
announcement. The secession of East Pakistan became a fait accompli; 
Bangladesh was established as a state and was subsequently admitted 
71 into the United Nations. The United Nations admission of Bangladesh 
raises interesting questions. For instance, did the admission amount 
to a recognition of the right to self-determination in the post-colonial 
context? Was the peculiar subordinate position of Bangladesh vis-a-vis 
the rest of Pakistan a determinate factor? Even though throughout the 
debates on Bangladesh, the General Assembly never discussed the issue 
of self-determination for the territory, one must concede that by ad-
mitting Bangladesh as a member state, the United Nations impliedly re-
cognized its right to self-determination. But did this signify the 
recognition of a general right of self-determination in the post-
colonial context? There is nothing in the United Nations' debates on 
the territory during the crisis to suggest that in admitting Bangladesh 
the organization felt its action was in accordance with a rule of law 
relating to the legitimacy of post-colonial self-determination. We 
can therefore not say in any certain terms that the United Nations' 
action amounted to a recognition of the existence of a right of self-
70. Id., 156. 
71. G.A. Res. 2937(XXVII)(November 1972) and S.C.Res. 351 (1974) 
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FIGURE IV. Bangladesh, India and Pakistan, 
determination in the post-colonial context. 
What then was the significance of the United Nations' admission 
of Bangladesh? It is a fact that even though East Bengal was part of 
Pakistan, it was physically (i.e. geographically) separated from the 
72 
rest of Pakistan by a wide expanse of Indian territory. It was also 
subjected to gross violations of human rights perpetrated by the central 
government. There was also evidence of economic disparities between 
Bengalis and the rest of Pakistan. The Awami League which 
72. See map in Fig.IV.above, i 
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provided the vanguard for the secession had the total support of the 
73 
Bengali people. In the light of these facts, could it be said that 
the United Nations' admission of Bangladesh amounted to an indication 
that at a more restricted level, the members of the organization would 
recognize the legitimacy of a claim to self-determination in post-
colonial context for a community in similar circumstances? 
In the debates on Bangladesh the United Nations did not consider 
the merits or demerits of Bangladesh's claim to self-determination on 
the basis of the territory's peculiar circumstances or on any other 
basis. The organization only concerned itself with humanitarian 
aspects of the crisis in relation to refugees who had fled their homes 
as a result of the Indo-Pakistan war. In admitting Bangladesh to 
the United Nations, there was no reference to its special situation. 
It is therefore logical to suggest that the organization did not base 
itself on the fact of human rights deprivation or the physical separa-
tion of Bangladesh from Pakistan. In the author's opinion, in admit-
ting Bangladesh, the determinate factor was one of effectiveness 
founded on the fact that the territory had succeeded in breaking away 
from the parent state. In other words, the successful separation from 
Pakistan was a condition precedent to the admission of the territory 
and the implied recognition of its rights to self-determination. The 
fact of Bangladesh's peculiar circumstances leading to the secession 
seemed to be of relative significance and at best of only a tangential 
effect on the decision of the United Nations. 
To summarise, the Bangladesh case does not indicate that the 
United Nations necessarily recognizes the existence of a right 
of self-determination in the post-colonial context for a community 
subject to gross violations of human rights. It however supports 
the view that where a territory successfully secedes from the 
73. Pages 215-217, infra. 
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parent state the United Nations is most likely to recognize 
the entity as a state. It must be emphasized that the basis for the 
recognition in such cases would not be because the United Nations 
feels itself compelled to act in conformity with some existing law to 
recognize a right to self-determination in the post-colonial context. 
It would rather be due to the fact that the United Nations does not 
view the creation of a state in such circumstances as a violation of 
any international law rule. On the other hand, where there is evidence 
that the creation of a state entity is in breach of an existing inter-
national law obligation, the United Nations would not recognize its 
claims to statehood. In such instances, the rejection of the entity 
notwithstanding its effective separation from the parent state, 
would not be due to the United Nations opposition to a claim of post-
colonial self-determination per se. It would be due to the fact that 
the purported exercise of self-determination is in breach of a specific 
existing international law rule or obligation. The recent case of 
Cyprus illustrates this point. 
The United Nations and Cyprus 
On the 15th of November 1983, Turkish Cypriot authorities de-
clared the northern sector of the Republic of Cyprus an independent 
^ 74 
state under the name of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC). 
The northern sector had been under Turkish Cypriot exclusive control 
since 1974 when, following communal violence between Greek and Turkish 
Cypriots, Turkey had intervened and secured the sector for the Turkish 
75 Cypriots. In several respects, the Turkish Cypriot control over the 
74. The London Times, Nov. 15, 1983, p.13; Time Magazine, 28 Nov. 
1983, p.20. Nejatigil, Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus in 
Perspective (1983)(Mimeo). 
75. For a treatment of the background to the communal violance and 
other related aspects of the Cyprus question see Ehrlich,"Cyprus, 
The 'Warlike Isle': Origins and Elements of the Current Crisis", 
(contd) 
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northern sector had amounted to a secession. The Creek Cypriot 
controlled government in Nicosia had no control whatsoever over the 
area. It (i.e. the Northern Sector) had become more of a de facto 
state. In fact in 1975, Turkish Cypriot authorities even proclaimed 
the area as the "Turkish Cypriot Federated State" which was never re-
cognized. The November 15th declaration was therefore an attempt to 
formalize or to seek a de jure recognition for a pre-existing state of 
secession. 
Despite the fact that the northern sector had existed as a de 
facto state since 1974, the United Nations Security Council deplored the 
November 15th declaration of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus 
77 
and declared the purported secession legally invalid. The strong 
opposition of the Council to the Turkish Cypriot claims to post-colon-
ial self-determination must be understood within the framework of the 
history of the Repioblic of Cyprus. The Republic attained independence 
78 in 1950. Since then the country has been plagued with ethnic conflicts. 
At the centre of the conflicts are Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots 
79 
who constitute the bulk of the territory's population. In the pre-
independence era, Greek Cypriots pursued enosis, i.e. unification of 
the territory with Greece, as the basis for self-determination for 
Cyprus. Turkish Cypriots on the other hand demanded a partition of the 
75. (contd) Stanford Law Rev., Vol.18 (1955-56), 1021; Loizos and 
Hitchens, Cyprus , M.R.G. Report No. 30 (1975)(Revised 1978); 
Evriviades, "The Legal Dimensions of the Cyprus Conflict", 
Texas Journ.Int'l.Law, Vol.10, 1975, 227; Foley, Legacy of Strife: 
Cyprus from Rebellion to Civil War (1954); Xydis, Cyprus, Conflict 
and Concilation, 1954-1958 (1967). 
76. White, "The Turkish Federated State of Cyprus: A Lawyer's View", 
World Today, Vol. 37 (1981), 135-141. 
77. S.C. Res. 541, Nov. 1983. 
78. G.A. Res. 1489 (XV). 
79. Greek Cypriots constitute 80% of the islands population. 
Turkish Cypriots make up 17%-20%. For the nature and background 
to the communal conflict see works cited in note 75, supra. 
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territory into two units based on thfe ethnic composition. To resolve 
these conflicting demands, Turkey, Greece, the United Kingdom (the 
then administering power) and representatives of the Cypriot countries 
concluded a series of agreements that became the basis of the terri-
80 
tory's independence. The agreements were the"'Treaty of Guarantee", 
,81 
the"Treaty of Alliance" (between Cyprus, Turkey and Greece only) and 
M 82 
the"Basic Structure of the Republic of Cyprus • The "Basic Structure" 
was fundamentally a carefully designed series of checks and balances 
83 
aimed at protecting the rights of the Turkish Cypriot minority. 
Under the Treaty of Guarantee, Cyprus undertook to 
ensure the maintenance of its territorial integrity 
and security as well as respect for its constitution 
(and) not to participate, in whole or in part, in any 
political or economic union with any State. It accord-
ingly .. .prohibited any activity likely to promote directly 
or indirectly, either union with any other State or 
partition of the Island. 
(Art. II) 
Under Article IV of the Treaty, it was further provided that "in the 
event of a breach of the provisions,...Greece, Turkey and the United 
Kingdom undertake to consult with respect to the representations or 
measures necessary to ensure observance of those provisions, where 
concerted action proved impossible each of the guarantor powers re-
served "the right to take action with the sole aim of re-establishing 
84 
the state of affairs created by the...Treaty". 
Under the Treaty of Alliance, Greece and Turkey undertook to 
resist any attack or aggression direct or indirect, directed against 
80. I.L.M., Vol. 13 (1974), 1259. 
81. Id., 1255. 
82. British Command Papers (1959), 9. 
83. See note 79, supra. 
84. The issue as to whether the Treaty was consistent with the 
sovereignty of Cyprus has been discussed elsewhere. See 
jocovides. Treaties Conflicting with Peremptory Norms of Inter-
National Law and the Zurich ^^London 'Agreements ' {1966) . See also 
Ehrlich, op.cit., note 74, 1060. 
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the independence or the territorial integrity of the Republic of 
Cyprus. It is within the context of these agreements that one can 
properly analyse the reactions of the Security Council to the estab-
lishment of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. 
By virtue of the agreements, particularly the Treaty of Guarantee 
and the Treaty of Alliance, the observance of the independence and 
territorial integrity of Cyprus became a subject of international obli-
gations. The raison d'etre of the Treaty of Guarantee was the prohibi-
tion of either a Greek-inspired or a Turkish-engineered partition. This 
prohibition was the fundamental basis of the creation of a united 
Republic of Cyprus. All parties (including the Turkish Cypriots) to 
the Treaties were therefore legally bound to observe the relevant pro-
visions. Consequently, the Security Council viewed the secession by 
Turkish Cypriots as a breach of their existing international law obli-
gations and therefore illegal. Resolution 541, adopted by the Security 
Council following the declaration of the Turkish Cypriot Republic, 
specifically stated that the Council: 
Concerned at the declaration by the Turkish Cypriot 
Authorities on 15 November which purports to create 
an independent state in Northern Cyprus, 
Considering that this declaration is incompatible 
with the 1960 Treaty concerning the establishment of 
the Republic of Cyprus and the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee 
1. Deplores the declaration of the Turkish Cypriots 
of the purported secession of part of the Republic 
of Cyprus, 
2. Considers the declaration referred to above as 
legally invalid and calls for its withdrawal... 
7. Calls upon all states not to recognize any Cypriot 
state other than the Republic of Cyprus. 
In considering the legitimacy of the Turkish Cypriot secession, the 
Security Council concerned itself with existing treaty obligations and 
rights of the Cypriot communities and the guarantor powers. In other 
words, the Security Council determined the legal invalidity of the 
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purported secession within the narrow context of the specific inter-
national obligations which were binding on the Turkish Cypriots and 
the violations of which could lead to an international conflict. The 
Council's decision was therefore not based on any pre-existing general 
international law rule against post-colonial self-determination. 
Apart from the Security Council, a considerable number of states 
85 
have also condemned the purported secession. It is siobmitted the 
general international opposition to the establishment of the Turkish 
Republic of Northern Cyprus is not based on any rule against post-
colonial self-determination. It is rather based on the fact that poli-
tically, the current crisis created by the secession is a potential 
threat to international peace and therefore undesirable. Turkey main-
tains a force of over 20,000 men in the northern sector to protect the 
interests of the Turkish Cypriots. Under the Treaty of Alliance and 
the Treaty of Guarantee, Greece reserves the right to intervene in 
Cyprus to resist any infringements of the territory's territorial inte-
grity and restore the status quo ante as created by the Constitution of 
Cyprus. The United Kingdom could take a similar action under the 
Treaty of Guarantee. Given the traditional hostilities between Greece 
and Turkey, the secession, which has the full support of Turkey, at 
the very least threatens to upset the delicate balance in the relation-
ship of the states in the region. 
85. The British Foreign Secretary declared unequivocally that the 
United Kingdom recognizes only one Cyprus and that the purported 
secession does not alter the status of the Turkish Cypriots 
(The London Times, 16th Nov. 1983, p.l). The United States also 
declared "we have consistently opposed a unilateral declaration 
of independence by the Turkish community believing it would not 
be helpful to the process of finding a final negotiated settle-
ment to the Cyprus problem"(id.^ 6). At the 1983 New Delhi 
summit, members of the (British) Commonwealth also condemned 
the Turkish Cypriot action and decided to form a five-nation 
action group to help the United Nations in trying to resolve the 
issue (Cyprus Bulletin, 28th Nov. 1983,1). The members of the 
E.E.C. also rejected the claims of the Turkish Cypriots {id.,3). 
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To summarize, despite the de facto separation of northern Cyprus 
since 1914, the Security Council and the international community in 
general have rejected the claims of the Turkish Cypriots to post-
colonial self-determination. However, in so doing, their objections 
were founded on specific pre-existing legal obligations of Cyprus on 
the one hand, and cogent political considerations on the other hand. 
The general reaction against the Turkish Cypriot claims was therefore 
not determined by any need on the part of the Council or the inter-
national community to conform to any rule of international law that 
prohibits self-determination in the post-colonial context. 
(ii) The practice of the Organization of African Unity 
The issue of self-determination in the post-colonial era is of 
86 
great significance to contemporary Africa. The continent comprises 
several ethnic groups. In pre-colonial times, political organization in 
African societies was based mainly on such ethnic arrangements and in some 
cases on imperial structures. The ethnic unit was one linked up by 
socio-political ties and constituted a nation (in the sociological 
87 
sense). The mad scramble which led to the Partition of Africa in the 
18th Century resulted in arbitrary demarcations of the continent into 
88 
colonies. Thus the colonial polities that emerged were usually 
clusters of ethnic groups brought together under the authority of the 
86. See generally, Novogrod, "internal Strife, Self-Determination 
and World Order". Bassiouni and Nanda (eds), A Treatise of Inter-
national Criminal Law I (1973) ,211; Mojekwu, "Self-Determination.' 
the African Perspectives" in Alexander and Friedlander (eds),Self-
Determination, National, Regional and Global Dimensions (1979),221, 
87. Mojekwu and Dors (eds), African Society, Culture and Politics 
{1911), 191-200 (Chapter 10). 
88. In almost all cases the demarcations cut across ethnic groups. 
Carrington^ in a research on African boundaries,observes that 
"they seem to bear little relation to the natural geographical 
zones or to the ethnic or cultural frontiers" (Carrington, 
"Frontiers in Africa", Int.Affairs (1960), 424). Examples of the 
'split ethnic groups' are the Ewes in Ghana and Togo, the Masai 
in Kenya and Tanzania, the Yorubas in Benin and Nigeria, and the 
(contd) 
160. 
given metropolitan powers. 
Colonialism was brief in Africa. It could therefore not bring 
about any meaningful coherent sentiments among the various ethnic groups 
that constitute a given colony. At best, where they had been united, 
it had been a superficial and convenient alliance to oppose the Euro-
1 • +. 89 pean colonists. 
The sanctity of the colonial demarcations was upheld mainly by 
the colonial powers. However, in the process of decolonization, the 
African nationalists demanded, and were granted, self-determination on 
the basis of such colonial units. Thus the new states that emerged in 
Africa were the political structures inherited from colonialism with 
all the arbitrary demarcations. The fact that a collection of ethnic 
groups lived together peacefully under colonial rule may not neces-
sarily be an indication that such groups may want to coexist in the 
post-colonial period. For the groups who may desire a separation from 
their parent states for one reason or the other, self-determination 
lends itself as a principle with great promise. 
In 1958, with less than ten independent states in Africa, the 
All African Peoples Conference meeting in Accra denounced what was des-
cribed as "the artificial boundaries drawn by imperialist powers to 
90 divide peoples of the same stock". The Conference subsequently called 
for the "abolition or the adjustment of such frontiers at an early date". 
Given the polyglot dimensions of Africa's situation, the imple-
mentation of the 1958 suggestions would have amounted to an exercise 
88. (contd) Somalis in Djibouti, Kenya, Ethiopia and Somalia. (See 
generally. Chime, "The Organization of African Unity and African 
Boundaries"in^/riean Boundary Problems (1969), 76-78; Touval, 
"The Sources of Status Quo and Irredentist Policies", in 
African Boundary Problems (1969), 101-118. 
89. Panter-Brick, "The Right of Self-Determination: Its Application 
to Nigeria", Int.Affairs, Vol. 44 (1968), 261. 
90. Quoted in Emerson, "Pan Africanism", Int.Org., Vol. 16 (1962), 278, 
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of post-colonial self-determination par excellence. It would also have 
meant a reshuffling of the political cartography of Africa. However, 
barely five years after the 1958 conference, a majority of African 
states became independent. With this came a change in attitude. The 
new states expressed objections to any changes in their frontiers. As 
one author notes "The new African countries dread serious challenge to 
their colonially defined boundaries for fear that the existing frame-
work of political order in the continent might be swept away in an 
91 
anarchy of tribal...conflict". In an effort to save the situation of 
"anarchy of tribal...conflict" the members of the OAU resolved in 
1954 to "respect boundaries existing on their achievement of national 
92 independence". The 1964 resolution which effectively discouraged 
the redrawing of the geopolitical boundaries in Africa as a matter of 
political realism is frequently cited as one of the bases for the 
93 
African objections to claims of post-colonial self-determination. 
Apart from the pledge to respect colonial boundaries, the African 
states also oppose post-colonial self-determination for political 
considerations. The general view is that outside the colonial context, 
self-determination is the very antithesis of territorial integrity and 
a symptom of disunity. It is therefore , incompatible with the poli-
tical ideal of African Unity. 
In 1965 when Tanzania recognized Biafra during the Nigerian civil 
war. President Nyerere admitted that the secession was a setback for 
94 African unity. His belief draws strength from the assumption that 
territorial unity of the constituent states in Africa is the basis for 
91. Emerson, Self-Determination Revisited in the Era of Decoloniza-
tion. Harvard Occasional Papers in Int.Affairs (1964), 31. 
92. OAU Res. AHG/15/1 (July 1964). 
93. Buchheit, Secession, 1Q3 -, Emerson, op.cit., note 91. 
94. The Case for Recognizing Biafra, Government Official 
Pubication, Dar-es-Salaam (1968), 5. 
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continental unity. During the Nigerian crisis Emperor Haile Selassie 
expressed a similar belief. As the head of the Consultative 
Committee on the crisis, he observed quite categorically that "the 
national unity and territorial integrity of (OAU) member states is not 
negotiable" and that "the national unity of individual African states 
is an essential ingredient for the realization of the larger and 
95 greater objective of African unity". 
On the face of it, the 'unity argument' appears common-sensical 
and plausible. However, an in-depth examination reveals that it is 
untenable. The major premise of the 'unity argument' is that territorial 
unity is a precondition for continental unity. At a glance, continental 
unity may appear like territorial unity writ large. The two phenomena 
are however totally different from each other. The factors that account 
for one do not necessarily account for the other. Territorial unity 
essentially concerns the inter-group relations within a given state 
system. Continental unity is an issue of international relations and 
follows the dictates of the foreign policy of states. 
It is in fact possible that an ethnically homogeneous and cohesive 
state like Somalia could constitute an impediment to African unity due 
to its foreign policy. It is equally possible for an ethnically divid-
ed state (such as Ethiopia with its problems in Eritrea) to pursue the 
ideal of African unity as an important aspect of its foreign policy. 
Haile Selassie himself proved this point when he help-
ed found the OAU at the time when the Ogaden and Eritrea were making 
secessionist claims. 
The 'unity argument' frowns on the proliferation of new 
states. Impliedly, it would seem to suggest that the more states there 
are in Africa, the more difficult it would be for them to unite and 
95. Quoted inljalaye, "Was Biafra at any time a State in Inter-
national Law?", A.J.I.L., Vol. 65 (1971), 556. 
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vice versa. One only needs to pount out that, the existence of too 
many states has never been listed as one of the impediments to African 
unity. Language barriers, disparities in economic development, the 
personal suspicions of leaders and political instability have often 
been listed as the main problems. However these could pose impediments 
to unite two states just as they would to the fifty-one states of 
Africa or any number of states that may emerge. 
For instance, military intervention in Syria contributed signi-
ficantly to the break-up of the United Arab Republic which had a member-
95 
ship of two. The overthrow of Milton Obote by Amin and emphasis on 
the development of Tanzania which was the least developed in the East 
African community led to the eventual disintegration of the latter. The 
community had a membership of three. The Ghana, Guinea, Mali Union 
collapsed with the overthrow of President Nkrumah of Ghana and Modibo 
97 
Keita of Mali. 
The rational basis for the African objection to post-colonial 
self-determination is faulty as we have indicated. However, this 
in itself does not affect the validity of any rules of customary 
international law that may have evolved in the region as a result of 
the state practice on the issue. We have noted earlier that in 1964 
the OAU members adopted a resolution pledging their respect for pre-
existing colonial boundaries. The resolution reinforces the political-
ly-based objections to post-colonial self-determination. The question 
is, does the 1964 resolution constitute a valid source of law on 
African boundaries, the uniform respect for which consequently creates 
customary international law against post-colonial self-determination? 
96. Directory on North Africa and Middle East (Europa, 1978-79), 289-290, 
97. On the problem of African Integration see generally Hoskyns, 
"Pan Africanism and Integration" in Hazlewood (ed.), African 
Integration (1967), chapter lo, and other works therein. 
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As a rule, it is doubtful whether OAU resolutions have any legal 
98 
effect in international law. This is not to deny that the resolu-
tions of international organizations play a significant role in the 
99 
creation of international law. Resolutions of international organi-
zations in themselves are not creative of law. They are therefore not 
legally binding unless they are repeated consistently to provide a 
basis for custom or they embody existing rules of law. In the latter 
situations however, the binding basis of the rule would not be the 
100 
resolutions but the pre-existing law. 
In the specific case of the 1964 OAU resolution, the rule on 
boundaries "coincides with the hitherto generally accepted view that 
frontiers do not 'lapse' when decolonization or secession takes place". 
This view itself is premised on the general practice of the United 
Nations by which the latter identifies self-determination units by their 
102 
existing colonial boundaries. In international law, boundaries, 
once established, assume a dispositive character. However, there is no 
evidence to suggest that the United Nations' practice is based on this 
rule or any particular rule of international law. In fact, given the 
evidence of the organization's practice, it is correct to suggest that 
in the delimitation of self-determination units, it feels itself bound 
by a rule of commonsense and expediency rather than by any rule of law. 
In the author's opinion, the United Nations' practice of identifying self-
determination units by pre-existing colonial boundaries therefore lacks 
98. See however Tiewul, "Relations between the United Nations and 
the OAU in the Settlement of Secessionst Disputes",Harvard Int'l, 
Law Journ., Vol.16 (1975-76), 259,275-76. See also Cervanka, 
The OAU and its Charter (1969), 45. 
99. On the legal implications of the resolutions of international 
organizations see Tunkin, Theory of International Law (W.Butler 
translation)(1974), 173-8. Greig, International Law (1976),22-23. 
100. See the discussion in this regard at page 17, supra, and the 
authorities cited therein. 
101 Brownlie, African Boundaries (1979),11. 102. Page 29, supra. 
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the support of the necessary op%nio Qur%s required to make it a rule 
of customary international law. The 1954 resolution can consequently 
not derive any depth of legality from United Nations' practice. 
There is however one convincing argument in favour of the resolu-
tion. Since it has become the rule of conduct of a majority of African 
states, it provides the basis for a rule of regional customary inter-
national law binding on those states which have unilaterally declared 
their acceptance of the status quo as at the time of independence. 
The resolution, in effect, provides the basis of a regional customary 
103 law rule similar to the ut% possidetis doctrine in the Latin Americas. 
Consequently, it could be said that a consistent rejection of post-
colonial self-determination partly founded on respect for the "colon-
ial boundaries rule" would constitute a valid basis for the emergence 
of a regional customary law rule on the issue. 
African responses to actual cases of post-colonial self-determina-
tion have sometimes been contradictory. On the one hand, the OAU has 
been known to take the view that issues of self-determination claims 
in its members states are matters within the domestic jurisdiction. 
On the other hand, it has unreservedly condemned some post-colonial 
claims. During the Katanga crisis, the OAU had not been formed, however, 
104 
African states collectively rejected the secession. In the case of 
103. The principle of uti possidetis laid down the rule that the 
boundaries of the newly established states (i.e. the Latin 
American Republics) would be the frontiers of the Spanish pro-
vinces or colonies which they v/ere succeeding. See the Columbia-
Venezuela Award, 1 U.N. R.I.A.A. 2(1922). See also the trans-
lation in A.J.I.L., Vol. 16, 428. 
104. There was however a division among the African States as to how 
best the situation could be resolved. While "militant states" 
led by Ghana, Guinea and the United Arab Republic called for 
outright U.N. intervention to crush the secession, "moderate 
states" led by the Ivory Coast and Nigeria urged national recon-
ciliation. (For samples of the trend of arguments in the 
United Nations, see Yearbook of the United Nations (1961), 
58 seq.) . 
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Biafra, despite the initial determination that the issue was one of 
domestic jurisdiction, the OAU later condemned it. it is however 
significant to note that notwithstanding the collective action, four 
African states, Tanzania, Gabon, the Ivory Coast and Zambia recognized the 
Biafran claims. In the case of the Sudan, the OAU did not condemn nor 
support the self-determination claims made by the South. It, however, 
supervised the settlement which was negotiated between the Sudanese 
107 
government and the secessionists m 1972. in more recent times, the 
OAU has objected to the secessionist efforts in the Shaba Province of 
108 
the Congo. But m stark contrast to those responses, the organiza-
tion has declined to discuss the issues of Eritrea, the Ogaden, and 
the Tigrinyan claims in Ethiopia on the grounds that these cases are 
109 
domestic issues. Arguably, the non-interventionist approach of the 
organization constitutes a negative response to post-colonial claims 
because it favours the parent state which can then employ any method 
within its means to stifle the claims. 
VJe can make the following conclusions on the African practice: as a 
rule, African states (as reflected in the practice of the OAU) are 
opposed to post-colonial self-determination claims for policy consider-
ations. Even though the rational basis of such considerations seem 
105. Paragraph V of the resolution adopted by the Fourth Summit 
meeting of the Heads of State of the OAU held in Kishasha 
(Sept. 1967), stated quite clearly that the organization 
recognized the situation as an internal affair, the solution 
of which (was) the responsibility of the Nigerians themselves. 
(See Brownlie, Basic Documents on African Affairs (1971), 354). 
106. Paragraph (iii) of the 1967 resolution {ibid.). 
101. See Badal, "The Rise and Fall of Separatism in Southern Sudan", 
in The Politics of Separatism, Collected Seminar Papers, Univers-
ity of London Institute of Commonwealth Studies, 85-99, particu-
larly at 90. 
108. The African Research Bulletin (1977), 4348C-4350D (1978), 
4891B-4964B. 
109. Sudanow (August 1978), Col. 2, 6. 
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diobious, the consistent negative practice of the OAU membership has 
evolved into a regional rule of customary international law on post-
colonial self-determination. However the restrained support for Biafra 
by a few African States during the Nigerian civil war seems to suggest that 
at least to some states (albeit few) the prohibition of post-colonial 
self-determination is not an absolute rule and that they may be prepared 
to look at each claim on its own merits and within the context of its 
peculiar circumstances. 
THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW RECOGNIZED BY CIVILIZED NATIONS 
There has been considerable debate as to what is meant by the 
phrase "general principles of law". A comprehensive survey of the dif-
ferent definitions of the phrase is beyond the scope of this work. For 
our purposes it is considered sufficient to note that a majority of 
jurists support the view that the general principles of law comprise 
those rules of national law "which constitute a reservoir of principles 
which an international judge is authorized...to apply in an internat-
ional dispute, if their application appears relevant and appropriate 
in the different context of inter-state relations". As Lord Asquith 
noted in the Abu Dhabi Arbitration, they are the rules that relate to 
"the good sense and common practice of the generality of civilized 
nations". They are consequently rules "inherent in and common to" I! 
the legal systems of most,,if not all, states. The question then is. 
110. Waldock, "General Course on Public International Law",Hague 
Recueil, Vol, 106 (1962-11), 54. See also the views expressed 
by Lord McNair in the South-West Africa Case, I.C.J. Reports 
(1950), 148. 
111. I.C.L.Q. (1952),247,251; Int.L.Reports, Vol. 18 (1951), 144. 
For a detailed treatment of the "general principles of law" 
see Gutteridge, Bin Cheng and Adamkiewicz, "The Meaning and 
Scope of Article 38(1)(C) of the Statute of the International 
Court of Justice", Transactions, Vol. XXVIII 
(1953), 125-134. 'Yun^ln,Theory of International Law (Butler 
translation 1974), 190-203; Greig, International Law (1976), 
31-38. See also The Diversion of Water from the Meuse Case, 
(contd) 
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are there any rules of law inherent in the legal systems of States 
that recognize a right of self-determination in the post-colonial 
context? Apart from the very debatable exception of the regime of 
natural law principles, the answer to the question is negative. There is 
no general principle of law common to all nations that permits sections 
of the populations to exercise a right of self-determination at will. 
We have indicated that the regime of natural law principles could 
be a possible exception. The principles of natural law, natural justice 
or 'natural equity' are recognized by and are inherent in the legal 
system of most states. Some early natural law philosophers conceded 
a right to civil resistance and to secession to a section of a state's 
population under certain conditions. They viewed each individual as 
possessed of inalienable or indefeasible rights which he retained upon 
his entry in society. In the event of oppression at the hands of 
authority, the individuals could assert their inalienable rights in 
112 
concept and institute a resistance against the oppressive authority. 
111. (contd) P.C.I.J. Reports Series A/B No. 70 (1937), 75; The 
Corfu Channel Case, I.C.J. Reports (1949), particularly at 22. 
112. Vattel, for instance, argued that a group could abolish its 
government in the event "of clear and glaring wrongs" to the people. 
He cites an example of such wrongs as "when a prince for no appar-
ent reason attempts to take away our life or deprive us of things 
without which life would be miserable" (Vattel, The Law of Nations 
or the Principles of Natural Law, Bk. I, Chapt.4, §54 (C.Fenwick 
translation 1916). Hugo Grotius also maintained that even though 
resistance to civil authority is generally not*permissible it 
could be excused where a minority suffer oppression under a given 
government ( Grotius, De Jure Ac Pads Tres., Chapt.6, §4, 7(4). 
(Kelsey translation 19651; Locke also argued that the power of 
government is "limited to the public good of the Society. It is 
the power that hath no other end butpreservation, and therefore 
can never have a right to destroy, enslave or designedly to impover-
ish the Subjects". Consequently, where governmental authority fails 
to serve these ends and there is thus a long train of abuses, 
prevarications and artifices then "the Body of the People or any 
single Man" may take steps to save the situation (Locke, Two 
Treatises of Government, Vol.ll (Laslett translation 1960), 
Sections 135-225. See generally also the works of Spinoza,"A Theologi-
cal Political Treatise", in Vol. I, The Chief Works of B. de 
Spinoza (R. Elwes translation 1887), 10. 
169, 
A major difficulty with the natural law thesis is that its appli-
cation to the modern state system is simply incongruous. The medieval 
philosophies of natural law were propounded at a time when the unified 
113 
state as we know it today did not exist. In any case, the medieval 
thesis of natural rights emphasized the inalienable rights of citizens 
to civil resistance which could well be distinct from the right to 
114 
exercise self-determination within an independent state. 
The American and French revolutions, which, as we have indicated, 
were the earliest manifestations of the will of the governed, embodied 
principles of natural law. Furthermore, in contemporary times aspects 
of natural law principles are inherent in the notion of human rights. 
However no matter how one construes the modern concept of human rights 
and the relevance of natural law tenets to the act of government, there 
is nothing that suggests that their inherent principles as recognized 
i 
by states today allow a right of post-colonial self-determination. This 
does not of course prejudice the issue as to whether it is desirable 
to use human rights and natural law principles as the policy basis for 
113. Page 2, supra. See also the North American Dredging Company 
Case in which it was argued that; 
"The law of nature may have been helpful, some 
three centuries ago...and the conception of inalienable 
rights of men and nations may have exercised a 
salutory influence, some one hundred and fifty years 
ago on the development of modern democracy...; but... 
(it) cannot be used as substitute(s) for... positive 
international law, as recognised by nations and govern-
ments through their acts and statements."(R.I.A.A.,Vol.4(1926) ,26) 
But see the view of Fitzmaurice that the notion of 
the general principles of law inherently involves natural 
law which is still valid,{Symbolae Verzijl 22). 
114. Buchheit, Secession, 55. 
115. Pages A-b,, supra. 
116. D'Entreves, Natural Law: An Introduction to Legal Philosophy 
(8th ed.), (1964), Chapter III. 
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recognizing a right of self-determination in the post-colonial context 
117 m the event of severe oppression. 
JUDICIAL DECISIONS 
The most significant judicial decision which dealt directly with 
the issue of self-determination in a non-colonial context was that of 
the Aaland Islands Case. At the Paris Peace Conference, the people of 
the Aaland Islands, who were under the jurisdiction of Sweden, made a 
formal request to be annexed to Sweden. They based their request "on 
the ground of the right of peoples to self-determination as enunciated 
by President Wilson". The request was supported by Sweden on the 
same basis. Finland on the other hand took the view that the request 
of the Aaland Islands people was one within its domestic jurisdiction 
119 
and with which neither Sweden nor any other entity could interfere. 
The League Council subsequently sought an advisory opinion on the issue 
from an International Commission of Jurists. 
In the opinion, the Commission noted inter alia that "positive 
International Law does not recognize the right of national groups as 
such to separate themselves from the State of which they form(ed) part 
by the simple expression of a wish, any more than it recognize(d) the 
120 
right of other States to claim such a separation" . In another report 
117. Page 196^, infra. 
118. See Foreign Relations of the United States-. The Paris Peace 
Conference, Vol. 4 (1943), 172. 
119. Sweden argued principally that the islands formed a distinct 
geographical unit and that its economic value to Finland was 
negligible. Consequently the secession could not have any 
adverse effect on Finland. It also maintained that the terri-
tory's history and general sentiments of its people favoured 
the Secession (L.N.O.J., Vol. 2 (1921), 703. For a detailed 
documentary account of the dispute see L.N.O.J. Special Supple-
ment (1920). See also Barros, The Aaland Islands Question: 
Its Settlement by the League of Nations (1968). 
120. L.N.O.J., Suppl. 3 (1920), 5. 
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to the League Council, a Commission of Rapporteurs supported this view 
and further stated that: 
to concede to minorities either of language or 
of religion or any fractions of a population, 
the right of withdrawing from the community to 
which they belong, because it is their wish or 
their good pleasure would be to destroy order and 
stability within States and to inaugurate anarchy 
in international life. It would be to uphold a 
theory incompatible with the very idea of the 
State as a territorial and political entity. 121 
Despite their objections to claims of self-determination by 
sections of a sovereign state, both the Commission of Jurists and 
Rapporteurs did not state their prohibitions in absolute terms. The 
Commission of Jurists noted that its opinion did not prejudge the issue 
as to whether a manifest and continued abuse of sovereign power to the 
detriment of a section of the population of a State which could give 
rise to an international dispute was necessarily confined to domestic 
122 jurisdiction. The Commission of Rapporteurs on the other hand was 
quite unequivocal. It noted that the right of a minority to separate 
from its parent community could be permitted as a "last resort when 
the State lacks either the will or the power to enact and apply just 
and effective guarantees to protect the rights of the disaffected 
123 
minority". 
In modern times, no international tribunal has been presented with the 
issue of post-colonial self-determination directly. The I.C.J. however 
124 dealt with a related issue in the Northern Camerouns Case. After 
the plebiscite that joined Northern Camerouns to the Republic of Nigeria, 
121. The Aaland Islands Question, Report to the Council of the 
League of Nations by the Commission of Rapporteurs, League 
Doc. B.F. 21/68/105(1921). For a commentary on the decisions 
on the Aaland Islands question, see Gregory, "The Neutralization 
of the Aaland Islands", A.J.I.L., Vol.17 (1923), 63. 
122. Note 120, supra. 
123. Note 121, supra. 
124. I.C.J. Reports (1963), 15. 
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the State of Camerouns brought an action at the I.C.J, against the 
United Kingdom. The basis of the action was that as former administ-
ering power of the Trust Territory, the United Kingdom had failed to 
honour its obligations under the Trusteeship Agreement in respect of 
the territory by not ensuring an appropriate level of political edu-
cation. In the view of the State of Camerouns, the failure had accounted 
for the option by the Northern Camerouns to be integrated with Nigeria. 
In its submission to the I.C.J, the State of Camerouns admit-
ted that it could not ask for a restitutio ad integrum having the 
effect of non-occurrence of the union with Nigeria since the integration 
was a fait accompli. it however asked for "a finding...of the 
breaches of the Trusteeship Agreement committed by the Administering 
Authority". The Court decided by a majority that any "judgment which 
(it) might pronounce would be without object" because it had not been 
125 
asked to redress the alleged injustice or award reparation of any kind. 
The Court consequently declined to adjudicate on the merits of the case. 
The adjudication on the merits would have inevitably touched on 
the issue as to whether after a decision to exercise self-determination 
by integration, the integrating unit and indeed any other party 
can request a review of the decision. We have noted that the 
State of Camerouns conceded in its submissions that it could not 
ask for a restitutio ad integrum. In other words, it admitted 
that once a community decides to be incorporated into a state, the 
exercise of self-determination assumes the effect of res judicata. 
It (i.e. the State of Camerouns) could consequently not seek a review 
of the decision which would involve a return to the status quo ante 
or the abolition with the union with Nigeria in its favour. The Court 
neither supported nor rejected this admission since it was not asked 
125. Id., 132. 
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to deal with it in the first place. The issue as to whether self-
determination, once exercised can be reviewed or not in respect of an 
integrating community was therefore left open. 
In summary, the issue as to whether there is a right of self-de-
termination in the post-colonial context has rarely been dealt with by 
international tribunals. In the only directly relevant decision of 
the Aaland Islands Case one finds an express exclusion of the right in 
international law,except as a last resort in cases where the state 
fails to provide adequate quarantees for a section of its community. 
THE WRITINGS OF PUBLICISTS 
The I.C.J. Statute lists the writings of publicists as one of the 
subsidiary means which may be used by the Court in determining rules of 
law. However, it is important to emphasize that even though they might 
be influential, the writings of publicists do not create international 
law. They are not in themselves sources of law in the strictest 
sense. They are only- evidentiary of the existing practice of states 
126 
and a reflection of the state of the law at a given point m time. 
On the issue of post-colonial self-determination, there is 
hardly a consensus among publicists. One school of thought supports 
the view that once exercised by a people, self-determination becomes a 
fait accompli and assumes the effect of res judicata. By implication, 
the principle can be applicable to a state once only. It can therefore 
not be claimed later by sections of the state. Emerson, the leading 
exponent of this school,therefore concludes that "with the great current 
exception of decolonization", there is hardly any room for self-deter-
127 
mination in the sense of the attainment of independent statehood. 
126. See generally Parry, The Sources and Evidences of International 
Law (1965), 103-105; Greig, International Law (1976), 47-48; 
Schwarzenberger, International Law (i), 36-37; Brownlie, 
Principles, 25-26. 
127. Emerson, "Self-Determination", A.J.I.L., Vol. 65, 1971, 465. See 
(contd) 
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Similarly, Van Dyke takes the view that self-determination only 
applies to colonial peoples and has no relevance to the post-colonial 
context. In his opinion, if such a restrictive interpretation is 
adopted, "the United Nations and its various members have a better 
chance of avoiding involvement in efforts to redraw boundaries over 
128 
much of the world". 
In the view of Ofuatey-Kojoe, the right should be made to apply 
effectively to all subject peoples "whether they be colonies, ethnic 
129 
minorities or religious minorities". He, however, concedes the 
possible difficulties in expanding the scope of the principles: "So far 
as the right of self-determination includes the right for secession, 
the states will resist the notion of self-determination for internal 
130 
minorities . 
Roslyn Higgins on the other hand maintains that the extent and 
scope of self-determination is still open to debate. However, a minor-
ity in a state could not validly claim the right because in her view, 
"self-determination is the right of the majority within an accepted 
131 
political unit to exercise power". 
In the view of Fawcett, a restruction of self-determination to 
colonial peoples only, would imply erroneously that in the politics of 
the United Nations some people have more right of self-determination 
132 
than others. Fitzmaurice supports this view when he suggests that 
the exclusion of peoples in a post-colonial context to self-determination 
127. (contd) also Sureda, "Self-determination has come to mean emer-
gence as an independent state by getting rid of colonial rule" 
(261). 
128. Van Dyke, Human Rights, the United States and the World 
Community (1970), 102. 
129. Ofuatey-Kojoe, The Principle of Self-Determination in Inter-
national Law (1970), 188. 
130. Ibid. 131. Higgins, op.cit., note 46, 105. 
132. Fawcett, The Law of Nations (1968), 37. 
175. 
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amounts to a double standard and constitutes a juridical absurdity. 
Basing himself on the provisions in paragraph 7 of the Declaration 
* 
on Friendly Relations, Rosentock argues that "a closer examination 
will reward the reader with an affirmation of the applicability of the 
134 principle to peoples within existing states". He is supported in 
this regard by Nayar, Olga Sukovic and Calogeropoulos Stratis. 
Stratis argues that self-determination is related to general human 
rights and freedom. It is in the main a humanitarian rather than a 
political right. Accordingly to limit its application to colonialism 
138 
would amount to distorting the classical meaning of the principle. 
We have indicated earlier that the views of publicists are not in 
themselves creative of law. They are only evidentiary of the sources 
of law. We have also seen from the various sources discussed earlier 
in this chapter that there is no law determining agency that recognizes 
the existence of a right of self-determination in the post-colonial 
context. In view of this, it is submitted that the views expressed by 
Nayar, Rosentock and Stratis are too assertive. They incorrectly tend 
to state as lex lata rules which are at best de lege ferenda. As has 
139 140 
been correctly noted by Akehurst and Umozurike, and as a review of 
133. Fitzmaurice, "The Future of Public International Law", Livre de 
Centenaire, Institut de Droit Int. (1972), 235. 
134. Rosentock, "The Declaration of International Law Concerning 
Friendly Relations; A Survey", A.J.I.L., Vol. 65(1971),713,732. 
135. Nayar, "Self-Determination, The Bangladesh Experience", Revue des 
Droits De L'homme, Vol. 7 (1974), 258, at 260; "Self-Determination 
Beyond the Colonial Context, Biafra in Retrospect", Texas Int'l. 
Law Journ., Vol.10 (1975), 321. 
136. Sukovic, "The Principle of Equal Rights and Self-Determination of 
Peoples" in Sahovic (ed.). Principles of International Law Concern-
ing Friendly Relations and Co-operation (1972), 323, 344. 
137. Stratis, Le Droit Ies veuples, a disposer d'eux-memes, , Etablisse-
ments Emile Bruylant (1973) , 342-8, quoted in Crawford, B.Y.I.L., 
Vol. 47, 449-50.' 
138. See a critique of Stratis' view in Crawford, ibid. 
139. Akehurst, A Modem Introduction to International Law (1982), 53. 
140. Umozurike", 199; Johnson, Self-Determination Within the Community 
of Nations (1957), 61. 
* See Appendix IV for the provisions. 
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sources of law indicates, generally, modern international law neither 
forbids nor permits a right of post-colonial self-determination in 
any certain terms. Thus any views on the legal status of the right of 
self-determination in the post-colonial context must as of necessity 
be normative propositions rather than assertive indications of exist-
ing law. 
Adopting such a normative approach, Ved Nanda suggests that under 
certain conditions, i.e. genocide and gross violations of human rights, 
self-determination in the post-colonial context ought to be permissible 
141 in international law. In the view of Suzuki, where self-determination 
is demanded by a cohesive group with a strong sense of identity under 
such conditions, the support for their claims might be necessary in 
142 
the interest of human dignity. It has also been suggested that the 
fundamental idea underlying the principle appertains to justice for 
the individual. In this light, self-determination might still be rele-
vant to protect claimants subject to exploitation and violations of 
human rights. 
Soviet writers adopt the view that self-determination includes 
the right of separation. However unlike most of their Western counter-
parts, they do not require a quantum of oppression as an antecedent 
condition for separatism. Levin notes: undoubtedly, the most import-
ant element of self-determination is freedom of state secession and 
144 
the formation of an independent state. His view is a 
141. Nanda, "A tragic Tale of Two Cities", A.J.I.L., Vol.56 (1972),321; 
"Self-Determination Under International Law, Validity of Claims 
to Secede", Case W. Res.Journ.Int'l.Law, Vol.13 (1981),257, 275 seq. 
See also the views expressed by Friedlander in "Self-Determination: 
A Legal-Political Inquiry", in Alexander and Friedlander, Self-
Determination: National Regional and Global Dimensions (1980),313. 
142. Suzuki, "Self-Determination and World Public Order", Va.Journ. 
Int'l.L., Vol.16 (1975-76), 790. For similar views see also 
Lung Chu Chen, "Self-Determination as a Human Right", in Reisman 
and Weston (eds.). Towards World Order and Human Dignity (1976),198-251, 
143. Prakash-^inha, "Is Self-Determination Passe?",Columbia J.Trans. 
Law, Vol. 12 (1973), 260. 
144. Levin, "The Principle of Self-Determination in International ^^^^. 
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reflection of the general Soviet position on the scope of the 
145 
principle of self-determination. It is thus supported by other 
, . 146 Soviet jurists. 
There is no uniform opinion among publicists as to the existence 
of a right of self-determination in the post-colonial context. In view 
of the fact that the opinions of publicists are only reflections of 
existing law, the differences among them are manifestations of the 
lack of any definite rules on the subject in international law. 
A significant number of authorities take the view that for prag-
matic political considerations there is not and there cannot be a right 
of self-determination in the post-colonial context. On the other 
hand, a yet more significant number support the existence of such a 
right. All these views may be valid only insofar as they relate to 
post-colonial self-determination as de lege ferenda. 
CONCLUSION 
A survey of relevant international conventions does not indicate 
any positive recognition for a right of self-determination in 
144. (contd) Law", Sov.Y.B.I.L. (1962) 
145. For a detailed discussion of the Soviet treatment of the principle 
of self-determination see generally: Ginsburg, "Socialist Inter-
nationalism and State Sovereignty", Yearbook of World Affairs, 
Vol. 25 (1971), 39; Tunkin, Theory of International Law (W. 
Butler trans. 1974), 718. Goodman, "The Cry of National Libera-
tion: Recent Soviet Attitudes Towards National Self-Determination", 
Int.Org., Vol. 14 (1960); Starushenko, The Principle of National 
Self-Determination in Soviet Foreign Policy (1963); Umozurike, 
151-158; Buchheit, Secession, 121-127. Levkov, "Self-Determina-
tion in Soviet Politics", in Alexander and Friedlander (eds), 
op.cit., note 141, 133-190; Shaheen, The Communist (Bolshevik) 
Theory of National Self-Determination (1956). The concept and 
scope of the principle in Soviet Law is founded on the basic 
principles as propounded by Lenin and elaborated later by 
Stalin, See, Lenin, Selected Works, Vol. 1, Part 2 (1950), 
particularly at 349 seq. ; Stalin, Marxism and the National and 
Colonial Question (1947). 
146. Bokor-SzegO, New States and International Law (1970), 32; 
Tunkin, id. (1974), 68; Shkukuadze, "Marxism-Leninism on 
the Right of Nations to Self-Determination", in The Soviet 
State and the Law (1969), chapter 2. 
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international law. In more specific terms, the United Nations Charter 
and the Human Rights Covenants only provide for self-determination 
in the colonial context. While the Helsinki Accords seem to support 
post-colonial self-determination, the force of the provisions are 
* vitiated by the fact that the Accords do not constitute binding legal 
obligations. On the other hand the Charter of the OAU impliedly rejects 
^ post-colonial self-determination through a commitment to the mainten-
ance of territorial integrity. The African position as reflected in 
the OAU Charter is reinforced by a consistent opposition to separatist 
claims by African states based on an agreement by the states to respect 
their pre-existing colonial boundaries and on other political consid-
erations. The consistency of the African practice as founded on the 
pledge of the States could be said to have provided the basis for a 
valid regional rule of customary international law against post-colon-
ial self-determination. It is however doubtful whether the African 
negative position is absolute in view of the ambiguity of the provis-
ions on self-determination in the African Charter of Human and Peoples 
Rights and in view of the fact that some African States were willing 
to make exceptions for the case of Biafra. 
In contrast to the consistent African practice one sees that the 
general international practice as reflected through the United Nations 
has been far from uniform. The organization was silent on the claims 
of Biafra, but it impliedly admitted the claims of Bangladesh when the 
territory effectively separated itself from the parent state. On the 
other hand, the organization actively assisted the suppression of the 
Katanga claims and has condemned the purported secession of Cyprus in 
recent times. Apart from the inconsistent treatment of the cases, 
the response of the United Nations in each was not based on any existing 
international law rule against post-colonial self-determination. 
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In all, the practice of the organization neither supports nor rejects 
the existence of the right as a matter of law. 
One searches in vain for any general principles of law recognized 
by the legal system of independent States that permit post-colonial 
self-determination. On the other hand, there are no existing principles 
that prohibit such claims. With regards to judicial decisions, the 
most relevant and direct one is the Aaland Islands Case which seemed 
to support the right but only as a last resort or the very exceptional 
circumstances where a section of a state's population is deprived 
of the state's protection. As a rule however, the decision unequi-
vocally rejected the existence of the right of self-determination for 
peoples in a non-colonial context. 
With the exception of the African case and the decision in the 
Aaland Islands dispute, the various law determining agencies we have 
examined do not indicate any recognition or rejection of a right of 
post-colonial self-determination in international law. The African 
practice only relates to a regional situation and is consequently 
restricted. The Aaland Islands decision on the other hand, stands 
isolated without any collaboration from international practice/con-
ventions, the general principles of law or even other judicial decis-
ions. In the light of this, it is submitted that the current inter-
national law position on the status of the right of self-determination 
in the post-colonial era is more or less "neutral". This is to say 
that there are no definite international law rules that forbid or per-
mit a claim to the right. The state of neutrality of the law has been 
reflected in the lack of consensus among jurists on the subject. 
In this chapter we have been concerned with the narrow issue as 
to whether international law recognizes a right of self-determination 
in the post-colonial context, it has been noted that a careful review 
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of the law determining agencies in the international legal system 
reveals that the law neither supports nor rejects the right. The 
conclusion that the law is "neutral" on the question does not prejudice 
the issue as to whether it is desirable or not to recognize the right 
in the post-colonial context. In the next chapter it is intended to 
examine the arguments for and against the recognition of the right. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
THE CASE FOR AND AGAINST THE RECOGNITION 
OF A RIGHT OF SELF-DETERMINATION IN 
THE POST-COLONIAL CONTEXT. 
Is there a need for the recognition of a right of self-dete2rmin-
ation in the post-colonial context? In modern times this question has 
generated considerable debate among international lawyers. On the one 
hand, one school of thought maintains that on the basis of political 
pragmatism and legal considerations, self-determination is simply inad-
missible and in any case undesirable in the post-colonial context. 
To this group self-determination can only be valid within the narrow 
context of decolonization. On the other hand another school of thought 
takes the view that in a world of oppression and general denials of 
human rights, it is both desirable and prudent to recognize the right 
of self-determination in the post-colonial era, as an institution to 
protect the rights and interests of constituent communities of sover-
2 
eign states. To this school the scope of self-determination as an 
1. Writers in this school include: Emerson, "Self-Determination", 
A.J.I.L., Vol. 65 (1971); Van Dyke, Human Rights, the United 
States and the World Community (1970), 102; Sureda, 261; Collins, 
"Self-Determination in International Law : The Case of the Pales-
tinians", Case W.Res.Journ.Int'l.L., Vol. 12 (1980), 137, 152; 
Espiell, The Right of Self-Determination, Implementation of 
United Nations' Resolutions, E/C N.4/Sub.2/405/Rev.l (1980),9. 
2. Nanda, "Self-Determination Outside the Colonial Context, The 
Birth of Bangladesh in Retrospect", Houston Journ.Int'l.L., Vol. 
1 (1979), 71; Carey, "Self-Determination in the Post-Colonial 
Era: The Case of Quebec", A.S.I.L.S. Int'l.L.J., Vol.1 (1977), 
47, 63-66; Prakash-Sinha, "Is Self-Determination Passe'?", 
Columbia J. Trans. Law, Vol. 12 (1973), 260; White, "Self-
Determination: Time for a Re-assessment?", International Law 
Review (1981), 147, Sornarajah, "Internal Colonialism and 
Humanitarian Intervention", Ga.J.Int'l. and Comp.L., Vol. 11 
(1981), 45; Suzuki, "Self-Determination and World Public Order", 
Va.J.Int'l.L., Vol. 16 (11975-76), 790; Lung Chu Chen, "Self-
Determination as a Human Right", in Reisman and Weston (eds), 
Towards World Order and Human Rights (1976), 198. 
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ideal is wider; it embraces all peoples in all territories irrespective 
of whether they are colonies or sovereign states. This school of 
thought sees a relationship between human rights and self-determination 
that necessitates the continued application of the principle. Let 
us examine each side of the debate in detail. 
1. The Case Against Self-Determination in the Post-Colonial 
. Context. 
The Nature of the Principle 
It has been suggested that by its very nature, the principle of 
self-determination is not suitable for application within the frontiers 
of a sovereign state and that, in any case, the principle is not meant 
for peoples who are not under colonial rule. The general tenor of 
this argument is that self-determination is meant to remedy the undes-
irable relationship between an oppressed local population and an oppres-
3 
sive alien, usually white and as represented by a colonial power. 
Consequently, once the alien is removed through an exercise of self-
determination, the principle loses its raison d'etre. It then becomes 
nonsensical to speak of self-determination in the post-colonial context. 
The main drawback of this argument is that it emphasizes subju-
gation by aliens as a necessary precondition for self-deter-
mination. In so doing, it glosses over the role of self-determination 
as an institution aimed at remedying a specific form of human rela-
tionship which is manifested through colonial domination. The focus 
of the principle is on domination as such. The relevance of self-
determination then is not necessarily restricted to patterns of inter-
4 
action involving alien rulers and native ruled. It is true that 
3. Sureda, 231. See also the arguments advanced by Ali Mazrui 
in support of what is usually described as the "pigmentation 
thesis" on self-determination in Mazrui, Towards a Pax Africana 
(1967), 14. 
4. Suzuki, op.cit., note 2, 838. 
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colonialism was largely an institution of alien (usually white) domin-
ation. Consequently the main concern of self-determination in decol-
onization had been on the alien and the specific relationships he 
stood for. However, it needs to be emphasized that decolonization was 
only an aspect of the implementation of the principle and not the sole 
basis of it. Thus the utility of self-determination as a remedial 
right against domination could well extend beyond decolonization. 
Even if one accepts that self-determination concerns only alien 
domination and not domination per se, the relevance of the principle 
in the post-colonial context is not vitiated. The identification of 
a group as alien is the result of that element of human parochialism 
that underlies social behaviour and gives rise to the "us" and "them" 
sentiments associated with human societies. However, the issue as 
to who is an alien is usuall-y relative. In the pre-colonial times, 
the alien, from the point of view of one ethnic group, was anyone 
who did not belong in that community. In the period of colonization 
several ethnic groups which were sometimes very distinct and regarded 
each other as aliens were brought together to form the basis of 
colonial administration. The common colonial experience provided a 
new basis of identification among such groups. But on the other hand, 
the colonial experience also 'created' a new alien symbolized by the 
colonial ruler. Thus in the context of decolonization the alien was 
defined not in terms of who belonged to the ethnic group, but by refer-
ence to the distinctiveness of the political identity of all colonial 
peoples in relation to their European rulers. 
It is possible that after decolonization, some distinct ethnic 
groups may revert to their pre-colonial parochialism to regard other 
constituent groups of the same state as aliens. In the post-colonial 
era, the depth of this parochialism could be accentuated where there 
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are obvious disparities in the distribution of national wealth, poli-
tical power and other community privileges. In such instances the 
disaffected group may regard itself as being dominated by the pri-
vileged groups in the community. It may subsequently consider itself 
as being under alien domination that requires a remedial action 
5 
through self-determination. In the post-colonial context, the demands 
of such a group cannot be casually dismissed on the grounds that there 
is no identifiable alien and that the very nature of self-determination 
precludes it from claiming the right. 
Peoples as beneficiaries of self-determination excludes 
non-colonial peoples. 
The thrust of this argument is that self-determination is a 
right of peoples. A claim for self-determination therefore presupposes 
that the claimant is a "people". For the purposes of self-determination, 
a people is the collectivity of the residents that make up the nation 
6 
or a self-determination unit. The constituent sections of a state 
can therefore not claim the right severally because in their individu-
ality they are not legitimate beneficiaries. In other words, racial, 
linguistic or other minorities resident in a state have no right of 
self-determination as such. One can therefore not speak of self-deter-
mination in the post-colonial context in the absence of legitimate 
beneficiaries. 
The basic thesis of this argument amounts to a statement of the 
exact scope of self-determination as lex lata and enjoys 
5. ;-iah Chang- uo and Martin, "Toward a Synthesis of Conflict and 
Integration Theories of Nationalism", World Politics,Vol. 27 
(1975), 361; Smith, "Towards a Theory of Ethnic Separatism", 
Ethnic and Racial Studies, Vol. 2 (1979), 21; Birch, "Political 
Integration", World Politics, Vol. 30 (1977), 325. 
6. Pages 29-30, supra. 
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7 juristic support. However it offers little use in the debate on the 
relevance of self-determination in the post-colonial context. For 
one thing, it perceives self-determination as static. Secondly, it 
glosses over the desirability of extending self-determination to minor-
ities and other residents of sovereign states. Let us examine each 
point in detail: 
Admittedly, in the decolonization process, the United Nations 
General Assembly has defined the beneficiaries of self-determination 
only in terms of colonial peoples. This is understandable because in 
that context the beneficiaries of the right must obviously be the resi-
dents of the colonial units. However, to insist on the relevance of 
self-determination to colonial peoples only is to take a static view 
of the principle. Before decolonization, self-determination had been 
applied extensively in Europe. The beneficiaries had been distinct 
nationalities who were non-self-governing. With the emergence of 
colonialism and the subsequent need for decolonization,colonial peoples 
became identified as a new category of beneficiaries. As a result of 
the emphasis of self-determination on decolonization since 1945, 
international lawyers analysing the nature of self-determination have 
tended to dwell only on its relevance to colonial peoples. In so doing 
such analyses have glossed over the essential similarity between the 
relevance of self-determination as applied to minorities and national-
ities in the pre-1945 period on the one hand, and the post-1945 era 
on the other hand. Above all, they have ignored the teleological 
7. Espiell, op.cit., note 1; Cristescu, The Right of Self-Determin-
ation: Historical and Current Development on the Basis of 
United Nations Instruments. E/CN.4/Sub.2/404/Rev.l (1981); 
Caportorti, Study on the Rights of Persons Belonging to the 
Ethnic Religious and Linguistic Minorities.E/CN.4/Sub.2/384/ 
Rev.1(1979),35; Cassesse, "Self-Determination of Peoples" 
in Henkin (ed.). The International Bill of Rights; The Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights (1981), 92. But see Bennet, 
Aboriginal Rights in International Law (1978), 50-2; Fawcett, 
The International Protection of Minorities, M.R.G.Report No.41 
(1979),4-5. See also Article 14 of the Draft International Con-
vention on the Protection of Minorities (1979) cited in Fawcett's 
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dimensions behind self-determination over the years a right which 
has applied mutatis mutandis to nationalities,occupied countries and 
to colonial units to remedy the status of subordination. 
The application of self-determination to these diverse categories 
of beneficiaries underscores the flexibility of the principle. It 
also lends weight to the view that in the post-colonial context, we 
ought to regard self-determination as a dynamic principle applicable 
to different beneficiaries in different circumstances. Just as the 
principle was used to 'correct' cases of political subordination in 
previous stages of its evolution, so can it be applied to similar situ-
ations in the post-colonial context. 
In modern times,the United Nations General Assembly has impliedly 
admitted the dynamic application of self-determination by recognizing 
Q 
the relevance of the principle to Palestinian Arabs and non-white 
9 
races of South Africa subject to apartheid, none of whom are under 
colonial rule. This vitiates any arguments that seek to reject post-
colonial self-detemnination on the grounds that non-colonial peoples 
cannot qualify as beneficiaries. 
Pacta sunt servanda 
In simple terms the doctrine of pacta sunt servanda implies that 
an agreement once made must be observed. The relevance of this con-
tractual concept to the issue of self-determination is that when groups 
of people agree to come together to form a state and subsequently 
exercise the right of self-determination, they impliedly commit them-
selves to stand by their commitment and to remain part of the state. 
8. G.A. Res. 2535B; G.A. Res. 2649; G.A. Res. 2672B; G.A. Res. 2787; 
G.A. Res. 3235. See also Schoenburg, "Limits of Self-Determin-
ation", Israel Yearbook on Human Rights, Vol.6 (1976),91, 102. 
Sureda, 345. 
9. See for instance, G.A. Res. 2396 (XXII); G.A. Res. 2671F 
(XXV). 
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The constituent groups in the state are therefore barred from withdraw-
ing from the association. The theoretical basis of this argument 
is the idea of the "social contract" which views society as the pro-
duct of a contract between either the constituent citizens or the 
constituent citizens on the one hand and the sovereign on the other. 
As a basis for rejecting post-colonial self-determination, the 
doctrine of pacta sunt servanda has numerous difficulties. Firstly, 
it presupposes that the creation of every state is based on a general 
consensus of the citizens and is thus analogous to a contractual 
arrangement. The reality is that in the case of the new states (i.e. 
the former colonies) where the issue of post-colonial self-determina-
tion is of great relevance, the basis of the creation of the state 
could be anything but one of consensus. In many instances, self-
determination was granted to the former colonies despite the expressed 
objections by some of the constituent groups to any association with 
10 
the rest of the community. To deny such groups the right of self-
determination in the post-colonial context on the basis of pacta sunt 
servanda would be ludicrous. 
Secondly, recourse to the maxim of pacta sunt servanda must in 
itself bring into play the related concept of sic rebus stantibus by 
virtue of which, a change in circumstances after assuming a contractu-
al obligation, is considered a legitimate justification for a party 
to demand the modification or abrogation of the terms of the contract. 
By implication, even if one accepts the validity of pacta sunt servanda 
as a bar to the application of post-colonial self-determination, one 
would need to add a vital qualification that this holds good only for 
as long as the conditions on which the claimant community became part 
10. Examples of such groups include the Somalis in Kenya and 
the Turkish Cypriots. See pages 27-28, infra. 
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of the state are not violated. 
Assuming then that the basis of the state is a contractual arrange-
ment, the attendant conditions or terms for membership would include 
the right of each participating section to share in the value pro-
cesses of the community and the right to equal treatment, etc. Where 
these conditions are breached or where there is a radical change in 
the circumstances or conditions under which the claimant "contracted" 
to become part of the state, the right of self-determination could be 
invoked. By its very nature the pacta sunt servanda thesis can not 
impose an absolute bar on post-colonial self-determination. In fact, 
by virtue of the related concept of sic rebus stantibus, the thesis 
impliedly admits the relevance of post-colonial self-determination. 
The Claim that Self-Determination is an Exhaustive and Not a 
Continuing Right, 
A logical extension of the pacta sunt servanda thesis is that 
once a unit or a people exercises self-determination, the right is 
exhausted. Constituent sections of the unit can therefore not seek 
a unilateral application of the principle in the post-colonial context. 
The rationale behind the "once-and-for-all" argument is that if claims 
in the post-colonial context are recognised they could lead to a situ-
ation of indefinite divisibility and balkanization in the existing 
international state system. 
As a bar to post-colonial self-determination, the once-and-for-
11 1-all thesis has no juridical basis. As was indicated earlier, there 
is no definite international law rule that supports the view that once 
self-determination is exercised, it assumes the effect of res judicata. 
Since the 1950s there have been several instances of self-determination 
exercises or claims which undermine the "once-and-for-all" thesis. 
11. Pages 172-173, supra. 
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The United Arab Republic (U.A.R.),for example,was a federation of 
Egypt and Syria, formed in 1958. Syria withdrew in 1961. The federa-
tion was reformed later with Iraq, Syria and Egypt. Iraq and Syria 
12 
withdrew in 1963. Singapore, Saba and Sarawak, were incorporated 
into the Malay Federation in 1963. Singapore withdrew from the arrange-
13 
ment two years later. Similarly Senegal and Mali were federated as 
the Mali Federation in June 1960. Two months later, Senegal withdrew. 
In 1981, following persistent demands for secession by French Canad-
ians (in Quebec), Canada organized a referendum to enable the people 
of the claimant region to decide whether they wanted to continue asso-
ciation with the rest of Canada. The majority cast a positive vote. 
As an international policy prescription, the once-and-for-all 
thesis is objectionable because it ignores the fact that in the post-
colonial era, cases of gross violations of human rights (e.g. genocide) 
could make the restructuring of the relationship between a group and 
its parent community through self-determination desirable. It also 
involves the risk of a value judgment that emphasizes the ideal of 
state stability at the expense of other community values. Stability 
is certainly desirable. However it is not an end in itself. It is a 
14 
prerequisite for the preservation of human rights. To condone 
violations of human rights in order to avoid balkanization or to 
ensure stability would consequently amount to confusing a means with 
12. But see the comments of Ijalaye in "Some Legal Implications 
of the Nigerian Civil War". Proceedings of the First Annual 
Conference of the Nigerian Society of International Law (Lagos 
1959), 70-114, particularly 89-90. 
13. On the Singapore separation see generally Leifer, "Singapore 
Leaves Malaysia", The World Today, Vol. 21 (1955), 361-4. 
Sopice, From Malayan Union to Singapore Separation. Political 
Unification in the Malaysian Region 1945-64 (1974), Chapt. 7, 
183-229. Milne, "Singapore's Exit from Malaysia: The Conse-
quences of Ambiguity", Asian Survey, 6, No. 3 (1966). 
14. See 366-367, infra. 
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an end. 
The rejection of post-colonial self-determination based on the 
fear of balkanization, assumes erroneously that balkanization is dys-
functional in every instance. In plural societies where ethnic 
tensions and animosities are endemic, the right of self-determination 
in the form of regional autonomy or outright secession could be a use-
ful method of resolving ethnic differences. In the case of Nigeria 
for instance, after the abortive Biafran secession, the country's 
elite saw it fit to diffuse ethnic tensions by restructuring the feder-
ation to create twelve autonomous states in the federation. There 
were four states in the federation originally. 
The claim that the application of self-determination in the post-
colonial context would violate the principle of territorial 
integrity. 
We have already discussed the relationship between the principle 
of territorial integrity and the principle of self-determination in 
regard to decolonization. The point in issue here is the relation-
ship between the two principles in the post-colonial context. The 
argument is that as a matter of international law, the operation of 
self-determination must be without prejudice to the territory of an 
existing sovereign state. In other words, since purported claims of 
self-determination in the post-colonial context are bound to affect 
the territorial possessions of the parent states against whom they 
are made, the claims are barred by virtue of the principle of terri-' 
torial integrity. 
As indicated earlier, the relationship between the territorial 
integrity principle and self-determination is expressed in Resolution 
15. Post, "Is there a Case for Biafra?", Int.Affairs, Vol. XLIV 
(1958), 26, 37-39. 
16. pages 13-9A, supra. 
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1514 (XV) and Resolution 2625 (XXV). We have also discussed that the 
provisions of Resolution 1514 (XV) concern specifically the right of 
colonial territories to self-determination in relation to the terri-
torial claims of existing sovereign states. Consequently its provi-
sions on territorial integrity preclude the application of self-deter-
mination in a non-colonial . context. On the other hand. Resolution 
2625 (XXV) addresses the relationship between post-colonial self-deter-
mination and territorial integrity directly. Under paragraph 7 of 
the resolution, respect for the principle of territorial integrity is 
made conditional to states conducting themselves 
in "compliance with the principle of equal rights and self-determina-
tion of peoples". In other words, where a state does not comply with 
these conditions and an aggrieved section of its population subsequent-
ly claim self-determination, one cannot use the territorial integrity 
argument as a bar to the claim. The International Commission of Jurists 
was in support of this view when it observed in its study on The Events 
in East Pakistan (1971) , that paragraph 7 of the resolution is an 
attempt to reconcile the principle of self-determination and the 
principle of territorial integrity. More significantly, the Commission 
also noted that as a rule, a claim of self-determination in the post-
colonial context is impermissible, but this is: 
subject to the requirement that the government 
does represent the whole people without 
distinction. If one of the constituent peoples 
of a state is denied equal rights and is discrimin-
ated against, it is submitted that their full right 
of self-determination will revive. 
The qualifications attached to the territorial integrity principle in 
Resolution 2625 (XXV) undermines any prescription that seeks to bar 
totally self-determination in the post-colonial context on the grounds 
of territorial integrity. 
17. Secretariat of the InternationaLCommission of Jurists, The 
Events in East Pakistan 1971 (1972), 67-68, 69. 
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The "Domino Theory" Argument Against Post-Colonial Self-Determination 
There is the general belief that the recognition of a right of 
self-determination in the post-colonial era is politically undesirable 
because the successful claim by one claimant could have a demonstra-
tion effect on prospective claimants and trigger off a chain reaction 
of claims. This argument is very significant to new states (particu-
larly those of Africa and Asia) which are constantly plagued by tribal-
based separatist claims. We have indicated earlier that in the case 
of Africa for instance, the state as a former colonial unit is made up 
of a cluster of ethnic groups which were brought together during col-
18 
onization. In the post-colonial era, the argument is that,given 
the rather artificial unity between these groups which is in itself 
a source of instability, self-determination constitutes a dangerous 
anachronism. Once exercised by one ethnic group, other groups would 
be encouraged to pursue similar claims. The recognition of self-
determination for one group could therefore have a "domino" effect 
which would lead to the dismantling of the state-system and provide 
19 
the basis for chaos and instability. The converse of the "domino 
theory" effect is that the non-recognition of post-colonial self-
determination and the suppression of one case could deter prospective 
claimants. 
The "domino theory" argument lacks any sound basis. As one 
secessionist leader noted, "a country never disintegrated because 
another one did,..one so-called secession does not necessarily lead to 
20 
another". Despite the secession of Bangladesh, the rest of Pakistan 
is still intact up to this day. Similarly, Singapore's separation 
from the Malay Federation has not resulted in the dismantling of the 
18. Page 160, supra. 
19. Collins, op.cit., note 1, 148. 
20. Ojukwu,. Selected Speeches and Random Thoughts (1959) , 190. 
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rest of Malaysia. 
The "domino theory" assumes that the basis of all post-colonial 
self-determination claims are the same. They are not. Past and pres-
ent cases indicate that while all separatist movements demand self-
determination in one form or the other, the internal dynamics of each 
movement differ from the others. Consequently, the suppression of one 
case would not necessarily discourage future cases as the converse 
of the "domino theory" would imply. In practical terms one sees that 
neither the fiasco of Katanga nor the bloodshed that came with the 
Southern Sudanese abortive secession deterred the Biafran secession 
attempt. The failure of Biafra in itself has not discouraged other 
movements in Eritrea and the Ogaden. In Europe, the futility of 
Basque secessionist efforts is in no way related to the fluctuations 
in the separatist activities of the Croatians or the Corsicans or 
the Catholics of Northern Ireland. 
The Claim that it is Unrealistic to Expect Existing Sovereign States 
to Recognize a Right of Post-Colonial Self-Determination. 
A demand for post-colonial self-determination by a group constitutes 
a rejection of the parent state's authority. At the very least, it 
amounts to a challenge of the continued legitimacy of the state as a uni-
fied entity of which the claimant forms a part and a manifest demand for 
a change in the status quo. In a world system based on the unified 
state, demands for the recognition of a right of post-colonial self-
21. Lyon, "Separatism and Secession in the Malaysian Realm, 1948-65", 
in The Politics of Separatism. Collected seminar Papers, No. 19, 
University of London Inst, of Commonwealth Studies (1974-75), 
69, the simply executed and the peaceable separation of Singa-
pore from Malaysia in August 1955 at least challenges a 
currently fashionable orthodoxy by suggesting that dangers 
and costs of "balkanization...have been exaggerated as against 
the costs involved in forcing different peoples to co-exist 
unwillingly as co-members of one sovereign state" (75). 
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determination would thus appear politically objectionable to the 
existing states. It has therefore been suggested that it is unreali-
stic to advocate a recognition of the right because, as a rule, govern-
ments have been very reluctant to support it. More significantly, it 
has been argued that 
except in the rarest of circumstances, no state will 
accept the principle that at their own choosing, some 
segment of its own population will be free to secede 
either to become independent or to join a neighbour. 
Similarly, no organization is in the least likely to 
lay down the law that its members must yield if they 
are challenged by an internal demand for self-determination. 
As a counter to this argument, it is sufficient to point out that 
historically, the reluctance of states to admit self-determination 
claims of any kind has never resolved the problems posed by such claims. 
The phenomena of separatist claims is quite divorced from the negative 
responses of the states. As Walker Connor notes: "the appeal and 
power of self-determination are quite independent of considerations 
of what a government ought to do or what it is up to do. It is 
granted that governments...will continue to resist their minorities" 
requests for independence, but in such cases it is expected that the 
State's existence will be increasingly challenged by secessionist-
23 
minded groups". The situation would continue to be like that unless 
prescriptions are formulated to regulate claims and denials of the 
right of self-determination in the post-colonial period. 
There is on the other hand a school of thought that maintains 
that the formulation of prescriptions to regulate self-determination 
in the post-colonial context is unnecessary in the light of objective 
realities. To this school, what determines the validity of a claim is 
22. Emerson^ "Self-Determination", A.J.I.L., Vol. 65 (1971), 464. 
See also Collins, op.cit., note 1, 148; Ofuatey Kojoe, The 
Principle of Self-Determination in International Law (1970), 188, 
23. Connor, "Self-Determination - The New Phase", World Politics, 
Vol. 20 (1967), 31, 48. 
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not an issue of legal rights; it is the success of the 
24 
separatist action itself. Similarly, it has been argued that the 
revolutionary character of secession derives its legitimacy only from 
25 -, , its success, and that in a separatist conflict, 
"whatever the outcome of the struggle, it will be accepted as legal in 
the eyes of international law". 
This school shies away from legal analysis involved in separat-
ist claims. Its approach is unacceptable because it adopts a non 
liquet position and implicitly condones self help situations. It also 
dispenses with the desirability of determining the legitimacy of the 
separatist issues on legal merits within appropriately formulated 
regulations. The severe shortcomings of this approach are further 
noted by Buchheit: 
It has no predictive value...The international jurist 
can act only as an historian chronicling instances of 
valid claims of self-determination after they succeed 
but unable to offer an opinion concerning their legiti-
macy before they reach, or fail to reach, fruition. This 
approach seems to preclude legal or rational analysis 
altogether, with the final judgement left to an often 
bloody trial by combat. ^  
2" The Case for Self-Determination in the Post-Colonial Context 
Apart from the several defects in the case against self-deter-
mination in the post-colonial context, there are cogent arguments in 
favour of its application. Before we consider these arguments, it 
needs to be emphasized that when we say that there is a case for post-
24. See for instance, the thesis of Bos, "Self-Determination by 
the Grace of History", Netherlands Tihdschrift Voor Inter-
national Recht, Vol. 15 (1968), 362,362. See also Johnson, 
Self-Determination Within the Community of Nations (1967), 50. 
25. Kaur, "Self-Determination in International Law", I.J.I.L., 
Vol. 10 (1970), 479, 493.' 
26. Akehurst, A Modem Introduction to International Law 
(1982), 53. 
27. Buchheit, Secession, 45. 
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colonial self-determination, we are not implying that every ethnic 
group, because it is distinct from other groups in the community, 
should be granted self-determination simply because it demands it. 
What is rather implied is that it is desirable, in view of political 
and legal considerations,to examine specific self-determination claims, 
each on its own merits, within the context of formulated regulations 
with a view to seeking a peaceful resolution to the conflicts such 
claims generate. A fortiori by saying there is a case for self-deter-
mination we do not mean that international law recognizes 
it as a norm. What we mean is that as a matter of policy, the formu-
lation of international legal prescription on the issue is 
desirable for a number of reasons. Let us examine these reasons. 
(i) There is a relationship between self-determination and 
the fundamental human rights of the individual 
Self-determination is basically a community right. However, 
the ideal it represents, that is, the right of a people to determine 
their own political, social and economic destiny,relates to justice 
for the individual in the community. In modern times, the individual 
is recognized as a legitimate subject of international law. In essent-
ial terms,the individual is at the centre of international or community 
organization. The ideal of self-determination is to ensure the appro-
priate environment through which the individual as a member of his 
community, can participate in the value processes of that community. 
The individual's participation is in itself an important pre-
requisite for the respect or preservation of his human rights. It 
is founded on the basic democratic principle that the consent of the 
governed is the basis of legitimate government. Hence the General 
Assembly resolution that self-determination is a necessary pre-condition 
28 for the enjoyment of human rights. 
28. G.A. Res. 637A - VII (1952) 
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Where the individual's access to participation in the value 
processes is removed by virtue of his identification with a subgroup 
in the community, there is wisdom in advocating for a policy pres-
cription that seeks to restore the basis of his participation and in 
effect to provide the necessary conditions for the enjoyment of his 
human rights. The desirability of recognizing self-determination in 
such circumstances arises from the need to "focus on the essential re-
lationship between the principle...and human rights to assert the 
essential nature of self-determination as a right that justifies the 
29 
remedying of a deprivation by restoring self-government". In other 
words, within the post-colonial context, the recognition of self-
determination is desirable as a remedial technique for dealing with 
deprivations of human rights. 
(ii) Self-determination in the post-colonial context is a recurrent 
conflict generating phenomenon which requires the formulation 
of appropriate prescriptions 
On the basis of past and present trends, it could be said that 
separatism and nationalist movements generally are on the ascendancy 
and the concept of self-determination has proved to be a permanent 
fixture on which separatists would rely for international support. One 
also sees that conflict-generating separatist claims have become 
recurrent phenomena. As one author observes, "it has happened in the 
past. It is happening now. And there is every indication that it will 
30 
continue to happen in future". There is therefore a great need for 
29. Ofuatey Kojoe, op.cit., note 22, 190. 
30. Id., 5. See also Ali Mazrui, "Violent Contiguity and the 
Politics of Retribalization in Africa", Journ.Int.Aff., Vol. 
XXIII (1969), 104; Connor, op.cit., note 23, "If the 
past and present are instructive, it can be expected that cul-
tural and political consciousness will spread with increased 
communications and the ethnic hodgepodges that are Asia and Africa 
will produce a host of new demands for the redrawing of poli-
tical borders" (46). 
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establishing practical institutional mechanisms to regulate the appli-
cation of self-determination to the separatist groups. The inter-
national community could choose to ignore the claims of such groups 
and insist on a blanket disapproval of self-determination. There is 
however past and present evidence to suggest that such a position 
would be dysfunctional. As far back as 1925, Arnold Toynbee stressed 
this point when he observed that the controversy about self-determination 
is one of those great permanent forces that have to be 
reckoned with in human affairs; in our historical 
retrospective we have already taken the measure of the 
havoc which it has caused; it is evident that the 
recurrent outbreak of the struggles have been as 
violent as they have been, just because the problem 
has usually been left out of account or dismissed as 
insoluble. ^1 
In recent times separatist conflicts in Cyprus, Eritrea and Ogaden 
have vindicated the view of Toynbee. The establishment of acceptable 
prescriptions for post-colonial self-determination would help to 
regulate such claims. Since separatists normally rely on internation-
al support, internationally accepted formulations could provide a 
standard of legitimacy for assessing the validity of a claim. They 
could also minimize the use of self-help measures to support or dismiss 
claims and consequently reduce recurrent cases of separatist-based 
conflicts-
CONCLUSION 
In a world based on the unified state system, suggestion for 
the recognition of self-determination in the post-colonial context very 
readily attracts political and legal objections. The objections arise 
from a fear of what may be described as the spectre of post-colonial 
self-determination. The principle in this context is considered as an 
institution with a great potential for disintegration. The pre-occupation 
31. Toynbee,"Self-Determination", .Quaterly Review^ Vol. 243 
(April 1925),327. 
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with the spectre tends to blind advocates of the non-recognition of 
post-colonial self-determination from appreciating the defects in 
their position and the need to assess the potential of post-colonial 
self-determination with a view to ascertaining whether it is capable 
of a functional role or not- Above all, in their fear of the spectre 
they tend to advocate the primacy of the unified state system over 
other community values for the realization of which the state exists. 
In other words, they confuse the state system as a means,with the ends 
of international organization. 
On the other hand, there is much to be said for a case for self-
determination in the post-colonial context. This is not to deny that 
there is some basis for concern in recognizing the principle in this 
context. What is rather meant is that when the balance is drawn between 
the case for and against post-colonial self-determination, there 
emerges ample justification for supporting the case for it. 
In supporting a case for post-colonial self-determination, one 
must admit that it entails the risk of opening a Pandora's box, parti-
cularly in plural societies. However, the awareness of this risk only 
heightens the need to draw a proper balance between the rights of the 
individual and his subgroup in the community and the requirements of 
the existing unified state system which provides the vehicle for the 
realization of the interests and goals of the community at large. 
Support for post-colonial self-determination entails other specific 
problems. For instance, what conditions must precede a claim to make 
it admissible, what criteria must be used to ascertain these conditions, 
who must decide on the existence of these conditions and who would be 
the admitting authority? Would attempts to regulate the right not 
conflict with the norms of non-intervention? These issues will be 
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discussed later in this work. For the moment let us review the 
nature and types of post-colonial self-determination claims that 
necessitate the formulation of the prescriptions on the subject. 
